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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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WORLDWIDE REPORT
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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S KARPOV BRIEFS NEWSMEN ON SDI, ABM ISSUES

PM301941 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Nov 86 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report under the rubric "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center":
"To Eliminate the Nuclear Threat"]

[Excerpt] A press conference on problems of SDI, the ABM Treaty, and strategy of offensive arms was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center 26 November for Soviet and foreign journalists. Participating in it were V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament; Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; Academician B.V. Raushenbakh; and B.D. Pyadyshev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration.

V.P. Karpov made a statement at the press conference. He said: A unique opportunity was opened up in Reykjavik to enter the 21st century without the strategic offensive arms which the USSR and the United States now possess and, perhaps, also to complete by the beginning of the century the total elimination of nuclear weapons on the earth, as proposed in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January this year. The door to a nuclear-free world set ajar through the Soviet side's efforts was closed by Washington's efforts, and the SDI program was the chief lever in applying those efforts.

The U.S. Administration is now trying to depict the matter as though SDI were fully compatible with the ABM Treaty because, it says, it envisages only research work and does not yet set the task of deploying ABM systems that go beyond the ABM Treaty. But if this is so, why then did the U.S. president reject in Reykjavik the proposal put to him to confine work in the sphere of space ABM defense to laboratories for a 10-year period, and why was he opposed to adopting a pledge not to test elements of space ABM systems in space? In an attempt to blame someone else, they accuse us by saying that the Soviet Union went to Reykjavik knowing in advance that President Reagan would not abandon SDI, and this was the only reason why we linked our proposed program for the elimination of nuclear weapons with the president's abandonment of the SDI program. But the Soviet side did not ask the president to abandon the SDI program in the form in which he officially proclaimed it, that is, the research program. Therefore, the president's rejection of the

Soviet proposal was evidence for us that the declared aim of the SDI program and the actual substance of the work which is being done and will be done in the United States to implement it certainly do not correspond to each other. The intention is obviously not to erect any obstacles in the way of implementing SDI and to use it as a means of whipping up the arms race and as a channel for experiments in the sphere of creating [sozdaniye] new, space arms which, apart from anything else, will play a significant role in strengthening the U.S. strategic offensive potential.

So, SDI is by its very essence in glaring contradiction with both the spirit and the letter of the ABM Treaty. And Washington obviously understands this, if you bear in mind that in Reykjavik President R. Reagan proposed signing a treaty to replace the ABM Treaty simultaneously with a reduction in the number of strategic arms.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR STRATEGIC FORCES CHIEF ON ANTI-SDI MEASURES

AU011417 Paris AFP in English 1401 GMT 1 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 1 Dec (AFP)--Soviet experts are developing dozens of measures to counter the U.S. Strategic Space Initiative (SDI)--the so-called "Star Wars" space-based missile defense system, the head of the Soviet Union's strategic missile forces said Monday. In an interview published by the semi-official Novosti news agency, General Yuriy Maksimov said the SDI had been developed by Washington as a "first strike weapon." "From a military point of view, a space shield would only be useful if the party that has it attacks first," Gen Maksimov said. With this in mind, Soviet scientists "have already studied dozens of counter-measures which would pose very complex problems to SDI," making Washington's aim of military superiority "illusory," he said. "In any case," added Gen Maksimov, "reprisals would be imminent and terrible."

Among the measures being studied are small space missiles, space mines and other weapons to destroy missiel-launching space stations. Experts are also considering ways of "exhausting" the space-based defense system, by launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) together with "decoy" missiles, or by firing ICBM's with widely varying trajectories, he said. The number of missile warheads could also be increased to sharply reduce the efficiency of the U.S. interception systems, the general added.

Gen Maksimov also said that since the advent of the SALT II arms limitation treaty in June 1979, the Soviet Union had taken out of service 72 ICBM launch pads and 21 heavy bombers. This brought to 540 the number of strategic units dismantled by Moscow under SALT I and II, against 168 dismantled by Washington, he said.

The United States announced last week it planned to exceed the limits of the SALT II Treaty by dispatching its 131st bomber equipped to carry cruise missiles. The U.S. had until last week abided by the terms of SALT II, although the U.S. Senate never ratified the treaty.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: SDI 'MONSTER' WEAKENS U.S. ECONOMY

LD252004 Moscow TASS in English 1915 GMT 25 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, 25 Nov (TASS)--By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

Upholding the SDI program, disgraced at Reykjavik, the U.S. "star warriors" try to present the program in such a way as if the economy, science, technology and, in the final account, the people of the United States will gain from it. But this is gross deception.

First, history showed clearly that military injections can serve only as a short-lived doping for invigoration of some branches of the economy. After a lapse of time, the parasitical nature of military expenditures manifests itself clearly. The main reason behind the present unfavorable state of affairs in the U.S. economy is the weakening of its key industries as considerable volumes of material and manpower resources are switched to the non-productive sphere of the economy. And SDI is a veritable voracious monster that will require the spending of from one to three thousand billion dollars.

Second, it has been proved that if the same funds are invested in the arms industry and in the civilian sector, the number of jobs created in the arms industry will be approximately one-third of the number of new jobs in the civilian sector. The research carried out recently by the Employment Research Association, a U.S. consultative firm, shows that the unrestrained buildup of military spending by the Reagan Administration has already resulted in the loss of 1,146 thousand job places in the industry. American economists estimated that the funds planned to be spent on SDI could create some 14 million additional jobs.

Third, the best part of scientists and engineers is drawn into military research and development and this leads to the slowing down of the rate of growth in the civilian sectors of the economy. Senator Joseph Biden said that SDI draws valuable resources for research and design work at a time when the civilian sector is in need of the best American cadres to improve the competitiveness of U.S. products in the world market. The gap between military and civilian projects is now so wide that there is little possibility of the creation of new products for non-military purposes on the basis of SDI developments.

Fourth, even if SDI gives some benefits to the civilian branches, this will be at a much greater cost than direct investments in the civilian spheres. West German experts arrived at the conclusion that there can be an "exchange" between the military and civilian technologies only at the first stage of developments, while at the subsequent stages it will become ever more difficult since the purposes are absolutely different.

Isn't it possible to achieve technological and scientific heights by implementing the program of peaceful exploration of outer space? This is precisely what the Soviet Union suggests. It made the well-known proposal to the United States. The implementation of a peaceful project, such as the launching of interplanetary spaceships toward Mars, would, specifically, require no less research in the sphere of technology than SDI. But it would bring a great benefit to humanity. Meanwhile SDI will adversely affect the United States and those countries that will have to take part in that race, will leave problems of developing countries unresolved. And all this for the sake of the mythical "space shield" that will not protect anyone and will make the situation in the world still more dangerous.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

COSMONAUT INTERVIEWED ON DANGERS OF SPACE WEAPONS

LD291519 Moscow TASS in English 1101 GMT 29 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, 29 Nov (TASS)--New political thinking is of great importance in the nuclear-space age. A striking example of this approach was the Delhi declaration on the principles of nuclear-free and non-violent world, signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi. Valentina Tereshkova said this in an interview to TASS.

The world's first woman cosmonaut, chairman of the Soviet Women's Committee, answering the question about the danger of SDI for universal peace, emphasized that the so-called U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative reflects the belligerent philosophy of domination in outer space, and through space on earth.

Perhaps no other matter in the history of the arms race was subjected to such a thorough and competent scientific and technological analysis as the "star wars" question, Tereshkova said. Space arms are global for their range: Deployed on near-earth orbits and equipped with maneuvering systems, they can appear any moment over the territory of any state and create a real threat to its security, she said.

Tereshkova emphasized that the deployment of space-based ABM systems would place a barrier to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of near-earth space. And great expediency and usefulness of this cooperation in the economic and in the scientific and technological sphere is undoubtedly. For space programs of various countries supplement one another in many directions. Great importance of this cooperation for a positive development of inter-state relations as a whole, for ensuring confidence is also apparent.

Valentina Tereshkova emphasized that in counter-balance to SDI, the USSR had advanced the plan of star peace, concrete proposals on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. This opens great opportunities for employment, which is very important in conditions of unemployment in the West. It also opens vast opportunities for the development and application of the latest technology both in space and on earth.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CPSU POLITBURO DISCUSSES REYKJAVIK, SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE TALK

LD132024 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; announcer-read report]

[Excerpts] At a session held on 13 November, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo discussed the results of the working meeting of leaders of the fraternal parties of the socialist member countries of CEMA which took place in Moscow. The Politburo approved the report of Comrade Gorbachev on this question, and noted that the positions of the CPSU that were expounded at that meeting are a practical expression of the line toward intensifying interaction among the ruling communist and workers' parties and of the priority development of relations with the socialist countries and the strengthening of world socialism.

It was emphasized that the CPSU greatly appreciates the support of the fraternal parties for the principled position of the Soviet Union in Reykjavik, and considers it important to continue building up the joint efforts of the countries of socialism in the struggle to abolish nuclear weapons and reduce conventional ones, and strengthen peace and international security.

The Politburo approved the results of the conversation between Comrade Gorbachev and Florakis, general secretary of the Greek Communist Party Central Committee. Satisfaction was expressed with the high level of relations between the two parties, and with the mutual understanding and unity of views over the whole range of topics concerning international relations. The importance was stressed of vigorous interaction among communists in the struggle to strengthen international and European security, against the nuclear threat and for world peace.

Having heard Comrade Shevardnadze's report on his talks in Vienna with Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state, the Politburo noted the importance of continuing the struggle to strengthen the historic frontiers on the path toward nuclear disarmament that were reached at Reykjavik, and of actively involving the U.S. Administration in specific work directed toward preparing effective agreements, based on the principles of equality and equal security, on the whole range of questions discussed there. For this reason the United States must renounce its unconstructive stance and its attempts to revise the main aspects of the mutual understandings achieved at Reykjavik. The session confirmed the determination of the Soviet leadership not to delay in steering matters toward a radical reduction of all types of strategic offensive armaments, to be followed within a 10-year period by their abolition -- in combination with the prevention of an arms race in space.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR SUPREME SOVIET ON REYKJAVIK, APPEAL FOR DISARMAMENT

Dobrynin Speech

PM201413 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Speech by Deputy A. Dobrynin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of Nationalities Foreign Affairs Commission and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at 19 November joint session of USSR Supreme Soviet chambers]

[Text] On 17 November the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities held a joint session in connection with the international situation which has been taking shape since the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

In many respects this situation is no longer what it was before the meeting. The struggle for a nuclear-free future has entered a qualitatively new stage and risen to higher and more active level.

Figuratively speaking, the demand for [spros na] peace has grown as never before. Mankind does not want to live in a home whose ceiling is hung with nuclear swords of Damocles. The debate on the problems of war and peace, the ending of the arms race and disarmament is broadening everywhere. There is a growing understanding among the world public of the fundamental fact that the dangerous "Star Wars" or SDI program is the main obstacle to a nuclear-free future.

The dangerous situation imperatively demands a new approach to security problems, new thinking in foreign policy, and a new philosophy of international relations.

The dialectics of Reykjavik, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev put it recently, is as follows: The goal has become closer and more tangible, but the situation has become even more complex and contradictory. Agreements of unprecedented scope have become clearly visible and accessible; but so have the enormous obstacles on this path.

All this complexity and tension of the present situation in the world was taken into account by the Foreign Affairs Commissions when examining the proposal for the USSR Supreme Soviet to adopt an appeal "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World." (Applause.)

A.F. Dobrynin read aloud the draft of the appeal, which was greeted with applause. On behalf of the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities Foreign Affairs Commissions he proposed that it be approved.

The USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously adopted the appeal "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World."

Session Ends With Appeal

LD191523 Moscow TASS in English 1503 GMT 19 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 19 TASS--Follows the full text of the message from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and peoples of the world.

"Mindful of the fact that the community of the historical destinies of all countries and peoples in the face of the threat of a nuclear holocaust imperatively dictates the need for joint actions in the name of averting it, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR deemed it necessary to address all parliaments and peoples of the world.

The Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik signified a qualitatively new stage in the effort to bring about a world without nuclear weapons. We know now: it is possible to get rid of nuclear weapons as early as during the lifetime of the present generation.

It is precisely with this aim that our country advanced its daring, yet quite feasible, programme.

The Soviet Union proposes reducing by 50 per cent the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the U.S. over a period of five years. In the five years after that, that is by the end of 1996, all the remaining arms of the sides in that category would be subject to elimination.

We propose eliminating completely medium-range nuclear missiles of the USSR and the U.S. in Europe and reducing radically the number of missiles of that class in Asia.

We propose that the USSR and the U.S. pledge not to use their right to withdraw from the 1972 treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems -- the treaty of unlimited duration -- over a period of 10 years and to observe strictly all of its provisions. We are opposed to SDI and stand for the strengthening of the ABM treaty.

We propose, finally, that the USSR and the U.S. immediately enter negotiations on a complete termination of nuclear tests.

The idea is that all the drastic nuclear disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union should be carried out under the strictest possible control, including international control with on-site inspections.

The radical measures listed above make up an integral package. The package is a balance of interests and concessions, a balance of the removal of mutual concerns, an inter-dependence of the security interests.

Reykjavik did not only give rise to hopes. It also brought to light the difficulties on the road to a nuclear-free world. The conclusion reached by a considerable part of the world public that the American 'Star Wars' plans, the so-called SDI programme, because the main obstacle hindering agreements on the elimination of nuclear weapons is a correct conclusion. This was confirmed in full at the Reykjavik meeting. The SDI programme is an attempt to achieve the status of military superiority, to find a method of waging a nuclear war with the hope for a victory in it.

The historical experience shows that the USSR has always found an adequate response to any threat to its security. This will be so in the future as well. The Soviet Union

has the sufficient intellectual, scientific, technical and industrial potential for that.

But the Supreme Soviet of the USSR realizes that the development of space weapons, with the arms race spilling over into an exceptionally costly and especially dangerous sphere, will deprive the politicians of a possibility of control the march of events. A technical fault or mistake, a computer malfunction can trigger off an irreparable catastrophe.

The Soviet Union suggests a real alternative to the space arms race. It is peaceful space exploration through cooperation among all countries for the common benefit and prosperity.

At this exceptionally important, perhaps decisive moment in human history, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR calls on all parliaments and peoples to come out strongly for a practical start to creating a nuclear-free world and building reliable security to be shared by all countries on an equal basis. This task must take priority over any state-to-state disputes and ideological disagreements. Nobody must be allowed to slam shut the door to a nuclear-free future, which has begun to be opened in Reykjavik.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR solemnly confirms that the USSR does not withdraw any of the proposals it made in Reykjavik, aimed at eliminating all nuclear systems. The Soviet delegation to the talks in Geneva has been instructed to abide by these proposals in their totality.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR confirms that the unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts, declared by the Soviet Union more than 15 months ago, remains in effect. There still is time until January 1, 1987 for the United States to listen, at long last, to the voice of reason and demands by hundreds of millions of people the world over and stop nuclear explosions. In this case, the USSR, too, would not resume nuclear testing. Thereby a long stride would be taken along the path to nuclear disarmament.

We continue to stand for a ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of all their stocks. We stand for strict compliance with the convention banning biological weapons. We stand for substantial cuts in conventional arms in Europe on the principles of equal security for the sides. The concrete, far-reaching proposals of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw countries on all these issues still stand and we are waiting for a reply from the NATO countries.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is convinced that there is room for every state in the common effort to deliver mankind from the nuclear burden. When the task is to save mankind, there are no big and little countries and peoples. It concerns all and should be a cause of all.

This is why the moment has come for everyone to determine his stand in the face of the threat of outer space being made into an arena for military rivalry. No government and no parliament may avoid responsibility as the matter at issue is the life of all countries, including their own countries and people. There cannot and mustn't be anyone neutral in this respect.

Our message to you is also an address by all Soviet people. Time is pressing. It is urging action.

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CSO: 5200/1148

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S GERASIMOV 14 NOV PRESS CONFERENCE ON PROGRESS OF TALKS

LD141816 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1716 GMT 14 Nov 86

[Text] In Moscow today a briefing was given for Soviet and foreign journalists on current questions of international policy, by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He said, among other things: [Begin Gerasimov recording] A few words about the outcome of the sixth round of Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear space weapons: We had Reykjavik fresh on our minds; after Reykjavik there was Vienna; after Vienna there was Geneva. The United States is transforming the construction of a nuclear-free world into the construction of a Tower of Babel. The tower never materialized because sides are speaking not only different languages, but about different things. After the Reykjavik summit the sides reached different conclusions as to what had been said and decided there. The sides differed also as to what had been discussed at Vienna, at the meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state.

Now problems have arisen about reaching conclusions on what happened at the Geneva round. U.S. officials are accusing the Soviet diplomats of not acting as they should have to build on the process achieved in Reykjavik. It is quite the other way round: It is the United States that did not act as it should have done to build on Reykjavik. The Americans are now just asking us to go downhill instead of ascending toward the heights. It is the United States that went back on its word and gave up the President's agreement to nuclear disarmament in 10 years. It is the U.S. diplomats who returned again to the figures and formulas that had apparently been overcome at Reykjavik by a bold decision to implement the rapid liquidation of nuclear weapons, bypassing the quagmire of arithmetic of levels and sublevels and other technical details, which are often used to drag out the whole problem of nuclear disarmament.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the proposals we made at the Geneva talks -- this was on 7 November -- are in complete accord with the results of Reykjavik, the Soviet position, and the concerted mutually-acceptable agreements and decisions achieved in the Icelandic capital. The package of measures proposed by the Soviet delegation -- which represents a balance of interests of the two sides, a balance of compromise -- gave grounds for expecting reciprocal constructive steps from the United States. No such steps followed, unfortunately. The U.S. side at the talks did everything it could to cancel out the results of Reykjavik.

As far as the U.S. position -- their actual position -- is concerned: the nuclear blasts in Nevada are a sufficiently loud indication of it, and the roar of the turbines of the 131st U.S. strategic bomber force, to be fitted with cruise missiles, is also an indication of it. The fitting of these bombers with cruise missiles signifies the

United States' withdrawal outside the limits set by the SALT II treaty on the limitation of strategic armaments. The United States decided on its own to cross the Rubicon of limitations, and the decision about the 131st bomber throws down a bellicose challenge to the world. Strictly speaking, the bombers are not what counts here. The increase in the U.S. strike bomber fleet will be under one percent. Of course, specialists point out that the bomber will not yield any significant strategic gain. From the military point of view, additional worries are involved, and, economically, there are additional costs. But the political price is great. This bomber shows louder than any words where America wants to go. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/1148

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S KARPOV, GERASIMOV BRIEF PRESS ON SIXTH ROUND OF TALKS

Press Conference

LD182248 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2000 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Special program on press conference given by V.P. Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, chief of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Problems Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held 18 November at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow, moderated by Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov; video shows Karpov and Gerasimov seated at Rostrum -- recorded]

[Text] [Karpov] The sixth round of the talks can be described as falling into two stages -- before Reykjavik and after Reykjavik. On the second stage, which we see as the most essential one, the main and most typical thing was the retreat of the U.S. side from all positive developments achieved in Reykjavik.

As a matter of fact, the U.S. side has resorted to a very simple, and I would say unbecoming device. It has preserved its old proposals, added to them those concessions that were made in Reykjavik by the Soviet side, and presented them as new proposals. It appeared that this odd mixture proved to be worse than the position that the United States in fact had when they came to the talks at the start of the sixth round in September of last year. This typical detail, I believe, is not always perceived by the observers who write about the sixth round of the talks. But that is very typical.

To substantiate this I shall cite an example. In Reykjavik, the United States undertook an obligation not to abandon the ABM treaty for 10 years. Mutual understanding was reached on this account. Following that, the U.S. delegation offers another version in their proposals: that the United States can only take a limited obligation not to abandon the ABM treaty for 10 years, but provided that they are granted the possibility to deploy the Strategic Defense Initiative. That is, in fact, they reserve the right for themselves to walk out of the ABM treaty during those 10 years under any pretext, while formally taking such obligation.

As for the question of laying down restrictions between actions which are permitted and those which are forebidden, which was also discussed in Reykjavik, and on which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze made specific and precise proposals at his press conference, the U.S. side is altogether avoiding this question assiduously, for instance, in respect to offensive weapons. What is essentially involved is that the second stage is just the stage of elimination of ballistic missiles. Everything relating to the agreement reached in Reykjavik -- and I can testify to that as a witness -- in respect to the

possibility of eliminating during the course of the second stage, the second 5-year period, not only ballistic missiles, but also other strategic offensive weapons, and if circumstances permit, all nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union — this accord is being denied altogether.

Let us take a third example, an example relating to medium-range missiles in Europe. There was discussion of the Soviet Union making concessions and agreeing not to include the British and French nuclear weapons. We agreed to such concessions. But we agreed to these concessions precisely within the framework of a general complex of the understandings reached in Reykjavik.

Now they tell us that the issue of medium-range missiles should be resolved separately; and what is more, in such a way that the United States receives the right to deploy its medium-range missiles, totaling 100 warheads, in such a way as to be within reach of the territory of the Soviet Union. Whereas we propose, and we state, that no medium-range missiles located in Asia can reach the territory of the United States; and that the United States should deploy in the same manner those 100 warheads that they insist upon.

So, in essence, the United States is even moving toward rejecting our proposal that the Soviet medium-range missiles should not reach the territory of the United States, but this is only so they can deploy their medium-range missiles in such a way that they could reach the territory of the Soviet Union. So, there you have three such examples from three areas.

On 7 November the Soviet Union submitted detailed proposals that express both the spirit and the letter of Reykjavik. These proposals cover the whole gamut of issues that were discussed in Reykjavik, on which accord was reached and on which directions have been indicated that might be used to bring the sides' positions closer together. These proposals, as I have already said, virtually cover everything on which an accord could be achieved. So, we submitted them on the 7th and within a few days the talks on this round concluded.

The U.S. side virtually did not wish to discuss in a serious way the all-embracing, complex proposals of the Soviet Union that had been submitted. We proposed that the next round of the talks should begin in December. We came up against resistance from the U.S. delegation, and it was only after long and stubborn persuasion that the United States agreed to hold a short meeting of representatives of the two delegations at the beginning of December to continue discussions.

We are hoping that at this meeting the United States will get down to discussing the Soviet proposals and give a clear-cut response to them without waiting for the next official round to open, that is, on 15 January. Well, it is possible to hope for a positive response, of course; we'll wait and see. That is what I would like to say about this round.

The second question I would like to discuss is the question regarding the Budapest proposals on conventional armaments and on a reduction in troops and armaments in Europe.

This question in the West now, in NATO circles and particularly in European circles, is being put more and more to the forefront as a kind of brake to solve the issue regarding nuclear weapons in Europe.

A special working group has been set up by NATO which is examining the Budapest proposals, but as yet there has been no response. They keep telling us that this group has still not completed its work, and it will still be working on it until December.

I have to tell you that, according to the decision of the Warsaw Pact, a working group has also been set up within its framework which is also dealing with the Budapest proposals, and that is an examination of questions on how best to implement them in the most practical way.

Today, a session of this working group is being held in Sofia. There will, no doubt, be an announcement about it tomorrow, and about the results of its work.

But I would like to say one main thing, and that is, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has already said, we are in favor of contacts between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with the purpose of discussing questions of the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. So, we are hoping that now, when the working group of the Warsaw Pact comes out with an appeal to the NATO countries, the NATO countries will ultimately respond in a positive manner to this appeal, and the contacts between the two blocs with the objective of solving questions on the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments can acquire real substance.

[Gerasimov] Question, please.

[FRG Radio Correspondent in Russian] With what objective is the Soviet Union now continuing the talks in Geneva, knowing that the White House is not agreeable to signing a treaty on a package of all your proposals?

[Karpov] But we are not giving up hope that as a result of the talks the U.S. side will look more attentively at those arguments that have been put forward by the Soviet side, that common sense will finally win the day in the U.S. Administration, and that sensible and real agreements in the field of nuclear armaments will be achieved. The necessity for such agreements is dictated by objective reality. That is why there is no getting away from solving them; one way or another they must be solved.

[ASSOCIATED PRESS correspondent in English with superimposed Russian translation] Tell us, please, will the forthcoming working meeting in December be devoted to one single issue, or, as is being reported from Washington, will attention there be focused mainly on space weapons?

[Karpov] I don't know where they get such information in Washington. [chuckles] We left it with the U.S. delegation that what was left uncompleted during the course of the sixth round would continue to be discussed. We, for our part, are expecting from the U.S. delegation a response -- preferably a positive one -- to our proposals that were submitted on 7 November. These proposals cover all three directions of the talks.

[Studio announcer] Comrade Karpov also replied to other journalists' questions.

Further Report

LD182316 Moscow World Service in English 2110 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Excerpts] Will nuclear and conventional arms get a reduction? What is to become of the Soviet nuclear moratorium when it expires next January? Why does Mikhail Gorbachev expect [as heard] to visit India? These and other questions were answered at a briefing

for newsmen that was held at the press center of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Tuesday. The briefing was held by Gennadiy Gerasimov, in charge of the information department of the Foreign Ministry, and Viktor Karpov, who leads the Soviet delegation to the Geneva talks with the United States on nuclear and space arms. [passage omitted]

Viktor Karpov noted that more people in the West were claiming that reductions in conventional arms and arms forces in Europe were a brake of sorts for a cut in nuclear arms on the continent.

Meanwhile NATO has been giving no reply to the proposals advanced by the Warsaw Treaty nations to bring about a reduction of this kind from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. NATO has formed a special working group to tackle this issue, but the West has been rejecting talks so far. The working group that has been set up in the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is ready to enter into contacts with NATO representatives. We hope, said Viktor Karpov, that these contacts will get underway eventually.

Asked what would happen after 1st January, when the Soviet nuclear moratorium expires, he said this must be decided at the end of the year with due account for all the circumstances. He said there is a limit to the Soviet Union's patience. We can't observe the moratorium indefinitely, said the Soviet Foreign Ministry representative. One day we'll have to take a decision and this depends on whether an agreement will be reached to stop the tests. Viktor Karpov said the Soviet Union was ready for immediate and full-scale talks with the United States on this problem and it was ready to solve it, no matter what variant it may take. The objective, he added, is to stop nuclear testing of any kind.

At a briefing at the Soviet Foreign Ministry press center, asked why Mikhail Gorbachev aimed to visit India, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said the following:

[Begin Gerasimov recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] For years the Soviet Union and India have been friends. In the last few years Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has visited the Soviet Union three times. The aim of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit is to further friendship and cooperation with India. [end recording]

Gerasimov Assesses CDU-CSU

LD181447 Moscow TASS in English 1435 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS -- The foreign-policy part of the recently published election platform of the Federal Republic of Germany's governing parties -- the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) -- includes a number of planks which are incompatible with the interests of security and peaceful cooperation in Europe, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Department, said here today.

He was speaking in the ministry's press center at a briefing for Soviet and foreign newsmen.

"This program," Gerasimov said, "contains a thesis on a temporary nature of the borders, which contradicts the commitment, made by the FRG under the Moscow Treaty of 1970, to see the borders of all states in Europe as inviolable both now and in the future."

"The foreign-policy section of the platform does not show a realistic approach either to European affairs or the pressing problems of strengthening peace or to disarmament," the Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

"In words, the two parties stand for cuts in nuclear arms, while in fact, they support SDI, repeating claims about its allegedly defensive and non-nuclear nature," he said.

"It is even being asserted," Gerasimov added, "that those renouncing this missile defense system are helping the Soviet Union along to world ascendancy."

The Soviet spokesman also said that the CDU-CSU program reeked of unfriendliness towards the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries and that it could only contribute to adding still more obstacles to developing constructive and stable relations between West Germany and these countries.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S OBUKHOV REAFFIRMS POSITION ON ARMS 'PACKAGE'

HK040146 Hong Kong AFP in English 0134 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Text] Brussels, Dec 3 (AFP) -- Alexei Obukhov, a senior Soviet negotiator at the Geneva arms talks, reaffirmed here Wednesday Moscow's refusal to reach separate agreements on the "package" of four major nuclear arms issues.

Mr. Obukhov, who has responsibility for strategic weapons in the talks, said the four elements -- space weapons, strategic missiles, medium-range missiles and a nuclear test ban -- were inseparable. His comments here came on the eve of the twice-yearly meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defence ministers in the Belgian capital.

The package constituted a "balance of compromises", he said, and only agreement on all of these issues would lead to a "nuclear-free world".

Mr. Obukhov, speaking at a press conference after talks here with Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans, criticised the United States for exceeding the Salt-2 treaty Friday.

"It is a decision which certainly will have a negative impact on the efforts to reach effective agreements," he said. It was a gesture "not in favour of limiting arms but in favour of accumulating arms."

The United States exceeded the unratified treaty by deploying a B-52 bomber capable of carrying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, taking it over the limit of 1,320 strategic nuclear delivery systems.

He said an additional series of "working meetings," of the Geneva negotiators was being held this week with the aim of "reaching a solution to the problems we face in the negotiations." The next scheduled round of talks in Geneva is in mid-January.

The Soviet Union had made "fresh" proposals in the talks on November 7, based on the near-agreement in Reykjavik, and he accused the United States of back-pedalling over proposals on eliminating strategic missiles within 10 years.

The Soviet side was prepared to agree on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, he said, and to open negotiations on short-range missiles -- of a range under 1,000 kilometres (600 miles) -- and freeze them at current levels. Soviet short-range missiles vastly outnumber those of the Americans.

Asked if the current controversy over arms sales to Iran had any influence on the talks, he said the Soviet Union regarded the negotiations as "independent of the internal affairs" of the United States.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S ARBATOV ON SDI, REYKJAVIK

AU211421 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 17 Nov 86 [no page given]

[Statement by Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States and Canada Institute, Moscow, to newspaper's Moscow correspondent Dimitur Gornenski; first part of 3-part report: "Eminent Soviet Scholars for RABOTNICHESKO DELO: Questions Posed by the Unconstructive Policy of the United States"--first paragraph is Gornenski's introduction; passages within slantlines in bold face]

[Text] Moscow, 16 November (from RABOTNICHESKO DELO correspondent Dimitur Gornenski) -- Soviet political and scientific observers continue to comment on the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Iceland's capital. During the month since the meeting they have had time and received new facts to make an analysis both of the results of the dialogue and its effects on the world political climate. The observer's statements analyze the reasons for the negative outcome of the Reykjavik negotiations and the bankruptcy of the U.S. position. A very full picture of these reasons is given by the conclusions of three Soviet scholars, Academician Georgiy Arbatov, Academician Vsevolod Avduyevskiy, and Professor Dr Georgiy Tsagolov, which we will be publishing over the next few days.

Academician Georgiy Arbatov (heading)

1. The Political Motives for the White House Rejection of Integrated Agreements [subhead]

2. One of the issues related to the Reykjavik meeting which has aroused especially intense interest among the world public is this: Why did the United States and the USSR fail to achieve a historic agreement delivering mankind from the nuclear threat? Was it due to the fact that they could not agree on the Star Wars issue? Or are there more serious, more profound reasons?

Thus the main question is: if the version is not confirmed that no agreements were achieved in the Icelandic capital due to individual, even technical differences, then what in fact was the true reason? It is my view that /the present U.S. Administration had not proved ready to reach accords on eliminating the threat of nuclear war./ And perhaps it did not want such accords at all!

It is difficult, after serious consideration, to adopt the very formulation of the issue that no accord was reached solely because of, and in relation to SDI because SDI, however much it may be unfeasible illusion, is nonetheless not an exceptional case. It is a concentrated expression of a definite policy, one which incompatible with nuclear disarmament and security.

All these contradictions in the present policy of the United States, the contrast between the words and deeds of the Washington administration, were illuminated at Reykjavik with maximum clarity. Because, let us say, if nuclear weapons are eliminated over a 10-year period, then why should a great cause have to be sacrificed from a weapons system for which no target will exist in 10 years time, namely ballistic missiles?

The U.S. President's explanations on this question were extremely unconvincing. To Mikhail Gorbachev he mentioned something about a madman who might in some way suddenly get hold of a few nuclear charges and blackmail the whole world with them. But is it really possible for a madman to get possession of an intercontinental ballistic missile? SDI is suitable only for actions against such missiles. It will be powerless against cruise missile or an aircraft, and even more against a "saboteur" carrying a nuclear bomb in his suitcase.

On his return to the United States, the President displayed greater frankness. There he talks not about an anonymous "madman," but about the Russians. It is precisely the Russians — "because one cannot trust them" — who are able to conceal several weapons, and then it will be bad for the United States. The President cannot agree to leave the American people without protection (that is, without the SDI). Amazing "logic." First, because would it be possible for anyone to conceal intercontinental ballistic missiles (given the existence of the strictest control measures!). Second, because in what way in essence can the U.S. President protect the American people from nuclear attack? There is no way, either now or in the foreseeable future. This is being pointed out to him by the U.S. critics — that even after 10 years SDI will not have progressed beyond the experimental stage. The only way for the American people to be protected against the nuclear threat remains the destruction of nuclear weapons. This was indeed proposed by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik, but was rejected by the U.S. President, because of the "Star Wars" chimera. And third, if the President is so distrustful of the Russians and expects that they will dupe the United States even with all possible methods of control, then why did he come to Reykjavik, and why did he agree to negotiate with the USSR on reducing weapons? We will not raise the question at all of whether such suspiciousness is justified or not. Eloquent evidence is offered by the very fact that in his explanations and in convincing the Americans of the need for SDI, the President revealed the essence of this position. /It turned out that he has conducted negotiations with no intention of concluding an agreement./

This also makes clear the position of the U.S. Administration on its attitude to the existing treaties — for limiting strategic weapons, for antimissile defense, and so on. The Administration does not need them, they only restrict its actions. It is the same as when it has no need of the international organizations -- from the International Court to USESCO and the United Nations. This is logical -- once the Administration places reliance on force, on arms, on military hardware, then international law becomes a burden and there only remains room for the law of the first.

/Recently eyewitnesses quoted the words of an anonymous highly placed U.S. figure: "Thank God that the President didn't sign anything in Reykjavik!" All right, but what if he had signed something? In such an event, would not the U.S. governing circles deal with this agreement of the administration in exactly the same way as the /Administration is preparing to act in relation to the treaties for limiting strategic weapons and for antimissile defense?/

This is so first and foremost because /SDI is an attempt to guarantee one's own security by means of weapons and military hardware./ And this had never led to disarmament and peace, but only to the arms race and war.

Furthermore, /SDI is an attempt to guarantee security for its own sake, while placing the security of other states under threat./ And one-sided security in our times is simply impossible. Our two states can survive or perish only together.

Finally, /SDI is an attempt nonetheless to find a method of waging nuclear war and or attaining victory in such a war,/despite all the solemn declarations of the U.S. President that he does wish to consider either of the two possible.

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CSO: 5200/1087

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: UN URGES U.S., USSR TALKS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

LD041840 Moscow TASS in English 1708 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Text] New York December 4 TASS — TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reports: The U.N. General Assembly has called on the Governments of the USA and the USSR in accordance with their special duties and responsibilities as the two biggest states that they should conduct bilateral talks with maximum determination to achieve agreements on specific and effective measures to end the nuclear arms race, ensure a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament and prevention of the arms race in outer space.

The General Assembly has carried today a resolution on bilateral talks on nuclear weapons by 140 votes. The international community has stressed that in this nuclear age the choice is not between war and peace, but between life and death. Therefore, prevention of nuclear war is becoming the main objective of the present.

The resolution on international cooperation for disarmament says that the USA and the USSR having the biggest nuclear arsenals should jointly display initiative and set a good example in curbing the nuclear weapons race, refraining on a mutual basis from placing weapons in outer space. In this nuclear space age, the resolution stressed, reliable security of all countries can be ensured only through political methods, through joint efforts by all states.

This opinion, apparently, is not shared only by the USA and a number of its closest partners. In voting on the first resolution they abstained, and on the second resolution they voted against that call by the international community.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR RADIO DISCUSSES ROLE OF REYKJAVIK, SDI IN U.S. ELECTION

LD152253 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 15 Nov 86

["Top Priority" program with Vladimir Pozner, Drs Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of Moscow's United States and Canada Studies Institute]

[Excerpts] [Pozner] The subject today is, basically, the results of the mid-term elections in the United States.

[Pozner] Both of you, as experts in the area of American politics, would probably agree that elections are rarely based on external, international issues. It's usually the domestic issue that's the most important. . .

[Plekhanov] Unless there is a war. . .

[Pozner] Unless you have Vietnam. . .

[Bogdanov] Some dramatic event. . .

[Pozner] In this particular case I would again think that you would both agree that international affairs played a very important role in the campaign, specifically, or shall we say specially after Reykjavik and the whole issue of SDI came to the forefront and seemed to be one of the major issues. Now, if you agree with that, and I find it difficult to imagine that you would not agree, so I'm saying you will agree with that, would you not see the results of these elections as somehow the expression on the part of the voting Americans that they are not all that enthralled with SDI and that perhaps what happened at Reykjavik, the fact that the President did not find it possible to agree with the Soviet Union, turned them off to a certain extent? What do you think?

[Bogdanov] I would pay a million bucks, you know, to know the right answer to that question! [laughter; in background Pozner apologizes for not having this sum] But unfortunately I have no objective, you know, facts to prove my views but I have, rather, political instinct and feeling. And my feelings and political instinct tell me that those two problems were very much in the front of the elections. They were silent, you know, factors. I would put it like that. Not vocal but silent factors. And electorate, voters, they had it behind their minds, you know, Reykjavik and all these nuclear problems. I don't know how that impacted on their, you know moving into this or that direction, but I have no slightest doubt that those were very major silent factors in defining electorate's position on voting for or against.

[Plekhanov] I think that it did play a role, foreign affairs did play a role and Reykjavik did play a role. And I think voters were kind of disoriented as to what the President's policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union really was. On the hand he was ready to, or apparently ready to, go far in the matter of nuclear disarmament.

On the other hand he emphasized the hard line against the Russians. And maybe in the mind of the President that was a logical combination; being tough with the Russian forces them to make good concessions. But in [the] practical world, in practical politics, it doesn't amount to a workable formula for Soviet-American relations. And I think that this ambiguity in the President's approach did produce a negative impression on the minds of the voters and so the Democrats, I think, hammered on that theme, and apparently successfully.

[Pozner] You talk about concessions that the Soviet made, and it's true that at Reykjavik some very important ones were made. There were also some concessions on the American's part, in particular when they agreed not to speak any more about ceilings and sub-ceilings, or limits and sub-limits, just to go ahead and forget about those things. Now, according to the information we have, in Geneva the Americans have gone back to the pre-Reykjavik stance of again insisting upon limits and sub-limits and what have you.

[Plekhanov] Backsliding. . .

[Pozner] How do you think the electorate is going to look at that in the United States? I mean, how do people relate to this see-sawing of now you see it, now you don't, here it is and here it isn't, and so on?

[Bogdanov] You know, Vladimir, I'm afraid we will have clarified answer to your question at the end of the next year, at the presidential election. I mean, it's a very difficult question. We have no instruments to measure. There is only one point, which is absolutely clear to me: that will impact very much because at the level of national elections foreign policy issues are playing always a big role, you know. But still I would wait, you know, with my qualified answer to your very important question.

[Pozner] Dr Plekhanov?

[Plekhanov] I think one could make a plausible point that, well, maybe Reykjavik was for President Reagan primarily an election ploy and before the election you had an apparent agreement, a desire to go half way on the part of the United States. After the election you see a backsliding toward the old position. So if the summit was designed simply to impress the voters in order to keep the Senate. . .

[Pozner interrupting] It was a Soviet initiative, the summit. It was not the Americans who thought up Reykjavik.

[Plekhanov] That's right, but the Americans were insisting on a summit or some sort of an agreement before the election. That was clear, I think. They really needed something before the election. And now that there's backsliding on virtually every issue.

[Bogdanov] Because they don't need them any more, it's all over, so elections are over.

[Plekhanov] That, I think, raises a lot of questions about what really the intentions are of this administration in Soviet-American relations.

[Pozner interrupting] Well, thank you very much Dr Plekhanov, Dr Bogdanov. I would like to say in conclusion that I have always felt that when people don't vote that means they have no choice. So what it means to me is that basically the choice between the Democrats and the Republicans is really no choice at all, otherwise I feel people would vote, if there was a clearly defined choice in both domestic and foreign policies.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS MILITARY WRITER ON 'SORRY RESULTS' OF GENEVA SIXTH ROUND

LD141658 Moscow TASS in English 1656 GMT 14 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 14 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev: Following the sixth round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons, U.S. Administration officials have made a number of statements touting the progress made in Geneva which, according to them, was made possible by the understandings reached at the latest soviet-American summit in Reykjavik.

The head of the U.S. delegation to Geneva, Max Kampelman, characterized the latest round of the talks as the most fruitful of all the rounds held so far. President Reagan himself argued that the latest American proposals in Geneva reflected the understandings reached in Reykjavik.

However, it is clear from statements by the selfsame Washington officials that by "progress" at the sixth round of the Geneva talks they mean not the further approximation of the positions of the sides but the attempts of the American delegation unilaterally to revise the understandings reached in Reykjavik.

What Washington keeps praising is not the mutually acceptable solutions to a number of important problems reached in Reykjavik but the American proposals at the Geneva talks which actually cancel everything positive the sides achieved in Iceland.

The U.S. Administration still wants another channel for a race in space strike weapons to be opened. The United States refused in Geneva even to consider any proposals restricting the "Star Wars" program in one way or another. We want to increase the number of SDI tests and to advance the program, Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in Washington.

Contrary to the statement of President Reagan in Reykjavik on U.S. readiness to abolish all strategic weapons over 10 years, the American side is now discussing at the Geneva talks only the removal of ballistic missiles, obviously hoping to preserve its four-fold superiority in strategic bombers, including those which carry cruise missiles.

The sides reached in Reykjavik the understanding that progress in every field of disarmament should be made as a package. The United States only refused to include in the "package of accords" its "Star Wars." President Reagan believed that the other items of the package had been agreed upon. Yet the American delegation to the Geneva talks groundlessly insisted that the question of medium-range nuclear missiles, on which the Soviet Union had made a concession to the U.S., should be tackled independently of the solution of the problem of strategic weapons as well. It was another substantial departure from the Reykjavik understandings.

They in the USA are arguing now over what President Reagan said in Reykjavik and what he meant to say but did not because of absentmindedness and coming up with stories about reservations, misunderstandings, etc. However, the sorry results of the sixth round of the talks on nuclear and space weapons show that the worst snag here is not "reservations."

It appears that, having come against the fierce resistance of the U.S. military-industrial complex, opposed to any accords with the USSR, the Washington administration has chosen to revise all the aspects of the understanding reached in Iceland and to retreat to the positions which the American side had held before the Reykjavik summit.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV'S NEW SERIES ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, REYKJAVIK

LD241332 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0900 GMT on 22 November 1986 carries a 40-minute program replacing the scheduled concert entitled "Repercussions" [Rezonans], the first in a new series devoted to the Soviet concept of nuclear disarmament. The unidentified announcer indicates that the program is presented by Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin, first deputy general director of TASS.

The announcer notes that a study of the past provides a better understanding of the present, and people are increasingly aware of the danger of finding themselves cast back to the past. The first atomic bomb test in New Mexico in 1945 is recalled. Newsreel of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki--"inhuman and barbaric" actions--is shown. The announcer says: World reaction was characterized by the unanimous view that there had been no military imperative for this mass killing. This would have appeared to be a long and generally recognized truth. But there are fresh twists to the story. At the September meeting of the Soviet and American public in Jurmala, a very original interpretation of the events of 1945 was given. Just listen. Here is a representative of Radio Free Europe.

An American voice, with superimposed Russian translation, says: "The bombing of Hiroshima allowed lives to be saved since it led to the rapid conclusion of the war; it saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans and millions of Japanese. And, ladies and gentlemen, since at that time the USSR was already in a state of war with Japan, it also saved countless Soviet soldiers, because it put an end to the war."

The announcer continues: "Employing similar devices, that is, turning the matter on its head, the United States is attempting to distort the nature of the current Soviet proposals, striving to undermine the disarmament talks and the banning of nuclear weapons. As a result of this policy, mankind itself has been cast in the role of nuclear hostage."

"The reliance on force has never helped and cannot help to resolve problems in relations between states and peoples. The present age urgently requires fresh political thinking."

It is noted that over a month has passed since the Reykjavik meeting, but the significance of the event has not grown dim. The announcer says: "Repercussions

of the meeting continue to determine the political pulse of the world today. It is impossible to imagine the present stage of international relations outside the context of the dialogue that took place between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and U.S. President Reagan." Video shows Reagan and Gorbachev arriving at Reykjavik, shaking hands on the porch of the house where the talks were held, and also seated chatting to each other. The announcer then says: "Here is Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin, first deputy general director of TASS. He led the group of TASS journalists in Reykjavik."

Shishkin, in the studio, addresses the camera saying: "How did the U.S. delegation conduct itself on the very eve of the meeting? It had already arrived in Reykjavik. It had settled into its own hotel and had set up its own press center there. Reagan, said Speakes, will state that the United States is proposing to the Soviet Union that the system for the verification [proverka] of nuclear weapon tests should be changed, that this system should be further improved, and that in exchange, the United States would agree to ratify the so-called threshold treaties. Let me recall that there were two such treaties, one in 1974, and one in 1976. One of them limited underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Throughout the past 10-12 years the United States has refused to ratify these treaties. And now, as a great gesture, it has stated its agreement to do so, but has made this conditional upon tests continuing and upon improvements being made to the mechanism for verification [proverka] and observation of these tests. In exchange for this the U.S. Congress gave up the restrictions it had introduced before Reykjavik on U.S. military expenditure.

"Thus President Reagan, without lifting a finger to strengthen peace and to safeguard security and having made not the slightest contribution to this, was already reaping political dividends in the form of a complacent Congress, which had lifted all restrictions on the military budget proposed by the administration. Clearly this could not fail to put one on one's guard." Video shows Shishkin to camera; short clip showing Americans in naval uniform in Iceland; hotel with the U.S. flag flying; Shishkin to camera.

The announcer provides spoken commentary to archive footage that then appears on the screen. He recalls the creation of the Soviet State in 1917 and the hostility that this aroused on the part of the interventionist states, but noting: "We were not without support. American longshoremen and railwaymen struck within the Hands Off Russia campaign. Then came World War II, with Britain and the United States now in alliance with the USSR. More and more countries come over to the side of socialism, which becomes a powerful factor in opposing international imperialism. Within CEMA the socialist countries have a complex program for scientific and technical development running up to the year 2000." Video shows clips of archive film showing strikes, military operations; Churchill and Roosevelt; and the CEMA building in Moscow.

The announcer goes on to say: "The communique of the November CEMA session, held in Bucharest, said that the decisions that it had made will make it possible for the influence of socialism upon the entire course of world development to be intensified. A question from the editorial office: What was the response amongst journalists to the progress of the talks in Reykjavik?

"Then the black-out [previous word spoken in English] set in, that is to say the period of silence. As we know, the talks were closed, the meeting was a working meeting, and so nothing was reported or told to the press. We had to exchange opinions among ourselves and just guess at what was going to happen the next day. The first thing that happened was that the meeting did not end at 1200. We sat there waiting for the doors to open at the house on the coast where the two leaders were meeting and we had to wait for a further hour and a half. And when Reagan appeared at the entrance of the house and the correspondents shouted: What's going on, Ronnie? He replied: We haven't finished yet. We are going to meet at 1500. And once again we stood waiting on the coastline of that bay.

"It was like the stage of some kind of world theater. Just imagine it for yourselves: A leaden sky, filled with black, rapidly moving clouds; in a semicircle around us, the bay. In the background the outline of blue mountains and a leaden sea. On the shore of the bay there stands an elegant, snow-white house in which the talks are taking place, and in front of it a green lawn. Around it, beyond the cordon, the peace champions with their placards and their slogans, demanding that the problem of curbing the arms race, of removing the nuclear threat, and of preserving life on earth be solved. And this unpredictable Icelandic weather, where the sun suddenly disappears behind the clouds, then bursts out and lights up this white building in bright light like a ray of hope amidst the excited talk of the correspondents and all those watching what is going on. The time approaches at which the departure of the President has been scheduled, the aircraft stands waiting, and the President and the general secretary do not appear. In short, the meeting is being lengthened. Information is circulated about a joint statement having in effect been prepared and that it will be published when the meeting is ended. In the meantime the sun drops toward the horizon, darkness comes down and the outlines of the mountains and the sea disappear. There is a completely black background against which there is just this white building. Suddenly, somewhere around 1900, the doors open. The two leaders leave one after another. Their appearance is clearly far from a festive one, they coldly take leave of each other, and all of us suddenly feel that the meeting has ended without result." Video shows Shishkin speaking to camera, interspersed with brief clips showing Reagan walking down the steps outside the Hofdi House toward a waiting vehicle; landscape and seascape footage, including shots of naval vessels; shot of the Hofdi House illuminated at night time.

The announcer then resumes his spoken commentary as still pictures and brief clips appear on screen. Sometimes, he says, man's quest for the mastery of nature and the world around him is accompanied by tragic consequences, as happened with the Challenger spaceship and the Chernobyl atomic power station. But these are chance happenings rather than things that cannot help but happen. In international politics, however, it is the things that are in keeping with expectations that stand out in greatest relief: While the Soviet Union implements its nuclear test moratorium the United States continues to conduct tests in the Nevada desert; while we remove six regiments from Afghanistan the United States continues to interfere in Nicaragua. In the West, he continues, the instability of the present-day world gives

rise to the things one might expect: hostility toward the existing order, escapism from real life problems and an appeal to the forces of mysticism and superstition. In the meantime the arms manufacturers strive to maximize profits. Video shows clips of Challenger and Chernobyl accidents; ground disturbances at times of nuclear test explosions; farewells to departing Soviet troops from Afghanistan; Hasenfus on trial in Nicaragua; French painter making a composition with the aid of an aircraft engine; tourists throwing money into the Trevi Fountain in Rome and workmen clearing away the coins.

The announcer then says: "A question from the editorial office: What are the differences between the commentaries made by the official participants in the talks in Reykjavik?"

Shishkin replies: "As you know, this was immediately followed by two press conferences that took place simultaneously but which were quite different in their tone and their mood. One of them was the one that we all saw on television. It was given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The other one was given by George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state. When Shultz came out to meet us he was dull and exhausted. In a shaky, gloomy voice he told us that the meeting had ended without result and that there was no hope. Behind him, equally strained and gloomy, stood his senior aides, the members of the U.S. delegation. Kampelman, the U.S. representative at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments, was clearly hardly capable of holding back his tears. In short, for the American side it was the death knell.

"On our side, as you know, Mikhail Sergeyevich demonstrated precisely and clearly the kind of proposals that had been placed upon the table at the talks--important proposals of principle; far-reaching, I'm not afraid to use the word epoch-making, specific proposals based on compromise, with due consideration for the viewpoint and the interests of the other side, as well as the interests of our and the other side's allies. They were carefully considered, reasonable, realistic, and practical proposals. He showed how agreement was close but did not happen solely because the President clung obstinately to his Star Wars and his attempts to take the arms race into space; to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union.

"The subsequent development of events was as follows: Shultz flew to Brussels to brief the allies while Reagan flew back to Washington. Evidently on the way the President had an opportunity to consider all the pros and cons of the funereal tone that had pervaded the press conference given by Shultz in Reykjavik and when he emerged on the ground in Washington he changed the tone literally 180 degrees. He announced that Reykjavik had been a very great success and without any hesitation he attributed to himself all the proposals that had been put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and which make up the backbone of a possible epoch-making agreement on questions of curbing the arms race. On the following day Shultz returned from Brussels having discovered how concerned and disappointed and, I would say, angry the allies were over the fact that the Americans had let slip away such a historic chance because of their stubborn attachment to the Star Wars project. And so it was with these impressions, and also to the accompaniment of the

criticism that had already started to be voiced in the United States itself by the liberal Democratic opposition, which began to criticize the U.S. delegation for being strongly influenced by the military-industrial complex, for being neglectful of the U.S. national interests, and for putting itself into the idiotic position of being an opponent of arms reduction in the eyes of the whole world--it was taking all this into consideration that the administration did this 180 degree turn." Video shows Shishkin to camera throughout.

At this point the announcer resumes his commentary over a succession of brief clips illustrating on the one hand war preparations and on the other dare-devil escapades done for entertainment. The magic of military superiority over the USSR, he says, is a constant stimulator to the arms race in the West. But people do not want to live in an atmosphere of fear. They organize protest marches and blockade nuclear bases. Would that armies retained only their ceremonial role! But arms spending goes on rising. Arms stocks are already sufficient to extinguish life on earth several times over. Video shows clips of troop maneuvers, actions by antiwar protesters, the trooping of the color ceremony in London, a transatlantic balloonist landing, a tight-rope walker losing his balancing cane and being rescued by helicopter, a surf-boarding dog, and an underwater wedding.

The announcer then says: "A question from the editorial office. Are the results in keeping with the original idea of the Reykjavik meeting?"

Shishkin replies: "All those opposed to detente welcome what Reagan has done. Well done, Ronnie, they say. He has shown firmness. He didn't let himself get caught in the Soviet trap. He ruled out the possibility of our really having to participate in their plan for world disarmament by the year 2000. That is roughly what these voices had to say. But once again I want to stress the fact that the response throughout the world and in the United States itself to those truly amazing proposals put forward by the Soviet Union was so great and so enormous that it has been impossible for the administration not to reckon with it. Highly placed representatives of the administration have literally been grabbing hold of all manner of journalists, both accredited and nonaccredited at the White House, and have given them interviews and explanations in which again and again they have been trying to persuade Americans and world public opinion that they, supposedly, were the ones who achieved a great success at Reykjavik, that they had moved forward the disarmament cause, and that the Soviet Union is to blame for the fact that no agreement was reached in the end.

"A clear picture is now forming from what we are getting from various world capitals and from different states. People do not believe this American deception. It is impossible to believe it. People see with their own eyes that the Soviet Union has proposed a real and a concrete plan for eliminating offensive nuclear armaments over a 10-year period, a concrete plan based on the fact that the ABM treaty will be observed for 10 years and that when all nuclear armaments are eliminated in 10 years' time, then there will be no requirement for any antiballistic missile defense because there will be no missiles and there will be nothing against which to provide a defense. People see all this clearly and precisely.

"On the other hand they see the way in which the United States, not just in words but in deeds, undermines the cause of disarmament. If you really do seriously want to reduce nuclear armaments, as you say you do, and if you undertake to eliminate them over 10 years, then one has to ask why you are now engaged in the further improvement of these weapons? For these nuclear tests are needed only in order to improve nuclear armaments and to develop [sozdavat] new ones.

"But the question arises: What about Reykjavik, then? Was it a success or a failure? Was it necessary or was it not? I think that the answer to this question is perfectly obvious. It was given in splendid fashion both during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's press conference and his television address and ultimately this is what it amounts to: Despite the negative position of the United States, despite the fact that we have not been able to come to an agreement at Reykjavik, nevertheless in the process of working out a solution an enormous distance has been covered; completely new and specific proposals have been set in motion, proposals to which it is very difficult to say no, which it is difficult to brush aside. It is clear that an enormous impulse was imparted to the talks and to the solution of the nuclear disarmament problem in Reykjavik. Indeed, this is what the idea of holding the meeting amounted to in fact. When Mikhail Sergeyevich proposed this meeting to Reagan he stressed precisely this, that a powerful impulse has to be imparted to the talks, a powerful impulse to the solution of this most vital task facing mankind. We shall see!" Video shows Shishkin to camera.

At this point the announcer presents the final section of the program, noting man's eternal desire for peace and security throughout his life and in his relations with his fellow man over clips of human eyes and human faces. There follow stills of posters heralding the Soviet peace proposals and condemning Star Wars. Peace cannot wait, the announcer says, urgent solutions are needed. Shouts of "Maggie, Maggie, Maggie; out, out, out!" are heard on the soundtrack over pictures of antiwar demonstrations and police actions against participants on screen. The antiwar movement is gathering strength, he said. Demonstrators are seen singing "We Shall Overcome!" Australians are seen demonstrating against the presence of American warships in their waters.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S CSCE ENVOY ON SDI, KOLA MISSILES 'AFTER REYKJAVIK'

AU281552 Vienna NEUE AZ in German 28 Nov 86 pp 6-7

[*"Exclusive"* interview given by Vladimir Lomeyko, special Soviet envoy to the Vienna CSCE conference, to NEUE AZ editor in chief Manfred Scheuch in Vienna; date not given]

[Excerpts] Scheuch: Mr Ambassador, how do you assess the situation after Reykjavik and the "Vienna summit" of the foreign ministers?

Lomeyko: After Reykjavik, the situation in the world has become even more complicated. In Reykjavik, an attempt was made to reach a breakthrough in the biggest and most important issue of our time, that is, disarmament. Our General Secretary Gorbachev is guided by a new manner of political thinking. He believes that one must find a way out of this situation because we are pressed for time to solve global problems — the north-south problem, the ecological time-bomb. Instead of solving these problems, money and strength are wasted for unnecessary, amoral armament. We want to put an end to that.

Unfortunately, no breakthrough was reached in Reykjavik because of SDI, and now the American side attempts to revise this [as published]. The last round of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons has shown that the American side is, unfortunately, not ready for concrete, mutually acceptable agreements.

Regrettably, some West European states, which pleaded so much for disarmament that they criticized the Soviet Union because it did not agree with Reagan's zero-option, are now, when Gorbachev has said yes, no longer showing any interest. Some politicians, even those in Europe, obviously do not understand that it is not a Soviet-American relationship and not an agreement between two superpowers that matters but a question which is vitally important for all people. We are all actors in this drama, there is no audience. We are all acting on this world stage. Whether we are leaders or not, we all play a role. Even if this role is played mutedly it has a certain function: A big chance could be missed.

The American positions consist of the old American proposals and the new Soviet concessions. An attempt has been made to pick out these compromises as somebody picks raisins out of a cake, but, of course, this is impossible because the only possible basis for agreements is parity; that is, one must accept not only one's own security interests but also those of the other side and the security interests of the whole world. There is no other way.

Unfortunately, there are followers of so-called technological supremacy, who believe it is possible to solve the problem on the basis of technological supremacy -- by means of the so-called SDI; we consider this a new channel of the arms race.

Scheuch: Well, let us speak about SDI: Just now a British military magazine has stated that the Soviet Union has already made great progress in the development of space defense systems.

Lomeyko: There is no doubt that this is a report that serves a certain purpose. It simply belongs to certain rules of the game. If one wants to achieve something one immediately says that the Soviet Union has been doing this already for quite some time. The fact that, on the one hand, it is said we are technologically underdeveloped and, on the other, we are advanced, shows that this is not true. But, what is even more important is that it does not fit into our plans. We need money for socioeconomic development in our country.

Scheuch: You said that the West European countries are obviously playing the role of spectators and are partly revising their original attitude. Now, the West European public is still afraid that in case of large-scale disarmament in the nuclear sector, the conventional forces of the Soviet Union would gain superiority. How can this fear be diminished?

Lomeyko: We are also against any further arms race in the conventional field. We are in favor of nuclear disarmament together with disarmament of conventional weapons down to the lowest-possible level that is necessary for defense. In order to realize this, the Soviet Union, together with other countries of the Warsaw Pact, put forth proposals in Budapest this summer to reduce forces by 25 percent next year, by a total of 1 million men. If one wants an agreement it can be reached there, because at present the Soviet Union is showing the will to very great, sincere concessions -- for instance, concerning the unilateral nuclear test moratorium. For 1 and 1/2 years we have not carried out any nuclear tests, although the Americans have already conducted 28 tests. Then our concessions in Stockholm that, also according to the assessment of Foreign Minister Genscher and other Western politicians, contributed very much to the positive results. One should not speak about fear, one must try to reduce this fear, together with the arms.

Scheuch: What was the intention behind dismantling intermediate-range missiles on the Kola Peninsula and in Karelia just a few weeks ago?

Lomeyko: This is further evidence of our willingness to disarm and an attempt to make concessions to the countries in northern Europe. You know that the ideal of nuclear-free zones in Europe has been in existence since 1963. The northern European countries appealed to the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union has to join in this project. We repeatedly stated that the matter is not so easy for the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union is the opponent of the United States and not of the northern European countries. Nevertheless, here too, we have made an attempt to achieve a breakthrough with a unilateral advance concessions. But, in the end, it needs two to dance a disarmament tango.

Scheuch: How do you explain the American attitude that you have described toward the questions of armament and disarmament?

Lomeyko: Of course, we have been very interested in this question, and I have often discussed this with experts in our country and also in the West, and also with military men. Even the Americans themselves — if they are not totally hardened demagogues — say: You must understand, our President is a prisoner of the military-industrial powers, this California Mafia, the monopolies. For them, SDI is a guarantee that for 25 or 30 years new weapons will be developed — that is guaranteed big business. In addition, DER SPIEGEL, too, has published a rather well-founded series. It is, unfortunately, a fact that disarmament is a danger for very influential forces, in the sense that they get fewer profits, have less influence on politics and in particular on the economy.

I also believe that there are two parties in America. Not Republicans and Democrats, but the Balance Party and the Supremacy Party. The first one has understood that negotiations with the Soviet Union and all over the world are only possible on the basis of parity. The other "party" wants to achieve supremacy again and to dictate policy with its wishes and wants the Soviet Union to be simply "armed to death" in this race. For these hardened conservatives even the idea of social justice is unacceptable. The idea of social justice denies the ideas of a meritocracy and the spirit of profit, and therefore, they do not want this system of social justice to be practiced and to succeed. This is a global struggle of ideas, and although everyone knows that the Soviet Union will never wage a war — because the Soviet people and all Europeans know what war means — armament is kept up through an atmosphere of fear.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA VIEWS THATCHER-MITTERAND TALKS ON REYKJAVIK, INF

PM251515 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Yu. Kovalenko Paris dispatch: "Two Trips by M. Thatcher"]

[Text] British Prime Minister M. Thatcher has been in the French capital on a 1-day visit, accompanied by her ministers of foreign affairs, defense, industry and agriculture. She had talks with French President F. Mitterrand and Prime Minister J. Chirac.

The main attention at the talks was devoted to the results of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik. Paris and London are voicing "concern" at the prospect of nuclear weapons being scrapped -- medium-range missiles in Western Europe in particular. The two capitals are both putting forward the thesis that, as the socialist countries are supposedly superior in conventional weapons, nuclear disarmament is therefore fraught, they say, with a threat to Western Europe. In this respect those on both sides of the Channel are ignoring the proposal made to NATO by the Warsaw Pact states to begin talks on mutual reduction in conventional armed forces and arms in Europe.

It should be noted at this point that before setting out for Paris Margaret Thatcher made a trip across the ocean where, "on behalf of the West Europeans," she voiced her "misgivings." There, according to the press, they hastened to calm the British premier by assuring her that Britain and Washington's other allies could continue to count on the United States with regard to retaining and improving their nuclear arsenals. Now, the right-wing newspaper LE FIGARO states with satisfaction, there can be no talk in Paris and London of totally scrapping nuclear weapons. "More Reykjaviks" must be avoided at all costs, LE FIGARO urges in a commentary devoted to the results of the French-British summit meeting. A special place at the talks was given to the issues of creating a "European defense" system.

F. Mitterrand said at a press conference at the close of his meeting with the British premier that "in strategic and military respects our two countries are very close to one another," because they are the only ones in Western Europe with their own nuclear weapons.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA: LAO PREMIER SUPPORTS USSR REYKJAVIK STANCE

PM181147 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Laos: A High Opinion"]

[Text] Vientiane, 13 Dec — The Lao people, together with all other peace-loving forces, support the Soviet Union's constructive, realistic foreign policy — the aim of which is to save mankind from a nuclear catastrophe and ensure lasting peace, progress, and prosperity in the world.

This was stated in an interview with a TASS correspondent by Sisomphon Lovansai, acting chairman of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) Supreme People's Council.

We rate highly the recent USSR Supreme Soviet appeal to the parliaments and peoples of the world, the Lao leader noted. It provides a clear assessment of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik, which was an important political event in international life, a milestone in the struggle against the arms race and for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and elimination of the danger of war. The Soviet side's stance at the meeting in the Icelandic capital was frank and sincere. But because of the U.S. authorities' stubborn reluctance to heed the USSR's proposals, accords were not reached on questions pertaining to strict observance of the ABM Treaty, reducing strategic offensive armaments, and halting nuclear weapons tests.

At present, Sisomphon Lovansai pointed out, the Lao people are working enthusiastically to fulfill the decisions of the Fourth Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) Congress. As LPRP Central Committee General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihan stressed at the fourth congress, the LPDR's foreign policy course is directed against the arms race and toward the struggle for peace, stability, and cooperation among the peoples in the region and in the world as a whole.

We call upon the parliaments and peoples of all countries to join forces in the struggle for peace and to resolutely demand that the U.S. authorities follow the Soviet Union's example, take a sober view of reality, and take positive steps for world peace and security, Sisomphon Lovansai stressed.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS

ITALY'S ANDREOTTI RECEIVES SOVIET SPECIAL ENVOY SUSLOV

Kremlin Arms Proposals Discussed

LD012213 Rome Domestic Service in Italian 2130 GMT 1 Dec 86

[Excerpt] Foreign Minister Andreotti this evening received Vladimir Suslov, envoy of Soviet leader Gorbachev, who informed him about the Kremlin's proposals on the reduction of armaments which is being discussed in Geneva. Suslov also stressed Moscow's concern that the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are not progressing.

Andreotti pointed out that in his opinion there is still room for agreements on the problem of space arms, a problem which for the Soviet has become a condition for any further agreement on the subject of disarmament. [passage omitted]

Disarmament 'Impasse' Discussion

AU021107 Rome ANSA in English 1050 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, December 2 — Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's special envoy, Vladimir Suslov voiced Soviet "concern" over the apparent impasse in Soviet-American disarmament talks in Geneva in a meeting of over an hour with Italian diplomatic chief Giulio Andreotti Monday.

The Geneva talks resume today. According to Suslov, Moscow was expecting developments in the talks after the Reykjavik summit, but nothing has materialized.

Restating the Soviet position, Gorbachev's roving ambassador also stressed that hopes for an agreement are linked to freezing the Reagan administration's "Strategic Defense Initiative" in the laboratory.

According to reliable sources, Andreotti said the points discussed at Reykjavik must be consolidated "without taking backward steps or setting preconditions".

Recently, Soviet negotiators have hinted they would be ready to reach independent agreement on the individual "baskets" being debated at Geneva, but at Reykjavik, Gorbachev made this conditional on freezing the "Star Wars" proposal project.

The sources said Andreotti claimed there were still margins for maneuver on the "space shield" concept. Suslov made no mention of the Reagan administration's decision to commission a new nuclear- armed B-52 bomber, thus breaking the terms of the SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

The Soviet Government also dispatched special envoys to other European capitals to explain the Soviet position on the eve of the resumption of the Geneva talks.

Press Conference Comments

LD021916 Rome International Service in Italian 1830 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Excerpt] The primary obstacle to an agreement on missile disarmament between the USSR and the United States is Washington's SDI program in which the Soviet Union does not wish to participate. This was said in Rome by Soviet special envoy Vladimir Suslov during talks with Foreign Minister Andreotti and afterward at a news conference held today at the Soviet Embassy. According to Suslov, the Soviet Union has already made great concessions at the Geneva negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arsenals. [passage omitted]

Comments on 'Irangate'

AU030856 Rome ANSA in English 0833 GMT 3 Dec 86

[Excerpt] (ANSA) Rome, December 2--The Iran arms-sale dominating developments in Washington will have no repercussions on U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks in Geneva because the importance of these negotiations "is such that no event in the world can interfere with them," Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Suslov said in Rome .

Discussing "Irangate", the Geneva talks, the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative and other issues at a press conference here, Suslov, in Rome to brief Italian authorities on the post-Reykjavik phase, also remarked that the Soviets "are dealing with a President elected by the American people and, therefore, will continue to negotiate with him so long as he is in office".

Addressing himself to the Star Wars space-based missile defense system, the Soviet envoy said that this program remains "the major obstacle in the way of success in Geneva" and affirmed that "the initiative is aimed at the creation of a new generation of nuclear arms, the achievement of which would violate strategic stability".

He said that there is no possibility of finding a common ground between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on this issue whereas "agreement would be possible, on the other hand, on our proposal to move together towards the peaceful conquest of space, which would also allow the technological conquests the U.S. is pursuing with the SDI".

Returning to the disarmament negotiations, the envoy said that an impasse has been reached in Geneva and added: "The time has come for other countries, especially the European countries, to let their voices be heard".

Asked about the response of the Italian foreign minister, Giulio Andreotti, to his appeal, Suslov said, "Andreotti told me he intends to explain the Italian point of view to the European Council in London and, immediately afterward, to his NATO colleagues. Anyway, I had the impression that he has assessed the understandings reached in Reykjavik with great seriousness. "Naturally", the Soviet envoy continued, "he is a minister in a government which belongs to NATO and, in his concrete approach to the issue, one can clearly see the factors of a line developed along with the other countries of the alliance.

"Our talks were useful and constructive", Suslov said.

He disclosed that he had also illustrated the Soviet position on disarmament to Msgr Achille Silvestrini, the secretary of the Vatican Council on Public Affairs. "We feel it is important to keep the Vatican informed because we are aware of the influence of the Catholic Church and its work for strengthening peace", Suslov said.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's envoy said that he was unable to say what decision would be made on the unilateral Soviet nuclear test moratorium when it runs out January 1.

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CSO: 5200/2460

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALY'S ANDREOTTI, USSR'S ADAMISHIN DISCUSS DISARMAMENT

AU100904 Rome ANSA in English 0823 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Excerpts] (ANSA) Florence, December 9--An envoy of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said that Moscow wants to continue arms control talks with the United States in Geneva and reach agreement "on all the single issues of disarmament without linkage among them" in a meeting here Tuesday with the Italian foreign minister, Giulio Andreotti.

The Soviet deputy foreign minister, Anatoliy Adamishin, also said that, "the decision to implement or not apply an understanding on the elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles (in Europe) and on a fifty-percent reduction in strategic arms will depend on the situation with the American Strategic Defense Initiative and respect for the ABM Treaty".

Speaking on the sidelines of the international symposium entitled "Global Security in the Prospective of 2000", opening in Florence Tuesday, Andreotti said that the Soviets have a "strong" desire to continue East-West negotiations and that their "availability is very important".

"One might have had doubts on whether the domestic situation in the U.S. could have caused the Soviets to slacken a bit in their commitment to negotiations. This does not appear to be absolutely true at all", the Italian foreign minister said and added: "The Soviets have re-stated that they are ready to negotiate with whoever represents America at this time".

The Italian foreign minister said that "this presupposes careful consideration of all the factors and that, in passing from one phase to another, from offensive to defense systems, the Europeans in no way accept inadmissible risks".

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CSO: 5200/2474

SALT/START ISSUES

CANADIAN PRESS COMMENTS ON U.S. SALT II DECISION

TORONTO STAR Editorial

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 28 Nov 86 p A24

[Editorial]

[Text]

Utterly inadequate. Those are the only words to describe External Affairs Minister Joe Clark's response to the fact that the United States today plans to deliberately break its SALT II arms-control treaty with the Soviet Union by deploying the 131st B-52 bomber capable of launching a cruise missile.

In the House of Commons yesterday, Clark said that he and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had, "as recently as this week," privately told Secretary of State George Shultz and President Ronald Reagan that it would be "better for the world if the U.S. would respect its SALT II obligations." Then he softened even that motherhood-and-macshmallows statement by adding that Canada would continue to let the Americans test cruise missiles in our North because "we in Canada have an obligation, a commitment, signed by the former Liberal government, toward NATO concerning the cruise missile and we intend to honor the obligation."

In fact, the agreement on cruise testing is with the U.S., not with NATO. And in Halifax last summer, following a meeting with the 16 NATO foreign ministers, Mulroney said that breaking the SALT II treaty "would not be endorsed by NATO (and) certainly not by the government of Canada." He can put meaning in those words by telling Washington now, before the next set of cruise tests start in January, that Canada will permit no more of them until the U.S. resumes observing the limits of the SALT II agreement. (The Pentagon could easily do so by dismantling one of its elderly Poseidon submarines.)

Such a firm response would reinforce Canada's long-standing support for arms-control initiatives, which need all the support they can get these days. In Moscow, Soviet spokesmen are already saying that the U.S. violation of SALT II will have negative effects on arms-control talks in Geneva; if the Soviets retaliate by some violations of their own, we won't have arms control; we'll have a no-holds-barred arms race.

TORONTO STAR Commentator

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 28 Nov 86 p A26

[Commentary by Gordon Barthos]

[Text]

U.S. President Ronald Reagan is courting a whirlwind of criticism — and risking an accelerated Soviet nuclear buildup — by sending aloft today the U.S. Air Force's 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles.

The move, which comes as the White House is mired in the arms-for-Iran crisis, automatically violates the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) agreement limiting nuclear weapons.

While deploying one more B-52 has little military significance, the U.S. Thanksgiving eve action was a political bombshell.

Already it has drawn an ominous threat from Soviet officials in Moscow that they will respond with "concrete, practical measures" to safeguard their security, and it has given them a handy propaganda stick with which to beat the Americans.

Chaotic competition

The news also has infuriated the U.S. Democrats who now control Congress, dismayed U.S. allies, including Canada, and discouraged proponents of arms control.

A top Soviet warned in June that "a chaotic arms competition" could be unleashed if the United States breaks existing arms control pacts.

If America "breaks out" of the deal, "all the limitations will become invalid," said Oleg Sokolov, the second-ranking Soviet diplomat in Washington.

Close to home, the U.S. move and the angry Soviet response may cause headaches for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and his government.

In Edmonton earlier this month a conference attended by 5,000 people called on Ottawa to stop testing cruise missiles here if the U.S. violated SALT II by adding to its cruise-launching platforms.

In Ottawa yesterday the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, a private research organization, called for a "suspension" of cruise tests in Western Canada — slated to resume in January — until the United States returns to the SALT II limits.

"Such a step by Canada would clearly communicate to Washington the importance Canadians attach to the continued observance of existing arms control agreements until better ones can be put in their place," centre director John Lamb said.

Arms cornerstone

The centre also faulted the Soviets for over-reacting to the development, and called on the Mulroney government to urge Moscow not to overstep the SALT limits.

Supporters of SALT II see the pact as a cornerstone of arms control, and the foundation on which future arms deals must be negotiated. They argue that the United States stands to lose more than the Soviets if the pact is scrapped.

"It put a brake on the arms race, set ceilings on the relevant categories of nuclear missiles and was to be followed by deep reductions" in a SALT III treaty which was never negotiated. Paul Warnke, chief architect of SALT II, wrote recently in the New York Times.

Former Central Intelligence Agency director William Colby and Robert English, a Soviet analyst for the Committee for National Security, warned in the New York Times that the United States would be "severely handicapped" in its ability to monitor Soviet military affairs if the pact were scrapped.

Under the SALT II provisions the Soviets are not permitted to disguise their missile silos; they must build cruise-missile-capable bombers in such a way that satellites can recognize them as such; they must give prior notice of missile test flights and only stage them from agreed-on areas; and the weapons' limits provide some predictability in the way Soviet military forces will develop.

Within two days of Reagan's threat in May to abandon the pact, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark described it as "a profoundly disturbing development" in a speech to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization conference of foreign ministers in Halifax. Clark apparently spoke for a majority of the NATO ministers.

Specifically, Reagan's decision will push America beyond the limit of 1,320 nuclear launchers allowed both sides in two categories of weapons: Missiles with multiple warheads, and bombers carrying cruise missiles. The United States now has 1,320 such launchers while the Soviets have 1,194.

To stay within the arms agreement the United States would have had to dismantle another strategic launcher — such as a Poseidon submarine — as it has in the past, to compensate for the newly upgraded B-52 bomber.

The SALT ceilings are important because they restrict the strategic, or long-range, missiles, submarines and bombers deployed by both superpowers.

While a technical return to the SALT II limits could be quickly and easily arranged, Reagan has now established the principle that the agreement, as White House spokesman Larry Speakes says, "is no longer operational."

Chances scuttled

The decision comes six months and one day after Reagan made his May 27 announcement that the White House would no longer respect

the arms accord unless the Soviets came up with sizeable concessions to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. Whether Reagan gave the Soviets a six-month deadline at that time is a matter for speculation.

While major Soviet concessions have been offered — most recently at the Iceland summit — wrangling over Star Wars space-based defence research scuttled chances for a formal deal.

Defending their decision to ignore the SALT II limits, White House officials have said the agreement was fatally flawed from the start because it merely curbed the upward spiral of nuclear arsenals without cutting them.

OTTAWA CITIZEN Editorial

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 29 Nov 86 p B2

[Editorial]

[Text]

The U.S. can't technically be faulted for exceeding the limits of the SALT II treaty Friday; you can't violate a treaty that's not in force. But the American decision to abandon the standards set in the SALT structure is regrettable.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan telegraphed this week's move to the world last May when he announced that in future the U.S. would "base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces."

The SALT II treaty is flawed, said the president, because it "was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified and has been violated by the Soviet Union."

America's allies, including Canada, expressed their concern at the time. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark told the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Halifax that the decision represented "a profoundly disturbing development and one we hoped could have been avoided." Other NATO ministers voiced similar views.

Now that the 131st bomber equipped to carry cruise missiles has become operational, the U.S. has exceeded the treaty limits. Unlike alleged Soviet violations, this was a deliberate and open act signalling a change of policy.

The world is not in greater danger today because of the U.S. move. The "violation" was only symbolic. The basic contours of

SALT II still remain in place. And the Democratically-controlled U.S. Congress might well take steps in January to put the U.S. back under the agreement's ceiling by forcing the retirement of old bombers or submarines for structural as well as financial reasons.

Properly, Clark has rejected retaliation by Canada. The denial of Canadian territory for future cruise missile tests, as suggested by some, would achieve nothing except to invite a U.S. countermeasure against Canada in some other field. Besides, it's unthinkable that Washington would return to SALT II because Canada tweaked its nose.

It's equally disingenuous to think that the development of the cruise missile would be seriously impeded if more tests could not be held in Canada. They would simply take place elsewhere. Canada would have demonstrated childish petulance instead of a mature sense of allied responsibility.

Of more importance, we would have lost our chance to influence a reversal of Reagan's decision. The best approach for Canada, and all those who support arms control as a tool for greater stability, is to propose a full review of the question at the NATO ministerial meeting next month.

Let the SALT structure stand and convince the U.S. to get back into it: that should be NATO's objective. Together, Washington's allies just might succeed — with a little help from Capitol Hill.

GLOBE AND MAIL Editorial

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 1 Dec 86 p A6

[Editorial]

[Text]

"The world would be better," External Affairs Minister Joe Clark confided to the House of Commons last week, if the United States had not breached the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

But while he and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney "regret the decision that has been taken by the United States," they are not about to make a fuss. In particular, they will not suspend the five-year weapons testing agreement under which Canada allows the U.S. to launch cruise missiles over the Alberta tundra.

The New Democrats and the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament both advocate such a snub, but Mr. Clark insists that "we have a commitment to NATO to test the air-launched cruise missiles, and we intend to keep our word." High River keeps the faith at Cold Lake.

Is Mr. Clark confused? Canada made no commitment to NATO on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Canada did subscribe to a NATO decision on deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), but its readiness to test the ALCMs was a bilateral commitment made in 1983 to the United States.

Now that the U.S. has armed its 131st B-52 bomber with an ALCM — and thus exceeded the

SALT II sub-ceiling on strategic launchers — Canada is entitled to second thoughts over its involvement in ALCM tests. Canada did not offer its co-operation in order to subvert SALT II.

SALT II, and the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, are the two cornerstones of the contemporary arms control structure. U.S. President Ronald Reagan now is intent on the demolition of both. He has already reinterpreted ABM in a manner that would permit the testing of components for space-based weapons — an interpretation which even the treaty's negotiators disavow.

The demolition of ABM would clear the way for a hideously expensive arms race premised on the mastery of space in order to neutralize ballistic missiles. The demolition of SALT II, on the other hand, could clear the way for a superpower competition to add to the current stockpiles of ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union, which itself is suspected by the U.S. of SALT II violations, has responded harshly to the American infringement and promises "concrete, practical measures" to safeguard its security. Since the U.S. "break out" is a limited one, Moscow is unlikely to resort to wholesale abandonment of the treaty. But a series of tit-for-tat violations by both sides could

slowly strip away all restraint.

That would hardly be in the West's interest. The Soviet Union, whose missile production lines are open, would be better placed to respond to a new arms race. Moreover, abandonment of SALT II would reduce the U.S. ability to monitor Soviet nuclear muscle. Under the treaty, the Soviets are not permitted to conceal their missile silos; they must build cruise-missile-capable bombers in such a way that satellites can spot them; and they must give prior notice of missile test flights and launch them only from agreed-upon areas.

The SALT II treaty is an important asset to the Western alliance, and Canada and the Western Europeans dare not countenance a U.S. retreat from it. Ottawa should urge Washington to dismantle another strategic launcher so as to restore the breached sub-ceiling. And, to underline its point, Ottawa should announce that it will invoke the provision for review in its bilateral agreement on weapons testing.

America's defence partners owe it co-operation, but need not define that as servility (the way the Soviet Union's vassals must). If Canada is a U.S. ally unquestionably, may it not be one unquestioningly.

OTTAWA CITIZEN Commentator

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 1 Dec 86 p A8

[Commentary by Gwynne Dyer]

[Text]

LONDON — For at least 30 years, the central disagreement among American Sovietologists has

been the question of whether it is Communist ideology or Russian national interest that motivates the actions of the Soviet Union. (Non-experts instantly and instinctively come up with the right answer — a bit of both, but rather more of the latter — but then they are not paid to go on arguing about it.)

The more urgent question at the moment, however, is whether it is national interest or ideology that motivates the United States. A case in point is the American decision to violate the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which gives new meaning to the old phrase "cutting off your nose to spite your face".

The dogmatic determination to scrap SALT II, which was signed by President Carter but never ratified by Congress, arises solely from the ideological conviction of the American right that all agreements with the Russians (except, perhaps, one for the unconditional surrender of the Soviet Union) are snares and delusions. Them sneaky Commies is too smart for us straight-shootin', slow-thinkin' frontiersmen, so we didn't ought to play cards with them.

There has never been any persuasive evidence of how the U.S. could improve its strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union by abrogating SALT II. Even the primitives who count nuclear weapons as though they were spears cannot show how Washington ends up with more new missiles, bombers and nuclear warheads than Moscow in a world freed of arms control: Congress is usually less generous than the Politburo.

It is all purely symbolic anyway, of course. The conversion of the 131st B-52 heavy bomber to carry cruise missiles confers upon the United States no new advantage more significant than an ability to blow up Sverdlovsk for the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th times.

If it comes to war, the inhabitants of Sverdlovsk won't even notice the difference. The same is true of the inhabitants of Des Moines, Iowa and Dayton, Ohio, who would be immolated a few extra times by additional Soviet warheads if the Russians join the new numbers game the Reagan administration seems determined to start.

The simplest and quickest Soviet riposte to the American violation of SALT II, however, is simply to declare that the note President Brezhnev gave President Carter about Backfire bombers at the time of SALT II is now "non-operational" (to use the White House term). In return for one extra cruise missile-carrying B-52, the U.S. would instantly have to concern itself with up to a hundred or more supersonic Backfire bombers.

The Backfire is a very fast and good Soviet medium-range bomber intended mainly for use against European, Chinese and maritime targets in case of war. But from bases in the extreme

north-east and north-west of the USSR, Backfire bombers could also reach military and urban targets in the continental United States.

In 1979 Brezhnev promised Carter, as an accompaniment to the SALT II treaty, that no Backfires would be deployed to bases from which they could reach the U.S. If Moscow wants to show Americans promptly and in the toughest possible way that you gain nothing by breaking arms control agreements, it need only move a few squadrons of Backfires to the Kamchatka peninsula or the Murmansk area.

Washington would have to convert a lot more B-52s to balance that one out — and the Russians can do that without even violating the treaty terms proper. If they follow Reagan into that terrain, however, they could reopen the production line for the giant SS-18 missiles (it's still there) and add a couple of dozen megaton-range warheads to their overkill capability against the U.S. each month.

But Moscow probably won't do anything of the sort. As a senior American official who spent years negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviet Union in the '70s said recently: "We taught them all our ideas of restraint and balance and nuclear sufficiency — and then when they had finally adopted them, we said 'April Fool!'" But the Russians seem to have learned that you do not count atomic bombs like spears.

The primitives have overrun the American strategic establishment for the moment — and just as more sophisticated American negotiators had to wait patiently through the late '60s and early '70s, hoping that the primitives who then dominated nuclear planning in the Soviet Union would eventually either learn or retire, so the Soviets now have to wait for the present gang of Cold Warriors in Washington to stop gibbering and brandishing their weapons.

They probably will wait. We are now 16 months into a unilateral Soviet halt to nuclear weapons testing, which has been extended repeatedly despite continued U.S. tests. The extraordinary proposals discussed at Reykjavik remain on the public agenda despite the Reagan administration's commitment to Star Wars, and the idea of complete nuclear disarmament within ten years will continue to work away at Western public opinion.

Back in the '60s, it took at least five years before American restraint in nuclear weapons production communicated itself to the Soviets. It may take as long for the message to travel the other way in the '80s, but it could well happen if the Soviets can exercise sufficient self-restraint.

It will be a good sign if Gorbachev can resist internal pressure to play the Backfire card in response to the U.S. abrogation of SALT II.

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CSO: 5220/18

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR HITS UK, FRG RESPONSE TO REYKJAVIK 'ZERO OPTION'

PM011629 Moscow KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Nov 86 Second Edition p 3

[V. Levin article under the rubric "After Reykjavik": "Trammels of Nuclear Dogmas Prevent the Governments of a Number of NATO Countries From Making a Constructive Response to Soviet Initiatives"]

[Text] Life confirms again and again the truth that those who want to get on choose methods, while those who do not seek excuses.

In Reykjavik the Soviet Union displayed a sincere desire to deliver mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe. The proposals set forth there open up real opportunities to eliminate nuclear weapons and to take a decisive step on the way to ridding both the entire world as a whole and the European continent in particular of them. As a result, an agreement was reached, as is known, that there will be no Soviet or American medium-range missiles in Europe, while the sides will each keep 100 warheads on such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. territory correspondingly.

Constructiveness was also displayed in the Soviet Union's agreement not to take the British and French nuclear potential into consideration at present. It should particularly be emphasized that the USSR made a great concession by taking that step. For that very potential is of a far from symbolic magnitude. Britain, for example, possesses 64 SLBM's and, moreover, these are missiles at the stage of being modernized, as a result of which they will have not 192 warheads, as in the early eighties, but 384 warheads. There is no need to explain what this means. France's nuclear potential is also of a real magnitude. It incorporates 146 nuclear weapon delivery vehicle units. That is at present. But in the comparatively near future the number of nuclear charges on submarine-launched missiles alone will more than double compared with 1986.

However, the Soviet Union still considered it possible not to take the British and French nuclear potentials into account now. Our country thereby underlines that it is profoundly aware of the special responsibility borne by it and by the United States as the mightiest nuclear powers. And the USSR made this concession in order to make the first step easier.

For we had heard from both London and Paris. Let the USSR and the United States start, they said, and they, that is, Britain and France, will not be long in subscribing to constructive measures. And this too was taken into account and predetermined the special significance of the first step. Not to mention the fact that many, if not to say all, governments of NATO powers gave unanimous assurances that their innermost dream is a "zero option" for Europe and that, if there were no Soviet missiles, American ones would not appear either.

It is now more obvious than ever that the deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe was not a response but a challenge. Talk of Soviet missiles was just a pretext, for as soon as the Soviet Union proposed the "zero," Bonn, London, and Paris fled from it like the devil from incense.

Incredible but true. Those who campaigned earlier for the "zero option" and speculatively maintained that the Soviet Union was hindering Europe's deliverance from nuclear weapons refuse to even hear of this today, after Reykjavik. Thus, British Prime Minister Thatcher declares that the nuclear deterrent potential is absolutely essential for the "defense of Europe." FRG Chancellor Kohl in turn launches into doubtful arguments to the effect that the elimination of medium-range missiles will not remove the threat in Europe.

The official motivation behind the stand taken by London and Bonn is the claim that the USSR and the entire Warsaw Pact Organization have superiority in conventional arms, which, so they maintain, will become even greater if nuclear weapons are eliminated. The head of the British Government adds to this the question of chemical weapons, while the Bonn chancellor discourses at length on missiles with a range up to 1,000 km.

And yet, people who resort to such arguments deliberately distort the essence of the problem. Let us take the question of conventional arms. Since 11 June 1986 the whole world has known of the Warsaw Pact states' proposals on this score. The socialist states propose as an initial step carrying out a one-time mutual reduction in the number of troops of the opposing military-political alliances by 100,000-150,000 men on each side within 1-2 years. Immediately after that, the socialist states propose, it would be possible to make further significant reductions, so that in the early nineties the ground forces and tactical strike aircraft of the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO in Europe would be reduced by approximately 25 percent compared with today's level. That reduction would amount to more than half a million men on each side.

These proposals were submitted almost 6 months ago. But the West pretends to know nothing and still stubbornly evades an answer. On the other hand, exercises in slanderous fabrications are continuing and increasing.

The Soviet Union gave an answer to the question about chemical weapons even earlier. It was set forth in the 15 January statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. "The Soviet Union," he said

"considers it a perfectly realistic task to totally eliminate already this century also such barbarous mass destruction weapons as chemical weapons." And there are specific Soviet proposals on this score. And if it were not for the obstructionist stance of the West, and primarily of the United States, which stubbornly clings to binary chemical weapons, the question could be resolved quite quickly.

As for Chancellor Kohl's reference to missiles with a range up to 1,000 km, it is a pretext. For a clear position was defined in Reykjavik--with the reaching of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles, the level of missiles with a range less than 1,000 km is frozen and talks on their subsequent fate begin immediately. Only somebody who wittingly and deliberately closes his eyes to reality can remain unclear.

This stand taken by Western politicians attests to their irresponsibility and disregard for the interests of peace and the peoples' security. The essence of this stand has nothing in common with the bombastic verbiage of the same Western statesmen about "allegiance to peace." At a press conference in Washington, which she visited recently, Thatcher did not conceal the fact that the modernization of the British nuclear means will continue. Kohl openly gambles on militarist and revanchist circles, clearly reckoning on using their help to win the Bundestag elections on 25 January and, at the same time, to please his transatlantic ally. For today Washington sets special store by everything that could help to derail the accords reached in Reykjavik.

At the same time, however, it is forgotten in NATO capitals that the Reykjavik meeting was a moment of truth and that the historic chance to rid mankind of the nuclear threat acquired real outlines there for the first time. And it is given to no one to torpedo this chance so easily. The sense of responsibility that imbues the actions of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states and is shared by broad public circles, including in NATO countries--a sense of responsibility dictated by new political thinking--not only messes up the cards of those who are trying to drag the world backward but also opens up reliable prospects. It is clear that it is not easy to achieve them, but it is possible and necessary to do so.

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CSO: 5200/1143

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA: FRG 'HAWKS' CALL FOR FURTHER MISSILE UPGRADING

PM111251 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[*"Our Commentary"* by Yuliy Yakhontov: *"Undermining Reykjavik"*]

[Text] It is no secret to anybody that the Federal Republic of Germany was one of the initiators of the 1979 NATO decision on missile "upgrading" -- the siting of medium-range nuclear missiles in West Europe, mainly in the FRG.

Now all 108 Pershing-II missiles have already been installed in combat positions on West German soil. Work is also in full swing on the deployment of 96 cruise missiles. They are aimed at USSR cities. Thus the FRG can claim the doubtful honor of being Washington's main missile launchpad in West Europe.

But this is not enough for the Bonn "hawks." The very formulation in Reykjavik of the question of mutually removing Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe alarmed them in a big way. Even though, to their delight, that agreement, just like the other accords, was not sealed through the fault of the American side, fear torments the local opponents of disarmament. What if the USSR and the United States nevertheless were at some point to come to an agreement on destroying their medium-range missiles in Europe?

In this situation it is quite possible to clearly discern in the FRG a group of influential politicians for whom disarmament would be tantamount to the end of the world. F.-J. Strauss, Bavarian prime minister and chairman of the Christian Social Union (CSU), remains the most zealous of them. Strauss' position was outlined at the recent pre-election CSU congress: "Disarmament, arms limitation, and arms control are in themselves of no value." The chief "value" for him is the demand for a "second arms upgrading," that is the additional siting of operational-tactical nuclear missiles on the territory of West European countries, mainly the FRG.

Only after such a "second upgrading," Strauss believes, can talks begin on reducing missiles of this kind. He now states that there is "no need to strive" for a "zero solution" on medium-range missiles at all.

Although the FRG Government states publicly that it agrees with the "zero option," during meetings with U.S. representatives and in contacts within the NATO framework West German politicians have been trying to persuade their interlocutors, so the weekly DER SPIEGEL notes, to forget about Reykjavik. Instead, they are calling on the United States to "okay" a new missile "upgrading." So, it seems to me that not only is a "step back from Reykjavik" being prepared for but, as in 1979, the foundation is being laid for a new buildup of the nuclear arsenals in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1179

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRENCH PRIME MINISTER ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE, STRATEGY

PM211540 Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 86 pp 7-17

[Text of speech by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to French Higher National Defense Studies Institute on 12 September: "France's Defense Policy"]

[Text] I am happy to be able to speak to you today in my capacity as prime minister and hence as head of national defense, about the main lines of the government's thinking and action in this sphere which is essential for our country's future.

The deep agreement which unites the French people on their defense, possibly for the first time in their history, absolutely must be maintained; first, because it would be unreasonable to destroy something which has taken so long to achieve, and second, because it is an exceptional advantage for France — our country's international credibility is all the greater because no one can now speculate on reversals of or changes in our policies and our determination — and finally because it cements national unity and loyalty to the homeland.

But the desire to safeguard the French people's support for the principles of their defense makes it necessary for the government to carry out the necessary modernization effort without delay. There have been delays, essential decisions about the equipment of our forces have been postponed, and new military stakes have emerged. This is why, as soon as my government took office, I announced that a new military programming law would be introduced and submitted to Parliament before the end of the fall session. The adoption of a new military programming law fulfills a need. Indeed it is clear that the existing programming law, which was adopted in 1983, can no longer serve as relevant point of reference.

We cannot have a defense policy unless there is continuity of effort and unless we have guidelines which give practical form to our will to defend ourselves. However, for some years defense budgets had stopped increasing, and their share of the national income had even been reduced over the years. This made planning difficult and postponed essential decisions on the final years of a program which was, moreover, not adequately funded.

The new military programming law is now being drafted. You will understand why I cannot now prejudge the final decisions which will be made by the defense council and the cabinet, and why I can only discuss the essential issues here, in other words the broad outlines of our defense policy.

I would simply like to say that the new military programming law will decide on an equipment plan which is compatible with the financial resources which the government decides to devote to defense. It will not speculate on possible updatings which would provide the funds in the future which we cannot allocate today. Above all, it will be a departure from the slow erosion of defense budgets and will make it possible to return to an adequate rate of increase in funds. This is the purpose of the budget decisions which I made this summer for 1987, the first year of the coming law.

While civilian spending will be reduced, taking the franc at a constant value — the first stage in reducing the budget deficit and cutting taxes — defense spending will increase by almost 7 percent. But, whereas administrative funds will remain the same, the amount allocated to equipment for the forces will increase by almost 14 percent; there will be more funds for equipment than for administration for the first time in 20 years.

These are the main outlines of our effort: priority to a military tool which is credible given the threats, and stringency in the everyday running of the Armed Forces. The same concern for stringency will be applied to the search for cost-effectiveness and for versatility in the weapons chosen, while the review of the structures and organization of our forces in areas where they may be cumbersome and excessively costly, will not be carried out at the expense of the operational activity of our units. I would like to stress that this policy is in keeping with our concept of the state's role — a state which must stop dealing with matters outside its competence and devote itself to the essential tasks, particularly to guaranteeing the country's independence and security.

But for what kind of policy is this financial effort being made? This brings me to the aims of our security policy.

France must have the means of safeguarding its independence and protecting its vital interests in view of the threat which the Eastern bloc's vast nuclear, conventional, and chemical arsenal still poses to its very existence. We must be more vigilant than ever given the changes in our immediate security environment. The strategic link between the two sides of the Atlantic, which was strengthened in the first analysis by the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, is still threatened by deep-seated currents which could upset the delicate balance inherited from the post-war period. France is aware of the potential contribution of

negotiated disarmament efforts to stability in Europe and the world and intends to work actively for this while safeguarding its fundamental interests; however, it would be imprudent to have excessive hopes in this sphere. At all events reductions in nuclear weapons must first be made in the American and Soviet arsenals.

France will not allow its forces to be taken into account directly or indirectly in negotiations in which it does not intend to participate until the pre-conditions it has set have been fulfilled.

As long as we are faced with the two superpowers' excessive levels of armaments and an imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, our security will depend on the strategic nuclear deterrent. In this connection, as far as the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] is concerned, we must adopt the responsible and lucid attitude of a country which does not intend to determine its attitude in accordance with other countries' laws. Although we must participate in the great technological research effort likely to rapidly affect the technology used in our offensive and defensive weapons, it would be unreasonable to think that there will be an alternative to nuclear deterrence for our country for a long time to come.

This means that the first thing we must do is to maintain the credibility of our strategic forces at an adequate level. In this sphere the modernization of our strategic ocean-going force, with the current plan to equip our submarines with M-4 missiles, must be continued with the design and construction of nuclear submarines with better performances. But this effort absolutely must be accompanied by preparations to replace the ground-based and manned airborne components of our strategic forces. That is why I have already stressed the need to launch immediately, after studies by the competent bodies, a new ground component capable of escaping an enemy first strike. Given the efficiency of modern offensive weapons, the best chance of survival seems in fact to be obtained by random deployment of major systems. This approach must be preferred to an expanded air defense which it seems reasonable to approach with great caution, because specific defensive systems, which would be very costly to develop and deploy, are likely to be saturated or neutralized by appropriate countermeasures.

It is also essential for our country to be equipped with observation satellites which will give it an independent capability for assessing threats and crises.

The fact remains that the progress which will be made in space and other technologies, particularly in the framework of SDI — which, it must be remembered, corresponds to the efforts which the Soviets have been making for a long time — and in many other European bodies in which we play a prominent role, will sooner or later bring about a change in concepts and in armaments. France must remain vigilant: It must pay great attention to maintaining the research and manufacturing capabilities of French industry in all leading spheres on pain of being left behind by technological progress and running the risk of a lag which would ultimately make it more vulnerable.

But the threat of a strategic nuclear response is merely the last resort for ensuring its survival, and France cannot base its strategy solely on the deterrent if it wants to maintain its influence and its capacity for initiative in Europe and in the world. France is a European power: In this capacity it cannot be indifferent to the fate of its neighbors whose security determines

French security in many respects. It intends to be active in the world: It must therefore exercise its responsibilities where it has a presence in its overseas departments and territories, where it is called upon to have a presence by countries to which it is bound by history and friendship, and finally where the survival of its economy may be jeopardized by sudden crises.

France has a special place because it has decided to equip itself with nuclear weapons and to shake off the constraints of an integrated military organization. But this situation does not alter the responsibilities which stem from full membership of the Atlantic Alliance. The fact that its nuclear effort has reached maturity, giving its deterrent force diverse tools, and the increased awareness of the European dimension of its security, enable it to explore in full independence the ways and means of strengthening deterrence in Europe. I would like to take this opportunity to say that although the nation's survival is decided on the country's borders, its security is decided on its neighbors' borders.

The enemy must not be able to hope to get round the nuclear deterrent by launching sudden or unexpected actions.

It must not be tempted to rapidly make territorial gains which would place the Alliance in a difficult position. It is true that the crisis situations for which we must prepare to ensure that the deterrent is not caught out are largely unpredictable: This is why France attaches so much importance to maintaining its freedom of action and not committing its forces to automatic involvement which could prove to be inappropriate.

Such a concern certainly does not mean that France would shirk its responsibilities: Quite the reverse, because it is situated some distance away from the most immediate military threat, is protected from the dangers of nuclear blackmail by its own strategic forces, and can rely on a broad internal consensus, it must be able to show great determination to throw all its weight behind the deterrent in case of crisis. In Europe, whether you like it or not, deterrence depends on the link between the use of conventional forces and the threat to resort to nuclear weapons. We are determined to act in accordance with this situation: France intends to be able to give any aggressor a nuclear warning, the location and timing of which will depend on the course which the conflict takes. This warning, which rests with the president of the republic, head of the armed forces, who will assess the need for it in accordance with the political and military situation, will have the aim not just of giving the aggressor an unequivocal warning, but also of halting the impetus of the aggression: If necessary, therefore, it will be possible to diversify and graduate it. France has publicly stated that, within the limits imposed by the extremely rapid nature of such decisions, it would consult the FRG, its ally, should it contemplate using prestrategic weapons on German territory. It is clear that the very conditions of deterrence mean that the decision cannot be shared.

In addition, our conventional forces must be organized in such a way that they can take effective action as quickly as possible. In this context, should the need arise, we are prepared to see whether the combination of our forces with those of our allies, to use Gen de Gaulle's expression, correspond to this concern. Given the situation in Europe time would be a decisive factor in a crisis or open conflict because one of the superpowers would try to take

advantage of its geographical proximity and the effect of a surprise attack to counter the other's extraordinary capacity to ship in its forces. In this battle of deadlines and mutual reinforcement, France, which is the alliance's only large reserve and which, moreover, is protected by its nuclear forces, can obviously play a crucial role.

As you can see, France is prepared to show even greater solidarity with its European neighbors. It sees no conflict between the right to make its decisions independently, which it wants to safeguard, and the solidarity which it intends to express. Indeed no one now disputes the fact that coordination between the nuclear powers present in Western Europe is greatest when each maintains its freedom of judgment and decision.

But our desire to show solidarity can only develop if it meets with a practical response from our partners. I am thinking primarily of the FRG, with which we must maintain special relations. Provided each respects the other's fundamental options and seeks the greatest degree of complementarity in the service of the security interests which the two countries essentially share, France is prepared to examine with the FRG ways of moving

forward together along the lines laid down by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer in 1963. The approach must be pragmatic and, in particular, we must not stray into futile discussions on the possible extension of our nuclear guarantee. Even in a strictly national concept, our forces make a decisive contribution to deterrence in Western Europe if the potential enemy regards Western Europe as a single entity. It is up to our two countries to ensure that the extension of our relations in all spheres and the resulting shared interests, make any hope of dividing them futile.

Are our relations with our other allies in the security sphere satisfactory? Are our relations satisfactory with the United States, which bears the heaviest burden of responsibility in the defense sphere; with the United Kingdom, with which our cooperation, however extensive it might be, could be further developed on the basis of many common interests, provided our two peoples overcome the automatic reactions inherited from a long tradition of rivalry which even now sometimes damage the quality of our relations; and with our southern neighbors, especially the Spaniards and Italians with whom we share increasingly obvious concerns in the Mediterranean basin? The answer does not rest with us alone, but I think it is useful to ask you to consider this question.

The French have never forgotten that they must not keep their eyes fixed on the Vosges or the Elbe. Their fate may also be decided in the Arab-Persian Gulf, in the Mediterranean, or in the Indian Ocean: They know that the threat, which takes many forms, can come from the sea which covers more than two-thirds of the surface of the globe. They are well aware that the imbalance which is being established between Europe and the southern countries in the demographic and economic spheres, may ultimately become a factor generating worrying tension.

However, despite some favorable signs, like the progress of the democratic idea in some Third World countries, there are still many major factors which undermine our security. The USSR and its allies are maintaining their presence

in Afghanistan and Cambodia by force. In the Middle East, strong national and religious feelings are aggravating crises to which there still seems to be no solution, as in Lebanon or in the Iraq-Iran conflict; they are prompting some groups and even states to behave in ways which violate the provisions of international law, such as blackmail, terrorism, or hostage-taking. It is no longer just the interests but sometimes the lives of our fellow citizens which are threatened. It must be admitted, therefore, that deterrence, which has preserved peace in Europe, does not prevent indirect strategies from developing in many regions. Everyone can see that existing or potential hotbeds of tension are increasing.

France's only ambition is to safeguard its vital interests, defend its friends, and help maintain peace by preventing major disturbances. It must use its permanent presence in the overseas departments and territories, especially in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, the Antilles, and Guyana. In general, this policy must be developed primarily through diplomatic, economic, and cultural cooperation with all the states concerned.

But experience shows that the security dimension must never be forgotten. We must therefore have as broad a range of means as possible, ranging from military assistance and the training of cadres to long-distance intervention forces. I would like to reaffirm our special responsibilities in Africa where, because of the special ties we have with many countries on that continent, we may be called upon to intervene, at their request, to help them guarantee their external security. I would like to stress here the importance of having forces permanently stationed in friendly countries near sensitive zones. The risk is obviously not the same for a potential trouble-maker if the French "factor" already exists or is just a possibility.

However, an existing presence is not enough. With a view to preventing crises or, if necessary, tackling them effectively, we must have well-equipped mobile air and land forces, staffed by professionals and capable of moving rapidly over long distances as soon as the need arises, in addition to an adequate capability for naval action to protect our ability to make independent decisions. In this sphere the government is worried by the excessive age of our surface fleet. Although the navy has shown in recent years the role it can play alongside the other branches of the Armed Forces in crisis situations, it is now faced with the need to modernize all its components. I cannot conceal the serious nature of the problem posed by the lag which has built up in this essential sphere. The government is aware of the need to modernize the fleet and maintain its overall balance. The programming law which will be submitted to Parliament in the next few weeks will reflect these two concerns.

I cannot end without mentioning the threat which a direct or indirect strategy pursued by states or groups supported by states can present for our population and our territory's vital installations inside our borders. This threat can be exercised by military action and also by terrorism — a real act of war which achieves its success through the individual and collective fear it generates within a population which it attacks and virtually tries to take hostage. Every effort must be made to reduce such threats and to reduce these new areas of vulnerability which are intended to destabilize the state and undermine the nation's will to resist.

I would like you to give careful consideration to the existing organization of responsibility and civil defense and the operational defense of the territory, which are designed to counter threats which are now being stepped up and diversified. Our security is based primarily on the nation's defense spirit which is an expression of its will to survive and be independent. I am asking you to make the strengthening of this security one of your priorities.

I am happy to have been able to take the opportunity of this opening session of the Higher National Defense Studies Institute to present to you the broad outlines of our defense policy. The founders of the institute, which is celebrating its 50th anniversary this year, were far-sighted in their desire to bring together military and civilian officials from all spheres for an open and constructive examination of the country's defense. Experience has shown that these exchanges of views, which are interesting per se, also help establish lasting ties among the nation's vital forces.

Defense is everyone's concern and I reminded you just now that the French people's underlying agreement on security policy is an asset for our country. The institute has certainly made a major contribution to this. Our officers, who participate in the institute's activities as members of the audience or as lecturers share their defense concerns and are enriched by the experiences and criticisms of civilian officials. The latter, in turn, have the opportunity to gain a greater awareness of defense requirements in their various spheres. They also discover that our Armed Forces, far from being cut off from the nation, is a true and living expression of it.

The same lesson can be learned from our history, which has at times been painful and at other times glorious: When France slackens its defense effort, it is not just its own security which is undermined; it is the balance in Europe and the stability of some regions in the world which are likely to suffer as a result. This shows that there is no alternative to this effort. "Increasing your strength in accordance with your plans and not expecting what you fail to plan to emerge by chance or from existing systems," — these are the lessons taught by Gen de Gaulle from which I and my government intend to draw inspiration in the next few years.

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CSO: 5200/2470

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: U.S. ISSUES 'FALSEHOOD' ON SOVIET BIOLOGICAL ARMS

LD051746 Moscow TASS in English 1714 GMT 5 Dec 86

[Text] Washington, 5 Dec (TASS)--TASS correspondent Aleksandr Lavrentyev reports:

The Pentagon has issued a report about a 'threat' posed by non-existent Soviet biological weapons. The logic of the falsehood is this: Since there is a high level of science in the USSR, it just cannot be so that Moscow does not produce its biological weapons.

The compilers of the anti-Soviet falsehood did not apparently realize that, according to their own logic, it is possible to change the name of the country in the report from the USSR to the U.S. and to bring similar accusations against the United States: American researchers' scientific achievements in biology and related sciences are widely known.

However, the Soviet side does not need to resort to such reports, since tangible evidence exists to the effect that it is precisely the United States that for many years has been conducting work to develop new biological agents.

In September this year a U.S. public organization, the Foundation on Economic Trends, has filed a suit against the U.S. Department of Defense on the ground that in 1985 alone the Defense Department had conducted about 75 experiments for the purpose of preparing for biological warfare.

The suit petition has it that gene engineering methods as well as biological agents under the guise of vaccines had been used during the experiments to change a person's behavior.

Recently the Argentine Ministry of Health demanded an end to experiments conducted by U.S. specialists in Argentine territory without the Argentine Government's consent. The Argentine authorities maintain that an unknown virus has been released into the environment on the outskirts of the city of Azul. The opinion of Argentine experts is that it is a question of genetic experiments which pose an immense danger to people.

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CSO: 5200/1178

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR'S ISRAELYAN CALLS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS MORATORIUM

LD161712 Moscow TASS in English 1600 GMT 16 Dec 86

(Text) Geneva December 16 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev writes:

The head of the Soviet delegation at the Disarmament Conference Viktor Israelyan has said that there is hope for the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons already in 1987, given all the participants in the talks display the necessary political will and interest.

Speaking at a press conference today before the conclusion of a regular round of the multilateral talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons within the framework of the Disarmament Conference, he stressed that this question is now acquiring special importance. Firstly, after the meeting in Reykjavik has demonstrated the possibility of creating a nuclear-free world it is now important to generate an impetus in other fields of disarmament as well, Israelyan said.

Secondly, he went on, it is necessary to avert a new spiral in the chemical weapons race in connection with the decision of the United States to start late next year the production of a new generation of chemical weapons — binary ones. Otherwise the conclusion of the convention will be put off for many years, if not forever, Israelyan said further. Causing concern are also recent reports from France about its plans to start implementing a programme of chemical weapons of its own.

On the other hand, the Soviet representative stated, talks on abandoning chemical weapons have reached such a stage when a convention on this matter could be worked out already at the next session of the Disarmament Conference.

Viktor Israelyan characterised the Soviet Union's constructive approach to this question and the latest Soviet proposals concerning monitoring the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry and the system of verification.

With the aim of making the talks easier the Soviet side took for the basis the earlier made British proposal concerning verification on request. At the same time it proposed to the United States to announce a joint moratorium on the production and deployment of chemical weapons, including binary ones. This proposal should be acceptable to the United States, he said further, because according to contentions by American representatives the United States is not manufacturing such weapons at present.

The head of the Soviet delegation called on the partners in the talks to step up work so as not to miss the unique chance to exclude for ever yet another terrible weapon of mass annihilation from military arsenals.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

JAPANESE DEFENSE AGENCY TO STUDY CBW COUNTERMEASURES

OW061155 Tokyo KYODO in English 1112 GMT 6 Dec 86

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 6 KYODO--The Defense Agency will begin studies next year on measures to counter attacks with chemical and biological weapons, defense sources said Saturday. They said the agency pointed to the possibility of toxic gas weapons being used in regional conflicts.

The Soviet Union holds supremacy over the United States in the development of chemical and biological weapons. Although some of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force troops are supplied with gas masks, no protective measures against chemical weapons have so far been taken by the air and maritime self-defense forces.

The proposed studies will include protection of civilians from chemical and biological weapons and whether to arm the three services with such weapons as a countermeasure, the sources said. They said the agency stressed the need for countermeasures against chemical weapons on the grounds that such weapons have often been used in regional conflicts involving conventional weapons.

The sources aid "Aegis" missile ships to be ordered by the maritime self-defense force in fiscal 1988 will be mounted with equipment to wash away toxic gas, bacteria and radioactive substances and keep polluted air from flowing into cabins.

At present, about 60 percent of ground self-defense force personnel are provided with gas masks while about 70 percent of all units are equipped with special rubber cloth giving protection against chemicals.

One possibility is for a special counterchemical combat unit consisting of about 30 personnel to be attached to each division across the nation in the future, the sources said.

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CSO: 5260/055

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS REPORTS ON STATUS OF MBFR TALKS

'Talks Deadlocked'

LD041507 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1442 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Text] Vienna, 4 Dec (TASS)--At today's concluding plenary session of the MBFR talks, the Soviet delegation again had to state that it was not found possible to move toward an agreement. The talks, in fact, remain deadlocked, V.V. Mikhaylov, the head of the Soviet delegation, stated at a press conference. Touching on the reasons for this unsatisfactory situation he recalled that the Warsaw Pact states see the purpose and sense of these talks in halting the arms race in Central Europe through the joint efforts of the sides and to proceed along the path of lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe. However, the course of the talks showed that the NATO countries were unprepared to reach agreement on genuinely equal conditions for both sides.

NATO Unprepared for Agreement

LD041614 Moscow TASS in English 1604 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Text] Vienna December 4 TASS--TASS correspondent Anatoliy Tyupayev reports:

At the final plenary meeting of the latest round of the talks on the mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the Soviet delegation noted today again that no advance toward agreement has been made. The talks are actually stalled and their prospect is not quite clear, the head of the USSR delegation, Ambassador Valerian Mikhaylov said at a press conference today.

Touching upon the reasons behind such an unsatisfactory state of affairs, he recalled that the Warsaw Treaty member states have seen the aim and essence of the talks in arresting the arms race in Central Europe by mutual efforts of the sides, in taking the road of the lowering of military confrontation in Europe, as this was determined by their mandate.

The course of the talks, however, showed that NATO countries are not prepared to reach agreement on terms truly equal for both sides, V. Mikhaylov went on. To this day the West persists with the attempts to distort the aim and subject of the talks to the detriment of the interests of socialist countries. This

tendency is, perhaps, manifested most clearly in the present stand of NATO countries. They distorted the idea of a limited partial agreement which was advanced by socialist countries nearly 2 years ago as a possible way out of the impasse.

The version of arrangement proposed by NATO countries has clearly a lopsided nature. It does not envisage arms limitation and reduction. Reducing the matters to an insignificant reduction of only the numerical strength of personnel and to its nonincrease, the Western side refuses reductions of whole combat units and limitation of the air force, while interpreting the obligation for nonincrease of forces to its unilateral advantage.

In this way, from the viewpoint of real reduction and lowering of the level of military confrontation, or if only of the halting of the arms race in Central Europe, the version proposed by the West is emasculated to the limit.

Nevertheless, it is used as a pretext for advancing arbitrary and obviously unacceptable proposals on verification and control, proposals that demand that the defence structure of the Warsaw Treaty states in Europe be revealed, while not being applied, for instance, to the territories of the United States, France, or Britain. One would think the authors of these proposals themselves do not believe in the reality of the implementation of such measures of control and advance them mainly for the purpose of covering up the fact that they are not prepared to seek agreement in earnest, the Soviet representative said.

Mikhaylov News Conference

PM151321 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Dec 86 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Seeking a Way Out of the Deadlock"]

[Text] The need to seek a way out of the deadlock which has arisen at the talks in Vienna on the question of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Central Europe was the subject of a news conference given for Soviet and foreign journalists on 12 December at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center.

Ambassador V.V. Mikhaylov, leader of the USSR delegation at the Vienna talks, said that the latest round of talks had failed to bring any constructive result and that no progress had been made in reaching an agreement. The attempt by NATO countries to distort the aim and object of the talks to the detriment of the socialist countries' interests must be considered the cause of this position, he said. This trend is particularly evident in the present stand taken by the United States and its allies with regard to the so-called limited, partial agreement, the idea of which was put forward by the socialist countries almost 2 years ago.

The version proposed by the NATO countries is one-sided, as it completely excludes armaments from the reduction and limitation process, and merely amounts to an insignificant reduction in the numbers of troop personnel and to their nonincrease. In this connection they have put forward quite arbitrary verification (kontrol) proposals known to be unacceptable or, to be more precise, proposals for a recount of soldiers

which would involve the disclosure of the entire Warsaw Pact defense structure in Europe without affecting the territory of the United States, Britain, and France.

The Soviet Union, it was stressed at the press conference, still considers it possible to achieve a positive result in Vienna on the basis of the socialist countries' 20 February draft agreement. It is sufficiently balanced and takes equal account of both sides' security interests, and it is also practicable. Implementation of the proposals put forward in the Budapest appeal would make it possible to considerably lower the possibility of military confrontation in Europe. The personnel of both sides' armed forces would be reduced by 500,000, including standard arms and nuclear arms.

Journalists' questions were then answered. Correspondents asked for comments on press reports regarding the possibility of direct contacts being established between the Warsaw Pact and NATO organizations. Major General Yu.V. Lebedev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate, pointed out that the Soviet side's idea of direct contacts between representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO states is explained, in particular, by the need to put the questions of reducing armed forces and conventional arms onto a practical plane. It would be quite logical for a problem that is clearly of a military nature to be discussed by working groups or at a meeting of the organizations' leaders. This kind of dialogue could help, in particular, to make the Vienna talks as dynamic and constructive as they should be. Unfortunately, the Soviet proposal has still not received any response from NATO.

Answering a question as to whether the verification [kontrol] measures formulated in the Budapest appeal are reliable enough, Yu.V. Lebedev stressed that they are undoubtedly effective. National technical verification [proverka] means and international procedures, including on-site inspection [inspeksiya] — these and other verification [kontrol] measures proposed by the Warsaw Pact countries would serve as a guarantee of the observance of agreements of reducing both sides' armed forces and conventional arms, and maintaining them at the established level in the future.

Other questions to journalists were also answered.

Mikhaylov: Talks Still 'Deadlocked'

LD121049 Moscow TASS in English 1047 GMT 12 Dec 86

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS -- Talks on a mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments in central Europe continue to be deadlocked, Valerian Mikhaylov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna talks, has stated here. Addressing a press conference here today, he emphasized that during all those years when the talks had been held the NATO countries had persistently sought to distort the goal and subject of the talks to the detriment of socialist countries

"Our proposal provided for the reduction of Soviet and American troops in central Europe together with the armaments attached to them by 20,000 and 13,000 respectively, as well as the subsequent non-increase in the next two to three years of the level of the armed forces and armaments of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty member states in that region.

"By putting forward the commitment on the non-increase or freeze, we actually met half-way the Western participants in the talks, believing that if they were not ready so far to substantially reduce their armed forces and armaments, perhaps, they would agree to a more limited but mutually useful step, i.e. to the checking of the arms race at the least.

"However, the developments show that the West is not ready for this decision either", Valerian Mikhaylov pointed out.

"The draft agreement tabled by the NATO countries is of a unilateral character. It totally excludes the reduction and limitation of arms.

In bringing down the matter to an insignificant reduction only of the numerical strength of the troops and its non-increase, the western side evades the reduction of troops by combat units and the limitation of the strength of the air forces, while formulating the non-increase obligation for the unilateral benefit for itself.

Moreover, contrary to the meaning of freezing the numerical strength of the troops, the West offers a practice of various exceptions from the obligation that would make it possible to concentrate without hindrance large groups of armed forces in central Europe under the cover of the agreement."

"From the viewpoint of real disarmament and the reduction of the level of military confrontation or at least the suspension of the arms race in central Europe, the Western draft agreement is rendered without meaning," Mikhaylov said.

The Warsaw Treaty countries declared in Vienna that they had been and remained opponents of the use of talks for creating a semblance of dialogue or a screen to cover up military programmes.

They resolutely opposed the use of the artificially established "Vienna impasse" for sabotaging the all-European reduction of conventional arms and armed forces. "The implementation of the proposals on cuts, contained in the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, would make it possible to lower substantially the level of military confrontation in Europe."

"Each side would reduce the numerical strength of the armed forces by half a million. This would apply to prescribed arms, nuclear weapons included.

"We believe it is still possible to achieve a positive result in Vienna on the basis of the draft agreement proposed by the socialist countries on February 20, 1986," said the head of the Soviet delegation.

"The draft is sufficiently balanced, it takes into account in an equal measure the security interests of the sides and is feasible.

If it proves impossible to overcome differences between the sides on the basis of this draft, it would be advisable to find another way out of this situation. For instance, it is possible to consider the simplest form of agreement on a certain reduction in the troops of the USSR and the United States in Central Europe given reciprocal observation over the reduction.

This step could be supplemented by a mutual political commitment of the sides to the effect that in view of the talks on the reduction of conventional armaments on the all-European scale they will not build up their troops and armaments in central Europe.

This could be useful both in itself and with regard to the creation of a more favourable atmosphere for all-European talks," Mikhaylov said.

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CSO: 5200/1172

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: MSU KULIKOV PROPOSES PACT-NATO MEET ON ARMS REDUCTION

LD091943 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1910 GMT 9 Dec 86

[Text] Berlin, 9 Dec (ADN) -- In its Wednesday edition, BERLINER ZEITUNG will publish a report from Moscow, which was prereleased to ADN. It is headlined: "Kulikov-Rogers Meeting?" It has the following text:

It has been learned from diplomatic circles and correspondents in Moscow that in the past 2 weeks the Warsaw Pact Organization has taken the following steps to establish contacts with NATO with a view to discussing questions pertaining to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, has proposed to General Bernard Rogers, the supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe, that a meeting be held. Ambassador S. Todorov, chairman of the Warsaw Pact Working Group, addressed a letter to M. Guidi, chairman of the NATO Special Group for Questions of Controlling Conventional Armaments, proposing the establishment of direct contacts.

H. Krolikowski, general secretary of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, sent a message to Lord Carrington, NATO secretary-general, calling for support for a dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in order to resolve the problem of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments on the continent.

So far nothing is known about any official NATO reaction to these proposals, nor has NATO reacted to the Budapest Appeal made by the Warsaw Pact states last June.

At the same time, Warsaw Pact diplomats are expressing the hope that NATO may examine the question of establishing direct contacts between the organizations in a constructive spirit.

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CSO: 5200/1190

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR PRAISE FOR POLISH CSCE DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

Ambassador Kashlev Address

LD081412 Moscow TASS in English 1347 GMT 8 Dec 86

[Text] Vienna December 8 TASS -- The delegation of the Polish People's Republic has tabled a proposal at the Vienna meeting of the participating states in the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe on supplementing the mandate of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe. The substance of this proposal is that at its next stage the conference could get down to the issues of European disarmament. What is meant concretely is that the participating states start a debate and taking steps on reducing the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and in parallel -- on further confidence-building measures.

The submitted document also stipulates that the conference will examine measures for building confidence and military-strategic stability, which are new in their nature, are linked directly to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and make it easier to reach accords on these issues.

Addressing a plenary session, Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev, head of the USSR delegation, said that the proposal by the Polish People's Republic is a concrete and constructive contribution to the work of the all-European forum. The understandings on confidence-building measures, which were reached in Stockholm, create solid prerequisites for further moving forward to drafting new effective decisions leading to real disarmament in Europe.

The Soviet delegation, like the delegations of other socialist countries, sees the principal goal of the conference's subsequent stage in getting down to practical talks on real measures for disarmament, the Soviet representative stressed.

Moscow Radio Commentary

LD101813 Moscow International Service in Polish 1400 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Station commentary]

[Text] As we all know, on Monday, Poland submitted an important initiative at the meeting of representatives of 35 European states, the United States and Canada. Our commentator writes:

The essence of the Polish initiative amounts to the possibility of getting down to solving problems of disarmament in Europe at the next stage of the Stockholm Conference. To that end the Vienna meeting should grant the conference an appropriate mandate. If Poland's proposal gains the support of all participants in the Vienna forum, and a mandate of that kind is granted, the states-participants in the pan-European process at Stockholm will be able not only to discuss confidence-building measures but also to make decisions concerning specific steps in the sphere of the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Speaking in support of the Polish initiative, Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev, chairman of the Soviet delegation in Vienna, said: The Warsaw Pact signatory states submitted at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest this June a wide-ranging and balanced program for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. That very program could become a subject of discussion at the next stage of the Stockholm Conference. The proposal by the PPR delegation makes it possible to begin a comprehensive and open discussion of disarmament problems in Europe in the wide circle of all participants in the pan-European process and taking into consideration the interests of all states, equally large and small.

But that is precisely what is feared by the United States. After all, it has happened now more than once that at various pan-European meetings the United States has found itself in the situation of the emperor with no clothes on. The United States feels much better when only two sides, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, are taking part in negotiations behind closed doors. Then it is possible to blame all lack of progress on the inflexible East. It is also probably not by accident that while the mere idea which forms the basis of the Polish initiative was still only floating in the air, as they say, U.S. officials declared that there was no room at disarmament negotiations for nonaligned and neutral countries.

But these objections carry little weight when compared to the logica of the Polish initiative. In fact, it is a common logic of peace, which the Warsaw Pact states take as their basis. Here is what General Viktor Tatarnikov, a leading Soviet military expert, and member of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna meeting, said in connection with this.

[Begin recording] [Tatarnikov in Russian with superimposed Polish translation] As we all know, the Stockholm Conference has a mandate obliging it to deal with specific issues, such as confidence-building measures, and security and disarmament. The first two issues--confidence-building measures and security--in general have already been examined in Stockholm. At present disarmament is on the agenda. The Vienna forum should assist in the realization of this problem. That is, it should extend the mandate of the Stockholm conference to enable it to deal more effectively with disarmament problems and stress those very problems. Of course, today this is a highly topical problem on the continent as no part of the world is so overloaded with armed forces and weapons as Europe. An appropriate mechanism for solving this problem would be the Stockholm Conference. It is a well set mechanism and, in effect, an operating one. That is why I think that the Vienna meeting can play an extremely important role in this matter. [end recording]

It only remains to add that on the day it was submitted, the Polish initiative was also supported by the delegations of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Other participants in the meeting have shown great interest in the proposal by Poland. The proceedings of the Vienna forum are continuing.

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CSO: 5200/1172

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS CONFERENCE ON TEST BAN

Text of Press Conference

LD022354 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2005 GMT 2 Dec 86

["Press Conference on Problems of Banning Nuclear Tests" at USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow on 2 December, with panelists Yuli Mikhaylovich Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign affairs minister; Andranik Melkonovich Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy; and Igor Leonovich Nersesov, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR; presented by B.N. Pyadyshev--recorded]

[Text] [Pyadyshev] Esteemed comrades, ladies and gentlemen. Why is it that while Soviet test sites have been silent, since 6 August 1985, nuclear explosions have continued to thunder at the American test sites? Why is it that the latest round of talks between Soviet and U.S. delegations in Geneva ended without tangible results? Our press conference today is devoted to these problems. Taking part in it are Yuli Mikhaylovich Vorontsov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs; Andranik Melkonovich Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy; and Igor Leonovich Nersesov, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR, leader of the integrated experiment of Soviet and American scientists in Kazakhstan.

[Vorontsov] The total cessation of all nuclear tests -- we are still convinced of this -- is a major measure of prime importance, leading the fastest way to the curtailment of nuclear weapons and their subsequent elimination. So it is no accident that it became an integral part of the proposals that were proposed by the Soviet side at the meeting in Reykjavik. This conviction of ours was again confirmed in the Delhi Declaration signed during the recent visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to India, where, among specific and urgent measures directed at disarmament, a full ban on testing nuclear weapons was also clearly designated.

As is known, because of the attitude of the American side on the question of maintaining the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty provisions, in Reykjavik, unfortunately, it did not prove possible to reach final agreement on any of the directions discussed there. But both in matters of strategic offensive weapons, and on medium-range missiles, the sides were close to reaching mutual understanding also on the problem of testing.

President Reagan in particular expressed agreement with -- and I quote -- "the United States and the Soviet Union beginning talks, whose final aim is the complete cessation of nuclear tests." End quote.

However, on the question of tests, too, the American side is now disowning the Reykjavik accords, evidence of this being all the subsequent statements of administration representatives and also the third round of Soviet-American talks that has ended in Geneva. The American side even refuses to include the word "halt" in the name of these talks, proposing to discuss merely the tests themselves.

In what do we see the reason for such a stance? Above all, of course, not in the issue of monitoring [kontrol]. In the course of many years, perhaps even decades now, we have constantly been told: Once there is satisfactory monitoring [kontrol], there will be an agreement [soglasheniye] on the banning of tests. Even in Reykjavik, evidently through force of habit, President Reagan again spoke of the need for reliable monitoring. [kontrol].

But this was obviously said as a result of inertia. There is no longer any problem of monitoring the cessation of nuclear tests.

In our dealings with the current U.S. Administration, we have already been convinced on more than one occasion that when even its own position on this or that issue begins to hamper them, they change it as easily as people change their gloves. I suppose this has become their favorite trick in politics. One thing is said, but ultimately something entirely different is done. This is also relevant to the question of tests. When the argument about the inadequacy of monitoring [kontrol] collapsed, it became, I suppose, quite clear to everyone that the emperor has no clothes -- the United States simply doesn't want to end testing.

The reason for the American side's refusal to agree to the ending of tests lies in the fact that the United States is openly placing its stake on obtaining military superiority over the Soviet Union by means of the development [sozdaniye] of third-generation nuclear weapons. During the nuclear tests which are being carried out at the current time in the United States it is not just new nuclear warheads that are being developed [razrabatyvatsya], but space-based strike armaments that are also being developed [sozdavatsya] in accordance with SDI -- the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative.

[Vorontsov] Taking the arms race to new frontiers, Washington now says directly that until the time when nuclear arms are liquidated, nuclear blasts will have to thunder on earth. The fact that the problem of monitoring [kontrol] was only an excuse was confirmed once again by the Soviet-American talks, whose third round has only just ended. But Comrade Petrosyants will speak about this in more detail:

[Petrosyants] The Soviet Union has done everything it could in order to move the problem of the complete ban on nuclear test away from a deadlock. Unfortunately, despite this the United States has not responded to the appeals to join in the moratorium, which we have announced and extended four times. But we do not intend to abandon the struggle for a complete halt to nuclear tests. We will, as before, vigorously strive for the achievement, together with all those who fight for the noble goal -- for a world free of nuclear arms and violence -- and for a complete halt to nuclear blasts on Earth.

[Pyadyshev] We already have a number of questions concerning the recent round of talks in Geneva. I will call upon Comrade Petrosyants now.

[Petrosyants] Thank you. [Word indistinct] a considerable number of various peace initiatives including those from 15 January 1986, and finally after the proposal of the Soviet side, this year, in 1986, in July 1986 the first consultations were held after a 6-year break, concerning the preparation linked with nuclear tests. There have already been three rounds this year -- in July, September, and November; it would seem that things are going briskly, but in fact we have not made any progress at all.

I would like to give you a few interesting facts: Here is an example: I will read the statement literally as a quote, not as my words but as a statement of the American side: the cessation of nuclear tests together with the liquidation of nuclear weapons is the final step and not the first step at talks on halting nuclear tests.

Turning your attention to this fact -- the cessation of nuclear tests is the final step and not the first step at the talks on ending the tests. Generally speaking, there is no logic in such a formulation of the question at all. It would seem that it is clear to every layman, not to mention a specialist, or any person, that if you halt tests you are already making the first step toward no further perfecting of nuclear weapons and furthermore, no further development [sozdavat] of lethal types of weapons, nuclear weapons.

It would seem that this is clear. However, unfortunately, in this context the American side poses the question exactly in this way and the so-called end goal is paramount here. And when we ask the question: What do you understand by the end goal, or, to be more precise, the long-term goal -- that is to say, the United States poses the question about the banning and halting nuclear arms tests as the long-term goal. I ask the question, a simple and natural one: What does it mean to say "long-term goal"? A year? Two years? Three years? How much time? The answer to this was forthcoming: This will only happen when the climate in the whole world is appropriate, when a situation arises in which there will be no need for nuclear arms. And, moreover, for as long as nuclear arms exist, the testing ought to continue, too. Here you have the American side's position. It is, of course, perfectly...does not make it possible to tackle the preparation of the treaty for real. [as heard]

[Pyadyashev] A question from the NOVOSTI press agency, to Igor Leonovich Nersesov, the head of the joint experiment of the Soviet and American scientists in Kazakhstan. In November this year, a group of Soviet scientists paid a visit to the United States. Can you tell us about the course and the results of this trip. What concrete accords have been reached with the American National Resources Defense Council [NRDC]. Please, Igor Leonovich, go ahead:

(Nersesov) This trip had been planned for the month of September, in connection with the fact that the main work on the joint experiment was already under way in the Soviet Union. We received permission only in November -- moreover, on these strange conditions: either we are the Council's private guest and we can stay in the United States for 1 week, visiting, strictly, only four places: San Diego, Dallas, Washington and New York, without the right to visit Nevada, that is to say, the facility that we would be coming to visit, or else we are taking part in the nuclear arms tests in the Nevada test range and then we are the guests of the U.S. Government. Well -- we rejected this latter option and we went as guests of the American NRDC. American specialists showed us samples of rock from eight localities in the region of Nevada, corresponding cartographic materials, geological maps and slides of the localities which had beforehand been selected by American seismologists, according to the geological data, as being suitable for work to be done there. On the basis of these materials we chose three localities, similar to those which exist in the Soviet Union, in Kazakhstan.

We agreed to establish on these sites now, directly, in the very near future, land-based seismological observation posts, without Soviet experts, since we have no permission to stay in Nevada. Furthermore, on these sites we plan, as in the Soviet Union, to drill 100-meter bores and step up new apparatus, until our partners in the council have a clear idea as to whether the American Government will give permission for bores to be drilled on these sites, given that all land in these sites is state property.

[Clark] Kate Clark, MORNING STAR, Great Britain. A lot has been written and shown on television here about the Soviet-American experiment in Semipalatinsk.

I would like to know whether, during your stay in the United States, the U.S. media also spoke a great deal about the initial stage of work by Soviet scientists in Nevada.

[Nersesov] Yes, our visit was reported in quite some detail by various newspapers during our stay in the United States; also at press conferences -- we took part in three press conferences. And, on the whole, the situation was pretty objectively described -- namely, the American Government does not permit us to carry out work in Nevada.

[Unidentified correspondent] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, quite recently U.S. Secretary of State Shultz said that the Soviet Union and the United States had come to an accord on the notes in respect of the issues of halting nuclear tests; now the issue to be discussed is what the melody is to be. How far does this correspond to reality; and if there is some sort of accord, what is the nature of this?

[Vorontsov] I think the secretary of state got a bit carried away with his metaphors. From the United States we hear but one melody, somewhat loud and in a low key -- the melody of nuclear explosions. As for accords, and those notes -- you have just been told how we tried to set to music everything positive that could be done at the negotiations in Geneva. But we did not manage to set it to music.

[Pyadyshev] Your question, please.

[Hardi] From here, if I may. Mihaly Hardi, Hungarian Television. Past week, the 131st strategic bomber came into armed service in the United States. After this, does not Soviet Union consider invalid all the existing limits of the SALT-II agreement, or will strategic parity be re-established on the part of the Soviet Union on a one-to-one basis?

[Vorontsov] On this account we at present have in front of us just a public statement from the Pentagon, plus some commentaries from individual U.S. officials. So far we have not received any official statement on this account addressed to us and there has not even been a public statement of that kind from the White House, from the President of the United States, or from the secretary of state. The Soviet Union is at present carefully studying the situation and I think that in time, once we also have in our hands the official reaction from the White House, we will be able to meet you once again and then talk specifically about all these issues.

[Unidentified correspondent] Soviet Television. Over the last few days in the United States there have been statements, in particular, for example, an expert such as Rowney recently made a statement that the closed nature of the Soviet society, as he put it, is an obstacle to monitoring [kontroll], how the Soviet Union observes agreements in the field of arms control. I would like to ask you to comment on these statements by the American side.

[Vorontsov] Evidently Mr Bowney is somewhat lagging behind the quickly-passing time. I do not know what closed Soviet society he finds at present, at a time when we propose that American scientists work on our nuclear testing grounds, at a time when we -- the Soviet Union -- have agreed to and have actively worked in Stockholm for on-site inspections [proverki] in necessary instances; when the Soviet Union is proposing the most extensive monitoring of reductions both in nuclear weapons and in conventional armaments in Europe. All this goes side by with our proposals, and numerous proposals at that, on these issues. Therefore, it would probably be better if people in the United States kept in step with the times rather than repeating fables from the past.

[Walker] Martin Walker, THE GUARDIAN. A question for Mr Vorontsov. The Soviet moratorium expires on 31 December. Has a decision already been made on extending once again the moratorium or is the Soviet Union going to resume nuclear tests next year?

[Pyadyshev] A similar question has been submitted here from Mr (?Nyudzume), from the Japanese newspaper ASAHI. Go ahead, please.

[Vorontsov] Indeed, our moratorium remains in force until 1 January next year. But there is still time, there is still time for the leadership of the United States to join in this moratorium, and then there will be no nuclear tests of any kind on both sides. I think that, of course, this is not much time, but it is enough for the United States to make an important political decision. And, even though the United States is so preoccupied with other, sensational matters, I think it will not forget that our moratorium expires on 31 December and that it will make a decision of its own on whether to join the moratorium or not. And thus, the question of making a decision is, mainly, one for the United States leadership, and what follows will depend on this.

TASS Report

PM022041 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 3 Dec 86 p 1

[TASS report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center: Will There Be Silence in Nevada?"]

[Text] The complete cessation of all nuclear tests is a top-priority measure, the shortest way to the curtailment and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons. It is no coincidence therefore that this measure was an organic part of the proposals submitted by the Soviet side at the meeting in Reykjavik.

This conviction was reaffirmed in the Delhi Declaration signed during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to India. Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, emphasized after opening a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists devoted to the problem of banning nuclear tests. It took place 2 December at the USSR Foreign Ministry's Press Center.

Unfortunately, because of the U.S. side's position in Reykjavik concerning the maintenance of the ABM Treaty, final accords could not be reached on any of the avenues discussed there, the speaker continued, but -- as on the questions of strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles -- the sides were close to reaching understanding on the test problem also. In particular President Reagan voiced assent to "the United States and the Soviet Union beginning talks whose ultimate aim is the complete cessation of nuclear tests."

However, on the issue of tests also the U.S. side is now disowning the Reykjavik accords.

The reason for the U.S. side's refusal to agree to end tests lies in the fact that the United States is openly aiming to secure military superiority over the USSR by creating [sozdaniye] third-generation nuclear weapons.

The press conference also heard a statement from A.M. Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, who dwelt on the results of the third round of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on questions of halting nuclear tests.

As a result of persistent Soviet proposals, he said, the first consultations for 6 years on questions connected with ending nuclear tests were held in July 1986. It was only after Reykjavik that the ice started to break to some extent. At the start of the third round in November the U.S. side reportedly that it had come not for meetings -- as it had previously insisted -- but for negotiations. This represented some movement forward. But in fact no headway was made.

The U.S. side proposed that secondary issues be resolved, in particular, the question of determining the yield of the nuclear explosions being carried out. For the Soviet side, which has declared a moratorium -- and a complete and unconditional moratorium at that -- this issue is of no great importance. But we were prepared to examine it if the U.S. side would say that it assesses this issue as a step toward a quest for ways to conclude a treaty or an agreement on ending nuclear weapons tests. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

The U.S. side declares: The ending of nuclear tests in parallel with the elimination of nuclear weapons is the final and not the first step at negotiations to end nuclear tests. There is no logic in this formulation of the issue.

Unfortunately, the U.S. side is talking of a "final" -- or, more precisely, "long-term" -- goal. The question we pose is a simple and natural one. What does "long-term goal" mean? A year? Two years? Three? How many? Their answer to this: Only when the appropriate situation prevails throughout the world, only when the situation is such that nuclear weapons are unnecessary. Moreover, while nuclear weapons exist there must also be tests. This is the position of the U.S. side.

Then Yu.M. Vorontsov, A.M. Petrosyants, and I.L. Marseesov, corresponding member of the American SSR Academy of Sciences and leader of the comprehensive experiment in Kazakhstan by Soviet and U.S. scientists, replied to journalists' questions.

Vorontsov Statement

LD021043 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0905 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 2 Dec (TASS) -- USSR first deputy foreign minister Yuliy Vorontsov has spoken at a press conference which took place here today. He said:

The complete ending of all nuclear tests — and we remain convinced of this — is a most important immediate measure and the shortest route leading to a reduction in nuclear arms and their subsequent elimination.

It is not fortuitous, therefore, that this measure formed an integral part of the proposals which were put forward by the Soviet side at the Reykjavik meeting. This conviction of ours was confirmed again in the Delhi Declaration, signed during the recent visit to India by Mikhail Gorbachev: among specific and urgent measures aimed at disarmament it clearly mentions "a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests."

As is known, because of the stance of the U.S. side on the question of maintenance of the ABM treaty, there was, unfortunately, no success in Reykjavik in attaining final accords on any of the topics discussed there. But, as in the questions of strategic offensive weapons and medium-range missiles, the sides were close to reaching an understanding on the question of tests, too. In particular, President Reagan voiced assent to "the United States and the Soviet Union beginning talks, the objective of which is the complete cessation of nuclear tests."

However, on the question of tests, too, the U.S. side is now disowning the Reykjavik accords, evidence of this being all the subsequent statements of Administration spokesmen and the third round of the Soviet-U.S. talks that has ended in Geneva. Even in naming these talks the U.S. side refuses to include the word "halt", proposing to discuss merely the tests themselves.

What do we see as the reason for such a stance? Above all, of course, not in the issue of verification (kontrol). For many years, perhaps even decades now, we have constantly been told: once there is satisfactory verification [kontrol] there will be an agreement on the banning of tests. Even in Reykjavik, evidently through force of habit, President Reagan again spoke of the need for reliable verification [kontrol].

But this was obviously said in a mechanical fashion. There is no longer any problem as regards verification [kontrol] of a halt to nuclear tests. After all in the past year alone our side has made in this sphere so many proposals removing any worry there might have been as regards verification [kontrol] that there would be enough of them for several agreements.

I would like to recall in this connection some of the Soviet Union's proposals. On 15 January 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev said that if the United States agrees to a halt to nuclear explosions on a mutual basis the necessary verification [kontrol] of the observance of a moratorium would be fully ensured by national technical means and also with the help of international procedures, and where necessary by on-site inspection.

On 24 August 1986, replying to another message of the "Delhi Six", Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the readiness of the Soviet side to send its experts to the meeting on verification [kontrol] issues proposed by "The Six" between experts of "The Six" and experts of the USSR and the United States. We agreed to also take up the proposal of the six countries on giving assistance in verifying [proverka] the halting of nuclear tests, including on-site inspection [inspeksiya na mestakh].

In accordance with an agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council, dated 28 May 1986, U.S. scientists have set up seismological equipment in the area of Semipalatinsk to check the nonconduct of nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union. What is more, in answers given to RUDE PRAVO on 9 September of this year Mikhail Gorbachev suggested that this accord between scientists should be turned into an official agreement.

He then suggested to President Reagan that thought should be given to the possibility of creating an international supra-national network to verify [kontrol] the halting of tests.

At the disarmament conference of 22 July 1986 we proposed beginning the development [razrabotka] of a system for prompt transmission of second-level seismic data using seismic stations united into a global network. At the same time we suggested that an international experiment on exchanging such data be conducted in 1988.

However, the U.S. reaction to all these constructive steps from the USSR as well as to the numerous proposals of the "Delhi Six" and to the recommendations of the Nonaligned Movement conference in Harare only too clearly attests that in reality it is not at all a matter of verification [kontrol].

In our dealings with the present U.S. Administration we have already seen for ourselves on more than one occasion that when their own position on some issue begins to hamper them, they change it as easily as they would a pair of gloves. For this has become their favorite trick in politics. One things is said but ultimately something entirely different is done. This is also relevant to the question of tests. When the argument about the inadequacy of verification [kontrol] collapsed, it became quite clear to everyone that the "emperor has lost his clothes": The United States simply doesn't want to end testing.

The reason for the U.S. side's refusal to agree to the ending of tests lies in the fact that the United States is openly banking on obtaining military superiority over the USSR by the creation [sozdaniye] of third-generation nuclear weapons. During the nuclear tests which are being carried out at the present time in the United States it is not just new nuclear warheads that are being developed [razrabatyvatsya] but space-based strike armaments that are also being created [sozdavatsya] in accordance with the SDI program.

Taking the arms race to new frontiers, Washington is now stating directly that nuclear explosions have to resound on Earth until such time as nuclear weapons are eliminated. The fact that problems of verification [kontrol] have been merely an excuse has once again been confirmed by the Soviet-U.S. talks, the third round of which has just ended.

The Soviet Union has done everything incumbent upon it in order to break the deadlock of the problem of the complete banning of nuclear tests. Unfortunately the United States did not respond to the calls for it to join in the moratorium which we introduced and extended four times.

But we do not intend to give up the struggle for a complete ending of nuclear tests and we will continue vigorously to secure the achievement of this together with all those who are struggling for the noble aim of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons.

Vorontsov Answers on Moratorium

LD021120 Moscow TASS in English 1114 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 2 TASS -- The Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions will be in effect till January 1, 1987, Yuliy Vorontsov, a first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, said in reply to questions at a press conference here today. He noted that the U.S. leadership still had time to join that moratorium.

The Soviet Union's stand on nuclear testing will depend on the actions of the USA, Vorontsov said. Since the Soviet Union introduced its moratorium, the USA has carried out 23 nuclear weapon tests. Most of them were related to the development of third-generation weapons rather than intended to check the safety of existing nuclear munitions. Seeking to break away from the Soviet Union and achieve one-sided military superiority, the USA is energetically working to develop nuclear weapons for "Star Wars."

In this situation, Vorontsov said, the endless extension of the unilateral moratorium would imperil the security of the USSR and its allies.

The problem of nuclear testing is inseparable from the U.S. attempts to develop weapons of new types. That is why it was included in the package of proposals made by the USSR in Reykjavik. The linkage of those problems is not at all far-fetched or artificial because the SDI programme envisions continued nuclear testing, Vorontsov said.

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CSO: 5200/1189

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR EXPERT INTERVIEWED ON SEISMOLOGICAL MONITORING OF TESTS

AU051455 East Berlin NATIONAL-ZEITUNG in German 3 Dec 86 p 4

[Report by Moscow correspondent Michael Graeme]

[Text] The experiment jointly agreed by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the private Natural Resources Defense Council of the United States is the prototype of a system for efficient verification of a nuclear test ban. This was stated by the Soviet scientist Igor Nersesov, head of the seismological department of the Academy Institute for Earth Physics and member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, in an interview with ADN after his return from the United States. "With this experiment we will show that it is easy to implement a verification system. The basis of such a verification has been created. It can be used in any area of any country, provided there is the will to stop the nuclear explosions."

As in the Kazakh cities of Karkaralinsk (Karaganda region), Bayan-Aul (Pavlodar), and Karasu (Semipalatinsk) three measuring stations have already been put into operation and Nersesov was recently in the United States with a delegation of scientists to select suitable sites for seismic measurements in the Nevada testing area. The U.S. Government did not consent to direct visits to these places.

Based on cartographic and geological material as well as on dispositions and space photos, the American partners proposed eight observation bases for selection. "Taking into account the view of American specialists, we selected the places on the basis of these materials in order to break the deadlock and be able to start the observations in Nevada," Nersesov stated. These places are in Nelson, south of Las Vegas, in Troy Canyon, northeast of the testing area, and in Deep Springs, on the border between Nevada and California. The distance from the U.S. testing area is approximately a big as that of the Kazakh stations from the Soviet.

In the United States, too, the experiment is to be implemented in two stages. As the first step the U.S. scientists approved the beginning of temporary observations with instruments at the surface at the beginning of December. Then drilling will be carried out just as in Kazakhstan. According to the

agreement, the U.S. side will supply the measuring instruments which supply clear information from deep underground. As the USSR experts have not been given direct access to the measuring stations, the data measured at the testing area will be supplied to the universities of San Diego and Reno, where they will be jointly evaluated.

"Of course, we do not have equal conditions," Nersesov stated. "In our country we selected the measuring points together with the Americans, who to a considerable extent determined the drilling sites." The U.S. scientists were not sure either, whether they would obtain approval for the required drillings from their government. "From the beginning we agreed to unilateral actions with the American side, as far as the monitoring of the testing areas is concerned. This is a demonstration of the good will of the Soviet Union. With the direct experiment we confirm that we agree to verifications in our country."

Nersesov praised the fruitful cooperation over many years with scientists from a number of U.S. universities. There has been an agreement on the forecasting of earthquakes since 1973. "We visit each other, pursue joint research, and publish joint works. The experiences show that we can cooperate very efficiently."

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CSO: 5200/1181

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS COMMENT ON SEISMOGRAPHIC MONITORING OF TESTS

LD141852 Moscow TASS in English 1822 GMT 14 Nov 86

[**"Unsupportable Stand"--TASS identifier]**

[Text] Moscow November 14 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Boris Shabayev writes:

Seismographs recorded another American nuclear weapon test in Nevada, the 23rd in the 15 months since the Soviet Union had introduced its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

Seismographs are impartial instruments which only record earth tremors. People are different: They will never look on impassively as irresponsible politicians subvert the foundations of world peace and security. The opinion of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of these people was reflected in a resolution of the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly on the immediate termination and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

The committee called upon all states to make every effort and to display political will immediately to draw up and conclude a comprehensive treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests and urged the United States to join the repeatedly extended Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions without waiting for the conclusion of the treaty. The delegations of 90 states voted for that draft resolution tabled by socialist countries and only three delegations, the USA, Britain and France, were against it.

Washington argues that the termination of nuclear tests calls for efficient control and at the same time is putting spokes into the wheels of the joint Soviet-American experiment called upon to demonstrate the dependability of a system of verification devised by scientists from the two countries. While American detection instruments were mounted near a Soviet nuclear test site way back in July and American scientists worked there, Soviet specialists were at first kept out of the USA and then granted visas but forbidden to travel to the areas where Soviet instruments were going to be mounted. So it is not verification that is Washington's headache but a pretext to continue nuclear tests.

They on the other side of the ocean keep harping on a U.S. "lag" in nuclear weapons, which should be closed through carrying on nuclear tests. But what "lag" are they talking about if the USA has carried out more nuclear weapon tests than all the nuclear powers put together, including the USSR? No, it is not to "catch up" with the Soviet Union that Washington is trying but to achieve military superiority and to secure U.S. dominance through strength in the world.

This position is absolutely unsupportable because it is at odds with the realities of our age and with the vital interests of the whole of mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1189

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S GERASIMOV REJECTS PIPES' CASE AGAINST MORATORIUM

PM121325 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 49, 7 Dec 86 p 5

["The Soviet Moratorium: Two Approaches" -- MOSCOW NEWS headline]

[Text] "Will what I write be censored?" asked Richard Pipes, a Harvard University professor. That was Mr Pipes' first reaction when "MN" New York correspondent Edgar Cheporov requested his views concerning the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests blasts that the Soviet Union began in August 1985. The moratorium has since been extended four times.

"No, no cuts will be made," replied Cheporov. MN has kept that promise and below has printed the views of Prof. Pipes, a noted expert on American-Soviet relations, who between 1981-82 was on the U.S. National Security Council and in charge of problems concerning Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

MN also presented Professor Pipes' views to the Head of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Gennadiy Gerasimov and asked him to comment.

The result is that we have two views of the same problem.

Richard Pipes: Why the U.S. Opposes the Soviet Moratorium

In considering the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing, it is necessary to distinguish the substance of the issue, which is national security first and foremost, from its public relations or political aspects.

Matters of this nature are inherently so complicated that they are best negotiated out of the glare of publicity. When they are turned into major political campaigns, the suspicion naturally arises that they may serve as political ploys meant to influence Western public opinion, and, through it, democratically elected legislatures in a manner favourable exclusively to one party.

The U.S. position on nuclear testing bans has been stated many times. It focuses on two elements: their adverse effect on the quality of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the difficulties of verifying Soviet compliance with them.

Because of the indisputable Soviet superiority in conventional forces -- the U.S. is so antimilitaristic that it does not even have a peacetime draft -- NATO must rely for its security on the nuclear deterrent. But nuclear weapons are not static, immutable objects. Existing stockpiles deteriorate from chemical changes. Alterations in design

which have enabled the U.S. to reduce its megatonnage to one-quarter of what it was in 1960 also cannot be undertaken without testing. Thus, nuclear tests have once revealed that 75 percent of one type of warhead destined for the Polaris submarine produced no yield at all.

Work on strategic defences calls for testing. In other words, only through continuous testing in a safe underground environment can the U.S. and its allies feel confident that their deterrent will work when needed. On these grounds, the U.S. has declared that as long as it must rely on the nuclear deterrent, nuclear testing will go on.

There also exists concern that the Soviet Union, whose society is much less open than ours, may take advantage of a moratorium to prepare (in secret) tests that it would, when ready, spring on the unsuspecting world. This happened in 1961, when the USSR suddenly and unilaterally broke an understanding with Washington not to launch tests without reasonable warning, carrying out in two months 40 atmospheric tests which the U.S. could not match.

The other consideration has to do with verification. The Soviet Union is a very large country with a complex geological structure. Under existing techniques of independent verification, carried out outside its borders by seismic techniques, the U.S. can have no assurance that the Soviet Union abides by the existing test limitation accords. Indeed, many American experts suspect, perhaps unfairly, that the Soviet Union has many times violated the threshold testing ban treaty since signing it in 1974. My country has, on several occasions, proposed negotiations on this matter only to meet with rebuffs, for which reason it has refused to submit this treaty to the Senate for ratification.

The unwillingness of the Soviet Union to engage in serious talks on verification has been a major stumbling block to further limits on testing. It is hard to understand why Moscow has failed to accept President Reagan's invitation of April 1986 to send its experts to the Nevada testing grounds to monitor U.S. testing, using any instrumentation they choose. Instead, it has entered into an on-site monitoring agreement with an American group which has no official status. The U.S. position is that such issues can be resolved on a government-to-government basis.

One can, of course, argue that a moratorium on testing would impose the same restrictions on the Soviet side as on the American. Soviet nuclear stockpiles are also subject to deterioration, and new Soviet designs also require experiments. But the differences between the two societies make such a moratorium more dangerous for the West.

For one, the existence of an independent press would virtually preclude the U.S. Government making secret preparations to violate existing accords. For another, it would be very difficult for the U.S. to terminate a moratorium after it has expired, because public opinion and the legislature would see this as a belligerent act. For both these reasons, it would have been quite impossible for the U.S. to break a testing moratorium as the Soviet Union had done in 1961.

The U.S. position on the Soviet proposal has been clearly stated many times. Limitations on nuclear testing must be compatible with U.S. and allied national interests. Given the central role the U.S. nuclear deterrent plays in these interests, testing will continue within the limits agreed upon in the threshold treaty. If the Soviet Union responds positively to the concerns about verification, the President will submit this treaty for ratification. A total ban on nuclear testing remains a

long-term U.S. objective, but it is conceivable only in the context of significant arms reductions, reliable verification, and an improved balance in conventional forces.

There is a widespread feeling in the United States that the Soviet Union exploits the easily misunderstood and emotionally appealing slogan of a testing moratorium for its own purpose. One of these is to kill the Strategic Defense Initiative which cannot proceed without tests. The other is to impel the United States toward something it has stated it will not do, namely, give up testing altogether. In the words of an official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Soviet moratorium proposal "is an invitation to a comprehensive test ban with no semblance of verification."

A testing ban is only one element in international security and not necessarily the central one. Many Americans feel that the Soviet Union has proposed it as a means of concealing its unwillingness to engage in equitable and verifiable arms reductions. It is up to the Soviet Government to prove, in the talks now under way, that these suspicions are unfounded.

Gennadiy Gerasimov: Testing Is the Ignition Key for the Arms Race Motor

Whenever a person doesn't agree about something but doesn't want to show it directly, he or she starts to make up excuses. Getting carried away, that person sometimes forgets that a lot of excuses make people suspicious since then it becomes easier to prove that they contradict one another or their premises.

Richard Pipes doesn't want to stop the arms race because he hates the Soviet system (he makes no secret of it) and because he wishes its demise (which is also no secret to those who have read the professor's writings). Accordingly, he wants no stop to nuclear testing.

But his article seems to be about something different.

For starters, he casts a deep shadow of doubt on Soviet intentions. Whatever we say, he knows our intentions better than we do. Why, he asks, turn complicated issues into major political campaigns? What he means is: Why should ordinary citizens rack their brains to help resolve the nuclear threat?

But where's his proof that the issue is complicated? There isn't any. Instead, there's only the airs that the professor has taken on -- a centuries-old ruse used by all overlords: The rabble (in the past) and the public (of today) can meddle with our princely affairs.

In actual fact, the matter of testing cannot be plainer, and this is the reason why it can become the focus of public attention easier than other matters. One doesn't have to go to Harvard to realize that, for the nuclear arms race to continue, there have to be tests since there is otherwise no way to know whether or not a new nuclear contraption will work. Mr Pipes complains that 75 percent of one type of warhead designed for the Polaris submarine produced no yield at all.

If you are out to invent weapons, then you are for testing. The bent for testing has various explanations: technological fatalism, ideological irreconcilability, the interests of national security at last.

If you are against the nuclear arms race, you will agree that testing is the ignition key for the motor of the arms race. Remove the key from the ignition and stop testing,

and that would stop nuclear military-technical progress (if progress is the right word to describe today's movement towards a nuclear abyss).

Thus Pipes starts by voicing suspicion about "political ploys". But a ploy implies a secret intent. And the USSR has no such intent whatsoever — Pipes cannot prove that an end to testing would only benefit the Soviet Union.

In the next paragraph he mentions "two elements" of America's opposition. Both are indeed equally applicable to the Soviet side: "A test ban would have an adverse effect on the quality of Soviet nuclear weapons and there would be difficulties of verifying American compliance with them".

What follows next are complaints about deterioration in American nuclear arsenals which, supposedly, have to be periodically checked and rechecked.

But they don't have to be. Nuclear weapons are not perishable lettuce. The components liable to "chemical changes", mentioned by the history professor, can be tested separately, without nuclear explosions. Anyway, in working on a treaty to put an end to testing, Soviet experts are prepared to share with Americans the "secrets" on how to check the quality of nuclear weapons without having to detonate them.

The next argument advanced by Pipes is about Soviet cunning, and he refers to 1961.

Let's go back to 1961. Let's quote THE DEFENSE MONITOR published by the Center for Defense Information in Washington.

In August 1959 the U.S. extended till the year's end the moratorium earlier announced by the USSR, the USA and Britain. The USSR responded by announcing that it would comply with the moratorium as long as Western countries did so. In December 1959 US President Dwight Eisenhower announced the termination of the American moratorium, saying that "we consider ourselves free to resume nuclear weapons tests."

In February 1960, France conducted a nuclear test. Though the Soviet Union had stated that its moratorium was conditional on the Western countries' moratorium, it refrained from testing until September 1961. By that time France had already conducted four tests. The US resumed explosions two weeks after the resumption of Soviet explosions.

THE DEFENSE MONITOR further writes:

"Did the Soviets 'break' the moratorium? Not according to US officials serving at the time, who agree that the moratorium had been ended by the 1959 Eisenhower statement.

"Both sides had freed their hands," according to Philip Farley, special assistant for disarmament affairs in Eisenhower's State Department, "and then the Soviets were the first to test, but that is not the same thing as violating the agreement."

A history professor should have remembered that.

Pipes moves next to geology. But everything has been clear in this area for a number of years. The latest details concerning Soviet geology have been studied by American seismologists who visited the Semipalatinsk area. Just one reference: The latest issue of the British magazine Modern Geology said in its editorial that the detection problem has now been solved -- so is the inescapable conclusion from scientific data. MN, by the way, has carried detailed accounts about the American seismologists' visit and the latters' conclusions.

Pipes then wades into jurisprudence. He sees the Soviet side as unwilling to engage in serious talks on verification. But, first, it should be mentioned that serious talks have already been held and that sufficient verification measures have been agreed to. And second, we should not go back to what has been already covered, and not legalize for the future the tests already limited by a certain threshold. Instead, we should go forward to a ban on all tests in general. Such a ban is much easier to monitor than the so-called "threshold" agreement.

Next, as a condition, the professor argues there should be significant arms reductions. But the Soviet Union has already proposed this. A false conclusion. We do not contrast the stopping of tests with the cutting of weapons. We were prepared to go a long way in Reykjavik. America made a step forward to meet us halfway there, but soon reverted to its former position. And as for Pipes, he has taken on the low task of defending nuclear madness.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S RYZHKOV, FINLAND'S SORSA ON NUCLEAR TESTS, ZONES

Ryzhkov Departs for Tallinn

LD190926 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0738 GMT 19 Dec 86

[Text] Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, today left Moscow for Tallinn, capital of Estonia (a Soviet Baltic republic). Together with Finnish Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, who is arriving in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Government, he will take part in the ceremonies to put into operation the Novotallinskiy seaport. The port was built with the participation of Finnish firms. At the airport, Comrade Ryzhkov was seen off by Comrade Aliyev and other officials.

Speeches at Port Ceremony

LD201003 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 19 Dec 86

[Correspondent (Heimer Lenk) report from Tallinn]

[Summary] A meeting was held in Tallinn today marking the commissioning of the first phase of Novotallinskiy Port. The port took 4 years to construct, and all the work proceeded strictly according to schedule. The port will be the most modern, and the deepest, on the Baltic coast of the USSR, taking vessels up to 100,000 tons. Many of the port installations were erected by Finnish firms.

Finnish Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa spoke at the meeting.

The meeting was then addressed by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

"In economic matters, as in politics, the need today is for a new way of thinking. This is especially important in today's complex international conditions, which pose a threat to the future of civilization on earth. In the nuclear space age, the only question is whether we are to exist, or not exist. After the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, it seemed that only one more step needed to be taken, and the world would be freed of the nuclear threat forever. Unfortunately, not everyone had sufficient political will to cover the remaining distance. The leaders of the United States and of

certain other Western countries are clearly unwilling to give up the illusory idea of gaining military superiority over the USSR. Since the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests has been in force, the explosions of more than 20 nuclear devices tested on U.S. sites have been heard. In the circumstances, the Soviet Union is forced to make a decision on the fate of our unilateral moratorium. First, and most importantly, we reaffirm our proposal that negotiations should begin immediately on a total nuclear test ban. But if the United States continues its explosions in 1987, our country will resume nuclear tests. That is not a simple decision, and not an easy one for us to take. Yet we cannot do otherwise, in the interests of our own security and of the security of our allies.

"We have said more than once that we will find the necessary answer to any actions against our security. Our country acts firmly and consistently on the premise that the world has become too small for wars and the policy of acting from positions of strength. That is the gist of the new mode of political thought that was convincingly demonstrated by the 27th CPSU Congress." [applause] [end recording]

After the meeting, the distinguished guests and the officials accompanying them inspected Novotallinskiy Port.

Ryzhkov on Moratorium Terms

LD191749 Moscow TASS in English 1640 GMT 19 Dec 86

[Text] Tallinn December 19 TASS -- "Soviet-Finnish cooperation is a graphic example of how confidently broad contacts can develop between countries with different social systems," Nikolay Ryzhkov, a member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, today said at a rally devoted to the putting into operation of the Novotallinskiy port, in the construction of which Finnish specialists took part.

The Soviet head of government noted the special importance of this cooperation "in the current complex international situation, when the future of world civilization is imperilled."

"The leaders of the U.S. and some other Western countries are obviously unwilling to give up their illusory hope of achieving military superiority over the USSR," Nikolay Ryzhkov said. "In these circumstances the Soviet Union had to take a decision on the future of its unilateral moratorium. First of all, and this is the main thing, we confirm our proposal for an immediate start to talks on a complete end to nuclear testing," the head of the Soviet Government said. But if the United States continues nuclear explosions in 1987, the USSR will resume nuclear testing, Nikolay Ryzhkov said. "This decision was hard and difficult to us. But proceeding from the interests of our own security and the security of our allies, we cannot act differently," he said.

"We are not renouncing our ideal of a nuclear weapon-free world and will continue to work to achieve it," Nikolay Ryzhkov said. He stressed that "the Soviet Union is prepared at any time to reintroduce the moratorium, which has demonstrated in practice a real opportunity to raise a barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race. The only thing needed is a U.S. statement on a halt to its nuclear explosions."

"The world has become too small for wars and a policy from strength," the speaker said. He stressed that "the Soviet programme for the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 has won broad understanding and approval all over the world. The idea of a comprehensive system of international security has put down firm roots. The Delhi declaration on principles for nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world signed recently by the leaders of the USSR and India has become another signpost for the efforts against the dogmas of policy from strength."

Touching upon Finland's proposal on the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the north of Europe, Nikolay Ryzhkov stressed that the implementation of that proposal would add considerably to the security of the countries of the region and the continent as a whole. The Soviet Union, the speaker said, "is prepared to continue to contribute by concrete deeds to establishing a nuclear-free north."

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR SIGNING OF RAROTONGA TREATY PROTOCOLS

Government Statement on Treaty

PM161215 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

["Soviet Union Signs Protocols to Rarotonga Treaty" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] On 15 December Ye.M. Samoteykin, USSR ambassador to Australia, signed on the Soviet Government's behalf Protocols 2 and 3 to the Treaty on the Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific (the Rarotonga Treaty) in Suva, the Fijian capital, where the headquarters of the South Pacific Forum — the regional organization of the countries of the South Pacific — are located.

The Rarotonga Treaty was approved on 6 August 1985 at the 16th session of the South Pacific Forum on Rarotonga Island (Cook Island). It has been signed by 10 states and ratified by 8 of the 13 South Pacific Forum member-states and came into force on 11 December this year. The treaty envisages the renunciation by those part to it of the production, acquisition, and deployment of all nuclear explosive devices on their territory and bans all nuclear test explosions and the burying of radioactive waste and other radioactive substances within the limits of the zone covered by the treaty.

Three protocols are attached to the treaty which are open for signing by the nuclear powers and provide for their commitments in observing the zone's nonnuclear status. Protocol 1 envisages the commitment of the United States, Britain, and France to apply the relevant provisions of the treaty with regard to territories which they control in the zone in question. Protocol 2 contains a commitment not to use nuclear weapons or to threaten to use them against countries party to the treaty. Protocol 3 contains a commitment not to test any nuclear explosive devices in the zone covered by the treaty.

When signing Protocols 2 and 3 of the Rarotonga Treaty, the Soviet representative made the following Soviet Government statement.

The Soviet Government, which is a consistent supporter of the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world as an important measure in the fight for the elimination of nuclear weapons and wishing to contribute to the efforts of the countries of the South-Pacific Forum in that area, has decided to sign Protocols Two and Three to the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific (the Rarotonga Treaty). The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that the creation of such a zone in the South Pacific will serve as an important contribution to forming a reliable security system in the Asian-Pacific region, will strengthen the international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and will contribute towards the attainment of the task of eliminating the nuclear weapons on earth once and for all.

Expressing its readiness to become a guarantor of a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific, the Soviet Union hopes that all the other nuclear powers will show appropriate responsibility in approaching the initiatives of the countries of that region and will do their utmost to ensure reliably and guarantee a truly non-nuclear status to the non-nuclear zone.

In signing the Protocols Two and Three to the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern part of the Pacific, the USSR Government considers it necessary to make the following statement.

1. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that the transportation of nuclear explosive devices by parties to the treaty anywhere within the limits and outside the limits of the nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific is covered by the prohibitions envisaged by Point "A" of Article Three of the treaty, in which the sides commit themselves "not to exercise control over any nuclear explosive devices in any form anywhere within the limits and outside the limits of the nuclear-free zone."
2. Point Two of Article Five of the treaty permits that each party to the treaty is entitled to taking on its own a decision as regards whether calls of foreign ships and flying vehicles carrying nuclear explosive devices at its ports and airfields or their transit through their territorial sea, archipelago waters and air space be allowed. In that connection the Soviet Union reaffirms its stand that the permission of transit of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in any form and the calls at the ports and airfields within the limits of the nuclear-free zone of foreign war ships and flying vehicles with nuclear explosive devices on board would be in conflict with the aims of the treaty and incompatible with the nuclear-free status of the zone.
3. In the event of any actions undertaken by the state or states, which are parties to the Rarotonga Treaty, in violation of their main commitments under the treaty connected with the non-nuclear status of the zone and perpetration by one or several states — parties to the treaty of an act of aggression with the support of a state having nuclear weapons or jointly with it with the use of by such a state of the territory, air space, territorial sea or archipelago waters of those countries for calls by naval ships and flying vehicles with nuclear weapons on board or transit of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union will have the right to consider itself free from the commitments undertaken under Protocol Two of the treaty. In the event of any other actions by the parties to the treaty incompatible with their nonnuclear status, the USSR reserves for itself the right to reconsider the commitments undertaken under the said protocol.
4. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that the commitments undertaken by it under Protocol Two to the Rarotonga Treaty also apply to the territory, to which the status of the nuclear-free zone applies under Protocol One to the treaty. In so doing, the Soviet Union reaffirms its stand on the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples under the UN declaration on that issue (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514/XV of December 14, 1960).
5. The Soviet Government declares that the provisions of the articles of Protocols Two and Three can apply to the text of the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific in the wording of the treaty in which it has been formulated by the time of the signing of the protocols by the USSR Government, considering its stand set forth in this statement. In this connection, no amendment to the treaty that would come into force in accordance with the provisions of Article Eleven or any change in the geographical outlines in the nuclear-free zone as set in Point "A" of Article One and described in Supplement One to the treaty, without an explicitly expressed consent to that by the USSR.

Shevardnadze Message to Forum

PM161217 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

["USSR Foreign Minister's Message" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, has sent a message to Kamisese Mara, chairman of the South Pacific Forum and prime minister of Fiji, answering the letter sent earlier by Kamisese Mara, forwarding the texts of the protocols to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific Ocean.

The message reports the decision by the Soviet Government to sign Protocols 2 and 3 to the treaty. At the same time it is noted that the Soviet Union's support for the setting up of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific is entirely natural, inasmuch as this step by the states of the South Pacific Forum is entirely in accordance with the main goal our country is supporting on the international scene -- ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space.

The bold and, at the same time, completely feasible program that we set forth at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, and which makes it possible to rid the world of nuclear arms by the end of this century, is directed precisely toward achieving these goals, the message stresses. Our proposals are aimed also at preventing the spread of the military rivalry into space. The Soviet Union counterposes the extremely expensive and particularly dangerous arms race in space, which would also become the main obstacle to liquidating nuclear arms, with a realistic alternative -- a peaceful mastering of space on the basis of cooperation of all states for universal benefit and prosperity.

The message continues as follows:

We entirely share the South Pacific countries' anxiety at the nuclear explosions which continue to thunder in their region, and we understand their desire to put an end to this. For its part, the Soviet Union persistently works for a complete ban on nuclear tests everywhere in the world. Serving as evidence of the sincerity of our intentions on this question is the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which has been strictly observed by the Soviet Union for nearly 1 and 1/2 years. Unfortunately, the present U.S. Administration has not responded to the appeals which have been heard throughout the world to join this unilateral action by the Soviet Union, and has thus not permitted a major step to be taken on the road to nuclear disarmament.

In advocating a practical transition to the building of a nuclear-free world and the creation of a reliable security equal for all states, we are convinced that this task must be placed above all disputes between states and ideological disagreements. Its solution concerns everyone.

By declaring their region a nuclear-free zone, the countries of the South Pacific Forum have once again demonstrated that in the process of liberating mankind from the nuclear burden, there is room for all states, large and small.

We are confident that if the other nuclear powers, like the Soviet Union, take a duly responsible attitude to this initiative, and do everything on their part to ensure that the declared zone enjoys real nonnuclear status, security in the whole Pacific region will be considerably strengthened.

The Soviet Union has no less an interest than the countries of the South Pacific Forum in ensuring that the situation in the Pacific is determined not by military preparations and the policy of confrontation, but by efforts to strengthen security. This is understandable since, though we live far apart, our shores are washed by the same Pacific Ocean.

In urging the creation of a all-embracing system of international peace and security the Soviet Union considers that the region of Asia and the Pacific must become a inseparable part of that system. Moreover, our country has made a whole series of concrete proposals on this subject, dealing both with the reduction of naval activity in the Pacific and with the elaboration of measures to ensure the safety of sea route in the region, and other matters.

We are in favor of jointly building new, just relations in the Asia-Pacific region with full respect for the right of each nation to live according to its choice, and to resolve its problems independently, in conditions of peace and security. We value highly the developing contacts with the countries of the South Pacific Forum, and think they are natural and useful.

The Soviet Union's signing of the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty is a good example of the interaction of the USSR and the South Pacific states in the interests of peace and security in the region. We continue to be ready for such cooperation and the unification of efforts in the resolution of the common tasks concerning our countries.

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CSO: S200/1197

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA FEATURE ON ENDING NUCLEAR TESTS

PM171043 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 November 1986 First Edition carries on page 5 under the headline "Terminate Nuclear Explosions!" a feature consisting of the following items:

A 300-word TASS dispatch, datelined New York, 14 November, and carried under the headline "Paramount Task of the Present," summarizing a draft resolution on the termination and prohibition of nuclear weapons tests approved by the UN General Assembly's First Committee.

a 120-word item entitled "Our Interview," consisting of an interview with M. (Kalyanasundaram), vice president of the All-India Trade Union Congress, by PRAVDA own correspondent O. Kitsenko, praising the USSR's Reykjavik proposals.

A 150-word TASS dispatch, datelined Canberra, 14 November, carried under the headline "'If There Is Determination and Will,'" based on an AP report of New Zealand's ratification of the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

Two readers' letters under the headline "At the Crossroads of Opinions," the first of which is signed by teacher Ye. Ukleina from Moscow and runs to 250 words. She praises the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests and describes the U.S. "unwillingness to stop testing" as "nothing but unwillingness to disarm and a desire to gain military advantages," expressing the wish that "reason may prevail there at long last."

The second letter, signed by pensioner F. Zhilenko from Kiev, reads as follows:

"The nuclear explosions being carried out in the United States willy-nilly provide food for thought.

"By announcing a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions the Soviet Union ran a certain risk. This is perfectly clear and we make no secret of it. It is also clear that by embarking on such a major initiative, or rather a specific step aimed at curbing the arms race and halting both the quantitative and qualitative growth of nuclear arsenals, our country expected similar actions by the other major nuclear power--the United States. And this is

natural, because only thus could the moratorium fully play its positive role (it would, of course, have been even better if a moratorium had been announced by the other countries possessing nuclear weapons).

"But more than a year has passed and the Washington administration pretends not to have noticed our initiative and behaves, to put it bluntly, in a challenging manner. The question is: Are we not being rather too 'delicate' with the United States? Of course we believe that the party and the government will not allow our country to fall behind in the military sphere. And yet the risk we are running is really considerable. Is it justified under present conditions?"

The feature is completed by the following "Observer's Postscript" by Nikolay Prozhogin:

"The letters we publish today have been taken from the voluminous mailbag received by the PRAVDA editorial office. It seems to me that both opinions expressed in them are justified. It must be said, however, that the number of letters reflecting Soviet people's anxiety for the security of our country and of our friends and allies has been growing recently. This is understandable. As the year's end approaches, so does the expiry of the time for which the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions was extended. Readers ask whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the USSR ought to observe the unilateral moratorium into the new year.

"This question is even more legitimate in view of the fact that officials in Washington are making attempts to present matters as if the USSR expressed total agreement with the U.S. stance on this problem in Reykjavik. The absurdity of such claims is obvious since this would mean agreement to the United States continuing to conduct large-scale work on the improvement of its nuclear weapons and the creation [sozdaniye] of new, space weapons.

"Each new U.S. nuclear explosion is registered not only by seismographs but also by millions of indignant people. They ask for how long the peoples can be provoked by disregarding their unanimous demands.

"The Soviet proposals based on the program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and submitted as a comprehensive package for examination by the U.S. side at Reykjavik are in harmony with these demands. These proposals included the strengthening of the ABM regime and the start of full-scale talks on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. It was this third point of the Soviet proposals that the U.S. side refused to accept, and this blocked the achievement of accord.

"The Soviet proposals remain in force today. Our country will continue to aim for their implementation. As regards the question of nuclear explosions per se and the fate of the moratorium, it will be resolved with due consideration for the U.S. stance on the entire package of problems discussed in Reykjavik. And, of course, with due consideration for the security interests of the Soviet Union and of our allies and friends, in other words with due consideration for the maintenance of the prevailing military-strategic parity. Meanwhile the Soviet moratorium is in effect and it works. And the U.S. Administration still has a chance to join it and display the responsibility befitting a great power."

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM

PM181618 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 1

["Soviet Government Statement" -- IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Almost 18 months have passed since the Soviet Union, in its desire to contribute to terminating the dangerous competition in building up nuclear arsenals and desirous of setting a good example to the other nuclear powers, made the decision to unilaterally terminate all nuclear explosions and called upon the United States to join in this action.

Despite the serious costs [izderzhkii] which the Soviet Union incurred in terms of its own security by extending the moratorium on nuclear explosions time after time, this unilateral measure played an exceptionally important role in international life. It placed on a practical plane the question of ending nuclear tests and together with it other questions of ending the nuclear arms race. The moratorium demonstrated in practice the possibility of taking steps capable of raising effective barriers in the way of the nuclear arms race.

It is a matter of the deepest regret that the present U.S. Administration has simply failed to respond positively to the USSR's call to join in its peace initiative. Totally ignoring the world community's demands contained in UN General Assembly resolutions, the calls by the Nonaligned Movement, the proposals by the leaders of the "Delhi Six," and the opinion of parliaments and the international public, the United States stubbornly continues to implement its nuclear-weapons test programs.

The United States attempted to camouflage its unwillingness to end nuclear tests by all sorts of "arguments," and in particular references to the impossibility of ensuring effective verification [kontrol] of this measure. It is, however, perfectly clear that this is a far-fetched pretext. The Soviet Union is prepared -- and this has been repeatedly stated at the highest level -- for all most rigorous verification [kontroll] measures in this sphere. Such verification [kontrol] would be fully ensured both by national technical means and by means of international procedures, including on-site inspection. The Soviet Union has expressed readiness to take advantage of the assistance offered by the "Delhi Six" countries in verifying [proverka] the end of nuclear tests. It proposed to the United States that it also examine the question of establishing an international supranational verification [kontrol] network.

The U.S. response to all these constructive steps by the USSR demonstrates most obviously that the real point at issue does not concern verification [kontroll] at all. The true reason for the U.S. side's refusal to join the Soviet moratorium -- and people

in Washington can no longer hide this -- is that the United States is openly counting on gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist countries by the creation [sozdaniye] of fundamentally new forms and types of weapons. Not only are new nuclear warheads being developed [razrabatyvayutsya] in the course of the nuclear tests conducted by the United States but strike space-based weapons -- nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers -- are also being created [sozdayutsya] in accordance with the SDI program. Work is being carried out to prepare [po podgotovke] a completely new form of weapon capable of hitting targets in space and on earth.

Naturally, if some people wish to develop [razrabatyvat] increasingly sophisticated types of nuclear arms and implement the "Star Wars" program, and extend the arms race to new spheres, a moratorium means nothing to them. It is precisely a refusal to abandon the plans to gain positions of military superiority through space that explain the U.S. Administration's invariably negative attitude to the Soviet Union's proposal to start fully worthwhile talks which could ban nuclear tests forever.

There is still no sign that the United States is ready to follow the USSR's example and abandon the conducting of nuclear explosions. Moreover, the rate of implementation of U.S. nuclear test programs remains at the previous high level. During the time that the moratorium has been in effect, while silence has reigned at Soviet test sites, the United States has carried out 20 officially announced and 4 unannounced nuclear weapon tests.

Under conditions in which the United States is stubbornly continuing to implement its nuclear test program with a view to creating [sozdaniye] new nuclear arms and building them up, the Soviet Union cannot display one-sided restraint forever. A situation has taken shape which, if continued, is fraught with the danger of serious damage to the security of the USSR and its allies.

After a deep and comprehensive examination of this question the Soviet leadership considers it necessary to state the following.

First. The Soviet Union again proposes the immediate starting of full-scale talks on the total prohibition of nuclear tests. It is prepared to conduct such talks whatever their composition [v lyuboy sostave] and at any forum, with the United States participating, of course. In the course of these talks verification [kontrol] questions must also be resolved in such a way as to ensure reliable compliance with an agreement on this score. In the process of talks on the complete prohibition of nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union could also be prepared to seek agreement on a phased solution to this task, having in mind the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-U.S. treaties and the introduction of interim limitations on the quantity and yield of nuclear explosions.

Second. The USSR is prepared to continue to adhere to its moratorium. However, it will resume nuclear tests after the very first U.S. nuclear explosion in the coming year. [SSSR gotov priderzhivatsya svoego moratoriya i dalshe. Odnako on vozobnovit yadernyye ispytaniya posle pervogo zhe yaderного vzryva SSAhv nastupayushem godu.]

Third. If the United States ends nuclear tests, the USSR, on any day or in any month will be ready to halt the implementation of its program of such tests on the basis of reciprocity.

The decision on the ending by the Soviet Union of its moratorium after the first U.S. nuclear explosion in the coming year is a measure which has been forced upon it, dictated exclusively by security interests. The USSR remains a committed supporter of the complete ending of all nuclear tests as a most important priority measure in the matter of achieving the main objective -- the curbing of the nuclear arms race and the subsequent complete elimination of these arms. As before, the USSR will strive vigorously for the achievement of this objective. It is convinced that its position on this question will meet with due understanding and support from all the peace-loving forces of our planet.

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CSO: 5200/1197

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR COMMENTARY ON NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM END

Foreign Ministry News Conference

LD200148 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1955 GMT 19 Dec 86

[Report with recorded portions on 19 December news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists held at the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry in connection with the 18 December Soviet Government statement on the nuclear testing moratorium; by announcer Yuriy Ulyanov. Video shows, seated at a table: Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister; B.D. Pyadyshev, Foreign Ministry spokesman; and Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces -- program broadcast in place of second "World Today" program]

[Text] [Ulyanov] Today a news conference was held in Moscow in connection with the Soviet Government's decision regarding the moratorium on nuclear tests. Comrade Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, spoke at it, saying in particular:

[Begin recording] [Petrovskiy] The issue of banning nuclear weapons tests has been brought out of the quagmire of technical jargon into the wide open political field. It has been graphically demonstrated that a practical solution to this longstanding urgent problem is fully feasible. And although the United States has provocatively and cynically carried out its nuclear tests 24 times, the moratorium remains a reality; and it will be in effect in the new year, 1987, but only until the United States carries out its first nuclear explosion. The United States is being given yet another opportunity to confirm in deeds the readiness that it has frequently declared in words to have a radical reduction in nuclear armaments. However, if the United States sacrifices this new chance as well to nuclear militarism, then there will be nothing we can do but end our moratorium. I would like to stress, however, that even if we are faced with the need to rescind our moratorium, we have no intention of rejecting the possibility of putting it into effect again as soon as the United States shows readiness to join our efforts in this matter. We are in favor of starting bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks, and a Soviet delegation could embark on such talks at any time and in any place. Finally, we are also ready, if required, for a special international conference to be held to solve the problem of a test ban.

At all these forums, the Soviet Union is proposing that problems of monitoring [kontrol] be tackled in earnest. The proposals by the Soviet Union constitute a resolute call for the moratorium to be retained and for the Nevada test sites to be forced into silence, just as the nuclear test sites in the Soviet Union are silent now.

[Unidentified Japanese correspondent] If the United States is carrying out nuclear blasts for the development of new types of weapons for SDI, then will the Soviet Union, too, develop its own SDI system in the event of the resumption of tests?

[Chervov] This situation has indeed now come about. The United States has renounced the SALT II treaty unilaterally. You know about this. Six new types of strategic offensive armaments are being developed [sozdavat]. It is precisely for this purpose that nuclear tests are being conducted, one after the other, at an accelerated pace. That is to say, not only for the Star Wars program, but also for the developing of new kinds of strategic offensive armaments. We have no such programs, and we are not conducting such tests; we are not developing space shields. The question here is that our strategic and nuclear potential has not fallen behind that of the United States qualitatively. [end recording]

[Ulyanov] And to the question: If the Soviet Union scraps the moratorium, will this not be at variance with the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000? Comrade Petrosyants answered:

[Begin recording] [Petrosyants] The point is that the program for scrapping nuclear weapons put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986 proposes the phased scrapping of nuclear weapons. Therefore, this program remains in force entirely, without any alterations. On the contrary, the Soviet side believes that the sooner we embark on this phased elimination of nuclear weapons the better it will be for all countries in the world, for the whole earth, for our entire planet. Elimination, as you put it, of the moratorium is not really elimination. The moratorium went on in actual fact for 18 months. This is a very long time to wait for another country to understand finally that the path occupied and adopted by the Soviet Union is the right one, the only right one, the only possible path to a phased approach to the scrapping of nuclear weapons.

[Correspondent Beglov] Let us suppose that, nevertheless, the Soviet Union is obliged to resume nuclear tests. In that case, will the scientists from the U.S. Council for the Conservation of Natural Resources be allowed to remain with their seismological equipment in the region of Semipalatinsk?

[Velikhov] The agreement between the Council for the Conservation of the Environment and the USSR Academy of Sciences was signed for 1 year, in July. And when we made a request to the Soviet Government to examine it and allow us to fulfill it, then consent was given for this year. Thus, regardless of the fate of the tests, the joint experiments will continue during this year. [end recording]

[Ulyanov] Will the Soviet Union try to catch up with the United States and make up for its lagging behind?

[Begin recording] [Chervov] Of course, the situation being created from the military point of view is no simple one in Soviet-U.S. relations. But nonetheless what I must tell you is that we have no intention of competing with the United States as to the rate of which nuclear explosions are carried out. Of course, nuclear explosions, particularly after the 18 months of Soviet moratorium, are now directly linked with the maintenance of military equilibrium, and consequently with the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. Therefore, while rejecting competition with the U.S., I think at the same time that solving the question of how often nuclear tests are carried out in the Soviet Union and what direction they will take is wholly and completely the right of the Soviet Government.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent (Nikonorov)] (Nikonorov) of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Several years ago, the United States ended trilateral talks on banning nuclear tests, which were being conducted between the Soviet Union, the UK, and the United States. On that occasion, the West called the main subject of disagreement the issues of monitoring [kontrol]. I would like to hear in more detail what the position is on the question of monitoring today.

[Velikhov] First of all, I would like to say that there have recently been several forums at which the scientific aspects of monitoring tests were discussed. The results can be briefly summed up: It can be said that seismological systems existing today enable an explosion of less than 1 ton [not further specified] of chemical equivalent to be monitored from a distance in the order of hundreds of kilometers; in other words, an amount considerably less than any militarily significant weapons test.

In addition, the supplementation of these systems with satellite monitoring systems also allows monitoring to ensure that neither side can develop in secret. Special devices enable a nuclear explosion to be decoupled, so to speak, from the earth's crust so that seismic detection is not hampered. So we can definitely say today that the existing systems based primarily on seismology enable compliance with a treaty on ending nuclear tests to be reliably monitored. [end recording]

[Ulyanov] At the moment, the Soviet Union is stating the possibility of it resuming tests. What has this new position altered regarding the Reykjavik proposals?

[Begin recording] [Petrovskiy] Strictly speaking, this conception has been expressed in the form of specific proposals as part of the Reykjavik package of agreements. This very position was, as you know, reflected also during the recent visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to Delhi, in the Delhi declaration in particular.

In the present situation, we think it is essential to view the issue of ending nuclear tests together with the attempts by the United States to develop [sozdat] new types of weapons, through nuclear tests, trying to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. Therefore, we still think that a radical reduction in nuclear weapons is virtually impossible as long as this fundamental channel in the race has not even been sealed off -- that is, as long as nuclear tests have not ended. Our position, the new position, set out of the Soviet Government statement, confirms once more the firm foundation of the proposals contained in the Reykjavik package: the necessity to resolve the problem of nuclear arms and ban offensive space-based systems in a single complex, a component of which is the starting of talks on banning nuclear weapons tests.

[Velikhov] I would like to note that, as you see in the Soviet Government's statement, a unique situation has come about. Even if the Soviet Union is forced to halt the moratorium, nonetheless the decision of what to test and how to test will be in the hands of the Soviet Government. But the U.S. President holds the button to the tests in Soviet testing areas. And every time he presses it, he will be making the Soviet warheads directed against the United States more sophisticated. [end recording]

[Ulyanov] The participants in the press conference were asked numerous questions about various aspects of the Soviet Government statement. Then one of the Western journalists asked a question about the further fate of Academician Sakharov:

[Begin Petrovskiy recording] Well, you know, you have anticipated the information that I wanted to announce toward the end of the news conference. Given the subject of our news conference, I would like to officially inform the correspondents gathered here

that Academician Sakharov has requested from the Soviet leadership permission to move to Moscow. That request was examined by the appropriate organizations, including the Academy of Sciences and administrative bodies. In particular, they took into account the fact that Academician Sakharov has been in Gorkiy for a long time, and as a result of the examination of this request it was decided to permit him to return to Moscow. At the same time, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a decision to pardon citizen Bonner. Thus, both Academician Sakharov and Bonner have the opportunity to return to Moscow, and Academician Sakharov can actively join in academic life now in Moscow at the Academy of Sciences. [end recording]

[Ulyanov] At the press conference, replies were given to other questions by Soviet and foreign journalists.

Gerasimov Comments

FL200230 Havana Television Service in Spanish 0100 GMT 20 Dec 86

[Text] At the Soviet Embassy in Havana, the USSR's position was extensively presented to Cuban press journalists who cover that area and to foreign journalists.

A press conference on the USSR's peace policy against the policy of war practiced by the U.S. Administration was granted today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, who also referred to the USSR's unilateral nuclear moratorium.

[Begin Gerasimov recording in Russian with consecutive Spanish translation] It must be said that before the moratorium was declared, the United States was ahead of us in nuclear weapons testing. They conducted approximately 200 more tests than the Soviet Union. Therefore, in a short period of time they achieved a great majority, a great advantage.

Several times we have proposed this moratorium, which will continue until 1 January 1987. At this time, we ask ourselves how we should proceed. As I have said to you before, we have multilaterally analyzed this question and we have reached the conclusion that we cannot continue a unilateral approach because, first of all, we have to act in accordance with the interests of the state's national security and, furthermore, we must take our own public opinion into account. [end recording]

Dubinin Press Conference

LD201035 Moscow TASS in English 1019 GMT 20 Dec 86

[Text] Washington December 20 TASS — The Soviet Union consistently stands for a complete termination of all nuclear tests as a very important first and effective step toward achieving the main goal — curbing the race in nuclear arms and ensuring their subsequent complete elimination.

This principled stand was confirmed at a press conference held in the embassy of the USSR in Washington Friday.

"The Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, introduced in August of 1985, has been repeatedly extended and has now been in force for almost a year and a half," said Yuriy Dubinin, ambassador of the USSR to the U.S. "The

introduction of the moratorium was not an easy step for us. There is a serious stake involved here in terms of the security of the Soviet Union and of its allies."

"In our view, the moratorium was and is one of the most effective practical measures which contribute to the stopping of a dangerous competition in the build up of nuclear arsenals, a good example to other nuclear powers inviting them to act in the same direction. We have repeatedly called upon the United States to join us in this action," he added.

"It is well known what the United States response was. Nuclear explosions continue in Nevada, while the Soviet test ranges remain silent. During the moratorium the United States conducted 24 nuclear tests. In other words, the United States continues to modernize nuclear weapons," the Soviet envoy said.

"The U.S. tried to justify its unwillingness to discontinue nuclear testing by arguing, in particular, that it is impossible to verify this measure effectively. It is a fictional pretext. The Soviet Union is ready for strictest measures of verification in this field. And this has been repeatedly stated at the highest level," Yuriy Dubinin emphasized.

"In an effort to optimally preserve an atmosphere favorable to achieving a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests the Soviet Union again proposes that full-scale negotiations be immediately started on a complete ban on nuclear tests," Yuriy Dubinin specially emphasized.

"The Soviet Union is prepared to conduct such negotiations with any parties and at any forum, naturally, with the participation of the United States. The USSR is willing to further adhere to its moratorium. However, it will have to resume nuclear testing following the first U.S. nuclear explosion next year. Should the U.S. discontinue nuclear testing, the USSR will be ready and willing any day or month to stop the carrying out of its program of such tests on a mutual basis," he said.

"I would like to emphasize that the Soviet Union intends to go on working toward an early achievement of a complete ban on all nuclear tests," the ambassador of the USSR said.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW WEEKLY 'ROUNDTABLE' ON TEST MORATORIUM

LD212112 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 21 Dec 86

[*"International Observers Roundtable" program with political observers Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin and Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobvsh and All-Union Radio commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin]*

[Excerpt] [Levin] Hello, dear comrades! We shall begin our program today with the December 18 statement by the Soviet Government on the nuclear test moratorium. I will not go into the history of this question; you are well aware that our country has extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions four times. But we have now reached a new point at which, while the Soviet Union has not carried out any nuclear tests for more than 500 days--today makes 503 days--the United States has carried out 20 officially announced and 4 unannounced nuclear weapons tests. Although these four tests were not announced, they were however, recorded by the relevant instruments at the disposal of our government, among others, and made public.

In this situation, after a profound and all-round study of the matter, the Soviet leadership came to the conclusion that the following steps must be taken. Let me remind you what they are. First, the Soviet Union is again proposing that full-scale talks be started without delay on the complete banning of nuclear tests. It is ready to hold such talks with any group of participants and at any forum, but naturally with the United States participating. During those talks the questions of monitoring [*kontrol*], among others, must be solved in such a way as to ensure that an agreement on this is properly observed.

[Bovin] Let me interrupt you here. On this point the U.S. is now maneuvering as follows: Over there they have the problem of the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. The Americans are therefore suggesting the following to us: Let's get together for the sole purpose of making amendments to those treaties to improve the monitoring, then we will submit them to Congress and ratify them. However -- and now it gets interesting -- if you don't want to have talks about this, they say, we will still submit them to Congress, and we will still ratify them, but with stipulations. In other words, they are taking a deliberate step to let some of the steam, so to speak, out of public opinion. That's simply a footnote to this point.

[Levin] And it's a substantial footnote. The second point in the Soviet statement is that the USSR is ready to continue its moratorium; however, it will resume its nuclear tests after the very first nuclear explosion in the United States next year. Here it's probably appropriate to add that according to THE WASHINGTON POST, the United States is

planning to carry out its first test next year on January 29, and overall in the first quarter of the year five nuclear explosions are planned. But here the situation depends wholly and completely on what stance the United States will adopt. It is appropriate to mention that literally on the very same day that the Soviet Union made the statement, 130 U.S. congressmen sent a message to President Reagan pressing him to support the Soviet position regarding the moratorium and stop nuclear tests from continuing.

[Kobysh] Allow me to make a little comment, too, on this point, and then we can go on. You said that everything would depend on the stance that the United States would adopt. Of course, we would like to believe that reason prevails and that serious forces...there are various forces at work in the United States: The military-industrial complex is far from being the only force; and as the magazine FORTUNE has just reported -- and this is a very interesting piece of information -- the military-business world is not predominant, and what is more, they calculate that it is reducing the profits of American capitalism.

[Bovin] Well, you don't need a report from the latest magazine to tell you that!

[Kobysh] That's right, you don't. But the thing is that this is what is reported by an organ of American capitalism, and its conclusion is that the most profitable thing for American corporations would be the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. That's something very interesting.

[Bovin] Yes, it is.

[Kobysh] However, the decision will, nevertheless, be made by the powers now standing at the helm, and they have already said that regardless of what the Soviet Union says or does, the United States will continue its nuclear tests. That goes to show that we should not hold excessive hopes, although we are counting very much on the fact that serious forces will take a serious attitude to what was said in the Soviet statement.

[Levin] And right here it is appropriate to mention the third point in the Soviet statement, which says that if the United States ends its nuclear tests, the USSR will be ready on any day of any month, on the basis of reciprocity, to halt the implementation of its test program. So this is the situation taking shape. Both the sincerity of the Soviet Union and its flexibility in approaching the problem of ending nuclear tests are confirmed not just by the Soviet Government statement, but also by the stance which was set forth in particular by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. For, if our comrades recall, the point made there was that we were ready to agree to some sort of scheme, some sort of plan, being developed for a certain number of nuclear tests being carried out, but on condition that talks be started without delay on signing an agreement for the complete banning of such tests.

[Bovin] We had quite a flexible position which contained the provision for a whole number of different versions so as to make it easier for the United States to make some sort of sensible decision. But all the same, they kept to this hard-headedness of theirs, saying no and that's that...

[Levin] And it wasn't at Reykjavik that this hard-headedness started. Almost a year ago, on January 15, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made a statement setting forth a stage-by-stage plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons over the next 15 years, and a great deal of attention was paid in that statement in particular to the problem of ending nuclear explosions. Also in that statement, almost a year ago it was

stressed that it was essential to resume as soon as possible the trilateral talks between the USSR, the United States, and Britain on the complete and universal banning of nuclear weapons tests. That could have been done immediately — that very month. That was what Mikhail Sergeyevich said last January 15. They are avoiding talks, and they are avoiding embarking on the path of completely banning nuclear tests.

[Bovin] It is what could be called the potential of lost opportunities. And after all, just look at how many lost opportunities there have been to change the course of history, to move away from the arms race — first one opportunity, then two, then three...

[Kobysh] Yes, the United States now, the administration, the ruling class, are bearing the enormous political costs of flatly and blindly refusing to join our moratorium. It is evoking a response throughout the world, even in the United States. And why? It is because SDI and basically all these tests are oriented toward experiments and practical work connected with the nuclear triggering of lasers, X-ray lasers. That is the aim of the tests that are now being carried out.

[Levin] And speaking of lost opportunities, it is not only the Soviet Union which advocates the ending of nuclear tests. The Delhi Six are also actively campaigning for this, and the subject was very vividly reflected in the Delhi declaration signed during the visit to India by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Finally there was a very recent event -- the accession by the Soviet Union to the Rarotonga Treaty, the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. This treaty was approved on 6 August 1985, the same day, incidentally, that the Soviet moratorium started, but also a day that has meaning for all of us for another reason. August 6 was the day of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; a reminder, so to speak, of the catastrophic consequences that using nuclear weapons can and has already led to. And so the Soviet Union was the first among the nuclear powers to accede to this treaty, and it pledged to respect the status of the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. But what they are saying in the West — in particular the French newspaper LE MONDE, although its attitude is understandable because it is in that very area, the Mururoa Atoll, that the French carry out their nuclear tests — what they are saying is that it is not in the interests of the West. Here there arises what I would call a very delicate question: What exactly is in the interests of the West? Nuclear explosions being carried out all over the world? Strong-arm pressure on all countries?

[Kobysh] Viktor Nikolayevich, when you were recounting the forces advocating the ending of tests, perhaps it would be worth mentioning the very important, the extraordinarily important position of China.

[Levin] Of course.

[Kobysh] This is of enormous significance, because China is a great power -- it is a nuclear power -- and the very fact that given a definite accord, it agrees to both the ending of tests and to the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether, qualitatively changes the situation. France and Britain will then also be in the same position. And there is one further question, another aspect: According to the calculations of scientists, including U.S. scientists, by the end of this century, about 10, and some even say 11 countries, will possess nuclear weapons...

[Levin, interrupting] Some of them, it seems, already possess them.

[Kobysh] Some, yes...

[Bovin] First of all, don't frighten people...

[Kobysh] I am not frightening people; I am just saying that the problem is acquiring very acute, a very urgent nature. And great dialectics are at work here, because the present U.S. Administration opposes tests and yet it has so far been unwilling to reach agreement on the prohibition and on the elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is in complete solidarity with us on the point that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat for the whole of humanity and that it is a terrible thing. Our positions on this completely coincide. And at all the talks on this issue we have identical documents.

[Bovin] And it is exactly this which is the contradiction in the U.S. position...

[Kobysh] Of course...

[Bovin] ...Because it is impossible on the one hand to oppose proliferation, and on the other to pursue the arms race, which promotes the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And of course this duality of the U.S. position, it...

[Kobysh] It does not add up.

[Bovin] Yes, that is it. Yes, it shows..

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA BRANDT INTERVIEW: SDI, MORATORIUM, NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Sep 86 p 4

[Report on interview with Willy Brandt, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, by correspondent Yu. Yakhontov: "Clear the Obstacles on the Path to Peace"; date and place of interview not given; first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Willy Brandt needs no special introduction. He headed the FRG government which concluded the Moscow and other well known treaties with socialist states. For many years now he has been the Chairman of the Socialist International. At the end of August he was reelected as the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) at its congress in Nurnberg.

He received me in his office in the SPD headquarters in Bonn. Tanned and fit -- one must stretch to believe he is 73 -- Brandt invited me to take a seat at a round table and ask my question.

The world situation? W. Brandt agreed with the fact that there is a basis to the growing anxiety among all peoples.

Does Willy Brandt see a concrete possibility of halting the slide of mankind into the nuclear abyss and turning the development of events in a better direction?

"If I had no hope of this possibility, I would not try to do anything," he answered. "But the threat to peace is enormous. This has to be stated with a feeling of profound concern. We are concerned not only with what we can predict, for example, the militarization of space which is already beginning; there are other dangers which may arise which run counter to the will of the people, such as the results of automation. With regard to Europe, weapons with short flight times, since the ranges are shorter, have been deployed on the continent. In case of a crisis situation or an equipment or human error, there is the serious threat that a weapon might be launched unintentionally."

"Together with my political friends, both in and outside the FRG, the SPD chairman continued, I believe it is absolutely unnecessary to add to the weapons which already exist and justify the threat of new types of weapons,

especially in space. Therefore we decisively support all means of avoiding qualitative changes in the arms race. Much here depends on whether or not the superpowers can come to serious negotiations. If this is possible, I hope that they will establish a barrier to these new types of weapons and not allow the race to develop on a still broader scale."

In answering the question on what the SPD Chairman thinks of the American leadership's refusal to all proposals from the Soviet Union to ban nuclear testing and disarmament, W. Brandt noted that one should bear in mind the developments now taking place in the United States. There is a growing tendency in the Congress not to increase, but to decrease funding for the strategic defensive initiative. There is a process on-going which the president cannot completely control. "I will not exclude," continued my interlocutor, "that under the influence of the serious opinions in Europe and other parts of the world they will to some degree be successful in inducing the United States to change its course. I see that even the Soviet leadership, although they are also very skeptical and I understand this, all the same is not excluding the possibility that the accents in Washington will be reordered."

The SPD Chairman thinks that the Soviet Union is correctly posing the problem on the need to develop a new approach and a new thought process when examining the processes in the world arena.

"I regard the new approach with which we are concerned as having the best prospects. We also think, for example, that general security cannot be maintained by simply reaching a point when you think you are sufficiently armed vis-a-vis a potential enemy and when other legal requirements are considered. It seems to me that the concept of collective security is not just a matter of weapons. We live in a time in which more and more questions require a global answer. There are many problems: ecology, energy, the problem of maintaining the existence of the poorest part of mankind. In other words, I would like to say again that I think the new approach is most promising, but I see that in the meantime--and this is understandable--it has not brought us concrete answers to many questions. Obviously, we must carefully, literally letter by letter, study area by area, sphere by sphere, acting in the belief that this is in its own way a revolution of the mind, delayed but nonetheless imminent," said W. Brandt.

When the conversation turned to the U.S. refusal to join the Soviet moratorium, the SPD Chairman expressed this opinion:

"As long as the U.S. leadership continues to gallop along on the SDI stallion and until this is completed, the logical conclusion that testing will be required for SDI is unavoidable. And this, it seems to me, is the reason that the very good, I think, move by the Soviet Union has not gotten any response at the present time."

"There should be, undoubtedly, universal approval for the fact that the USSR has not become discouraged and has again extended the moratorium in order to use any chance for serious negotiations. But one should keep in mind that the question of testing, for the Americans, is not a question of testing, as such,

but a question of whether they will give up SDI or in any case delay it so that in one round of negotiations it may perhaps or may not resolve how to proceed to mutual satisfaction.

"I again repeat: the main question in negotiations with the United States is not simply tests but tests in connection with new steps on the path of armaments. If it were possible to come to an agreement that all work on SDI could be accomplished without this step or it could be delayed 10 years then another situation would be created for nuclear testing, at least in relation to the reason, which is being put forward as justification. Even if one supposes that this reason is justified, then it all the same loses its persuasiveness.

"I would like to direct attention to something new in the Soviet position which many of us have rated highly, specifically: the agreement of the USSR on various forms of verification. This basically responds to the desires which have long been advanced by the West. As a result of the present Soviet agreement, the positions of the two sides would be much closer if only there were a desire to achieve a positive result," stated W. Brandt.

Then the conversation turned to the question of the role which Europe might play in disarmament and strengthening peace.

"If both superpowers were to come to a definite agreement (so far it does not look as if this will happen, but nonetheless we can not exclude the possibility) then those Europeans who live west of the USSR, in particular, we, who live in Central Europe, all the same can not consider living only with the crumbs off the table of the superpowers. I will elaborate on this concept: there are a great number of things which we can do in addition. For example, the question which was discussed between the SPD and the Socialist Unity Party of (East) Germany (SED) concerning making a part of FRG and GDR territory a nuclear free zone -- similar to the proposal put forward several years ago by the Palme Commission. Or the question of a zone free of chemical weapons including the territory of both German states and the CSSR. There are also other issues.

"I think that the role Europe must play should in some way supplement the role of the superpowers. I am convinced that a Social Democrat government in the FRG, if our party again comes to power, insofar as the two issues mentioned earlier would be able to move still further in the area of concrete steps and not just plans. There are things in which only the great powers have competence and other states can not change them. But the Europeans may do many things and supplement in many ways and, if successful, significantly reduce the number of dangerous points on the path of further development in Europe. For example, we can make our contribution to the matter of removing intermediate range missiles from the continent. Then the possibility of a catastrophe as a result of equipment or human error such as I have already described would automatically be reduced. This especially concerns tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, we insist that they be withdrawn.

"There are other aspects which do not directly relate to security but which promote strengthening peace: cultural, economic, technical, ecological and, of course, political.

"Last year M.S. Gorbachev, during our meeting in Moscow, told me that he understood how much the European states differ because of historical, cultural and other characteristics. He also noted that he saw a difference between the European socialist countries and that this, in his opinion, does not at all interfere with peace. I also think," continued Brandt, "that the different conditions of development might promote a more successful discussion and the solution of practical issues, may be even outside the borders of the blocs. To promote the process which itself in essence is a process that serves peace is a completely viable prospect. But alone nothing can be done.

"If you ask me, what can the FRG do and how it can make a contribution? I would answer:

"I think that the federal government which has been in power since 1983 has not shown exceptional imagination or any special desire to completely take advantage of even those possibilities which exist in negotiations present. It has behaved more like an administrator, while the treaties with the USSR, DDR, and CSSR and, of course, the Treaty on the Basis of Relations with the GDR include reserves which are far from being exhausted. All these treaties, of course, contain elements of the policy of security. These documents state that the treaty participants intend to take such common steps which will help strengthen European and international security.

"This is what we have in mind when my friends and I talk about and come out for the second phase of detente. Everyone knows that detente has to do not with just one element but with a large number on many planes. In speaking of this, I mean that in the future, the federal government must, just as in the past when beginning in 1969 we were in power, seek new approaches and not simply be more or less indifferent. It must seek as yet unlapped reserves either in bilateral or regional forms of cooperation."

"In the FRG it is well understood -- and the SPD government will also confess -- that our country cannot play a leading role in the world arena but in the groupings in which it has entered both in NATO and the EEC and also the West European Union. We have absolutely clearly announced this in the recent SPD Nurnberg Congress.

"But regardless of the fact that the FRG is not a super power it will always choose its position among the many neighbors responsibly. Therefore the initiatives which I support are of the policy of security and strengthening peace are best not taken alone but jointly with others. Concerning things which affect the FRG's vitally important interests such as, for example, the deployment of chemical weapons, then the struggle against them and for the removal of them must be led by us or as a last resort we must oppose it independently. This is completely justified since it concerns our territory and our people.

"Everything else beyond the limits of that indicated must necessarily be done by the FRG along with its European partners. I specifically mean the the partners from West Europe but also those from East Europe since more often we are being connected with them in one or another organizations."

At the end the SPD Chairman noted: He hopes that during the Soviet-American dialog, regardless of great difficulties, it will manage to clear the obstructions blocking the path to a strong peace.

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RELATED ISSUES

CANADA: NDP FORUM DISCUSSES PULLING OUT OF NATO

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 24 Nov 86 p A3

[Article by Ken MacQueen]

[Text]

MONTREAL — Canada should cut itself free from a commercial and military alliance with the United States and other NATO countries, says Remi DeRoo, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Victoria.

He told a nationally-television New Democratic policy forum Saturday that Canada could play a pivotal role between the Soviet Union and the United States by charting an independent foreign policy based on peace and justice.

DeRoo said Canada should tell the superpowers, "We have had enough of you holding the rest of the world hostage for your own commercial and political interests."

In his televised remarks and in a 25-page brief distributed to forum participants in 14 centres across the country, DeRoo, a member of the social affairs commission of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, condemned Canada's participation in the "global war economy."

In his written presentation to the NDP on the weekend, DeRoo also seemed to question Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's free trade initiative with the United States. Despite pressure for closer ties with the U.S., DeRoo said Canada should "affirm her independence as a sovereign state with moral purposes."

"The fact that Canada's economy is closely tied to the U.S. military-based economy has largely limited Canada's ability to promote more independent policies and strategies for economic justice, human rights and nuclear disarmament," DeRoo wrote.

Economic ties and defence-sharing agreements make it difficult to promote human rights in Central American, Southeast Asian and other "repressive regimes operating within American economic or military spheres of influence," DeRoo added.

The bishop's call for greater Canadian independence won enthusiastic applause from the 200 or more people crowded into a University of Montreal lecture hall, which had been converted into a television studio for the broadcast.

The hour-long broadcast, featuring NDP leader Ed Broadbent and a discussion of future policy needs by a panel including DeRoo, and Montreal economists Diane Bellemare and Kristin Shannon, was bounced off satellite into similar halls in major centres across Canada.

The New Democrats already support a policy of pulling out of NATO, as DeRoo suggested, and Broadbent told reporters, "I am completely in accord with that approach."

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RELATED ISSUES

TURKISH ARTICLES ON EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON EUROPE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 23-27 Aug 86

[23 Aug 86]

[Excerpts] The Chernobyl disaster and the subsequent radioactive scare has brought home what might transpire in a probable nuclear war. According to researchers a nuclear war would mean the deaths of 150-160 million people in the U.S. and 100-125 million in the U.S.S.R. This number would be expected to reach 1 billion worldwide, and when the wounded and the effects of radioactive fallout are added the number would be doubled in no time. Meanwhile, as U.S. and U.S.S.R. are busy pressing their 'red buttons', Turkey would be among the most affected, receiving the overflow from the explosions in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that due to the burning effect of the explosions, hundred of thousands of people in Turkey would die in the first few hours, the number increasing, in the longer term, to millions due to radioactive fallout and subsequent diseases.

Pointing out that the actual use of nuclear weapons would amount to suicide, military experts present the following argument:

The superpowers are extremely careful not to confront each other directly in a local crisis. Wars in Korea and Vietnam, Cuban crisis, the occupation of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Afghanistan, the events and fighting in the Middle East are all instances of the superpowers' reluctance to confront each other directly. In the context of mutual avoidance nuclear weapons acquire the function of 'deterrence', alongside their destructive capabilities.

In our research we have consulted foreign sources and sought the views of strategy experts in Turkey, and came up with the following conclusions:

Since the Second World War

During the Second World War targets were all military. Later economic targets gained importance, and increasingly larger targets came into view such as civilian populations and large urban centers. Meanwhile, the debate among experts as to whether "strategic targets, civilian populations or missile silos should be the bombing targets" has finally been resolved. Today, both sides -- that is, U.S. and U.S.S.R. -- think in terms of destroying each other's missile silos.

For instance, lets say one side has 5 thousand megaton of nuclear bombs and the other side has a similar amount. If one side is to attack the other it would have to destroy the missiles silos of its adversary. Thus to prevent such a scenario Reagan's famous Star Wars (SDI) project was launched. According to this project, during an attack the strategic missiles of the Soviets would be destroyed in space without ever reaching America. If the project becomes successful and if the Soviets cannot come up with an equivalent project then Americans would gain an advantage. They would be in a position to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack and still retain their striking capability. According to experts, unless Soviets can manage to steal from America they currently do not have the technology to match this project.

Two Parts of Nuclear War

Experts make a distinction between two types of nuclear war:

1. General nuclear war
2. Limited nuclear war

Consensus among observers is that a limited nuclear war would sooner or later turn into a general nuclear war. Such an operation would rapidly escalate into all-out nuclear war. In a general nuclear war the objective would be to destroy at least three-fourths of the adversary's ICBMs. And the remaining missiles would still be able to perform the defense role. At this point one may well ask whether "the side which strikes first would be in a favorable position." Experts view the issue as follows:

The side which strikes first would undoubtedly be in a better position. In fact, the objective of 'deterrence' is to convince the other side that striking first would not be all that advantageous. Even if the Soviets attack America with all their missiles America would still have enough missiles in hand to strike back at the Soviets. It is called 'second strike'. So long as a country has the second strike capability that would

serve as 'deterrent'. And the Soviet Union possesses that capability.

That more or less describes the notorious 'balance of terror' -- if one side tries to destroy the other and if the other side has enough power to counteract then deterrence prevails. Experts also remind us that if the SDI project becomes successful this would give the advantage to America.

Turkey between East and West

Well, what would become of Turkey which is at the center of all this thanks to its strategic location, if and when a war breaks out? Is it possible for Turkey to become an early target due to its neighbors or geopolitical situation? Strategy experts give the following answers to such questions:

In a war between East and West, Turkey would always be the first target of the Soviet Union. The reason for this is the Straits. Subsequent targets would be the Istanbul region where heavy industry is located, and Ankara, the capital. But if the Russians were to attack Turkey, they would have to assess the damage to themselves arising from the explosions. The wind might constitute a great disadvantage for that country. For example, if the Russians were to explode a bomb over Istanbul they would have to take into account the periodic wind tables indicating direction and force. Even if we assume that they estimated rightly and exploded the bomb on the most propitious day, they would still have to contend with Istanbul which is not known for its predictability. One may find that it had decided upon a southwesterly wind in the middle of the night which would upset all the years of research and calculations. And the clouds loaded with radiation would then head northwards and duly occupy the Russian airspace.

Major targets in the U.S. (strategic bases)



- Strategic bomber bases
- ▲ ICBM installations
- Nuclear submarine bases
- + Ballistic testing ranges

Strategic Attack Targets in the USSR



- ▲ ICBMs
- △ Intermediate range missiles
- Nuclear submarine bases
- + Ballistic testing ranges

[24 Aug 86]

[Excerps] It is said that in the event U.S. suddenly attacks the Soviet Union with its 7,000 megaton stockpile Turkey would be the country affected by the explosions in the first instance. Densely populated industrial cities like Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Diyarbakir and Bursa would be affected greatly. The firing of nuclear warheads to hit the strategic bases in the Caucasus would mean that apart from the scorching effect of the first few hours, radiation will start accumulating in our eastern regions carried by the prevalent air currents. And animals would be dying alongside humans, this in the foodbasket of our country. According to scientists, in a nuclear war Turkey's advantage is being a country of mountains and valleys, and its disadvantage being right next to the U.S.S.R.

Leaving 'balance of terror' aside, what would be the result of a U.S. surprise attack over Soviet Union? Experts respond as follows:

In the present context Soviet missiles would be fired as soon as the U.S. missiles are airborne. But lets assume that Soviets have succumbed to a total surprise attack and fell under the fire of American nuclear weapons during the night. The U.S. attack would consist of ICBMs, tactical missiles, submarine and strategic bombers. It does not follow, however, that all these forces would be unleashed over Soviet soil simultaneously at the push of the red button. Some weapons would be kept in reserve as a strategic calculation, for second strike purposes. The overall result of such an attack is likely to be:

- Destruction of all Soviet strategic and nuclear weapons
- Destruction of the Soviet air force and airfields
- Destruction of all naval bases (except submarines and battleships in high seas. As they are point targets it is very hard to hit them)
- Destruction of all major Soviet cities
- Deaths of over 100 million people at the time of the attack (those in Siberia, thanks to their distance and dispersal patterns, are more lucky in that regard)
- Destruction of all industry, war industry, and research centers

Neighboring Countries

The scorching effect of the attack would start fires in neighboring countries in no time, and radiation would descend upon the people like a nightmare. As was the case in the Chernobyl accident, prevailing winds will favor some countries and destroy others totally. Experts note that villages and smaller towns are likely to be less affected, provided they survive in the

first instance, and those living in mountainous or desert areas would have more chance of survival.

Soviet Attack

When a similar scenario is enacted, this time the Soviets engaging in a surprise attack against U.S., there are likely to be some minor differences:

- Total paralysis of U.S. industry which is located very densely
- Due to higher density of the population the human toll is likely to be higher.

Neighbor on Fire

Describing the effects on the neighbors of the Soviet Union if a nuclear warhead is exploded there, experts say:

In strategy there is a term called 'sanctuary'. This denotes the sacred soil of a country. Between the West and the sanctuary there are the Iron Curtain countries. These serve as a buffer zone between NATO and Soviets. But Turkey borders on the Soviet Union directly. In fact Turkey has borders with the Soviet Union whether it is sea, land or airspace, with the possible exception of the Bulgarian border in the Balkans. (And Bulgaria happens to be a Soviet satellite.) Hence any attack on the Soviet Union will, as Roosevelt used to say, 'start a fire next door'.

Targets in Europe

Experts say that in a war situation the Soviets would initially target the missile sites in Britain and France, to be followed by Germany and the other countries where American bases are to be found. Americans, on the other hand, would first aim at Eastern Germany, and the central European region inside the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union would need to devote only 150 megatons worth of arsenal to deal with the missile sites in Britain and France. As to which Turkish targets the Soviets might focus their attention only they would know.

[26 Aug 86]

[Excerpts] Rays which can penetrate matter are called radiation. There is plenty of radiation in nature. Certain elements continually emit radiation. One rarely comes across doses harmful to humans. Excessive radiation, whatever the source, is harmful. Radiation received during X-ray is harmful but it is not strong enough to have serious consequences. Harmful doses are emitted when a nuclear plant releases radiation or a nuclear

bomb is exploded. All rays emitted from atomic nuclei are known as 'nuclear radiation'. Humans, animals, plants and all inanimate matter are continually subject to a bombardment of radiation. The sun, the stars, rocks, minerals and electricity all emit radiation. But whereas the types of radiation inherent in nature do not harm living things, radiation emitted by man-made equipment like nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons is deadly.

A perpetual source of radiation is radioactivity. This is the name given to a process whereby the excessively charged nucleus of an atom discharges a particle or a group of particles, emitting a shining light or an electromagnetic wave. There are three types of radioactivity:

- Alpha rays
- Beta rays
- Gamma rays

The 102 known chemical elements in nature contain over 1,300 radioactive isotopes. Every radioactive isotope has a certain 'period' (half-life). This is the time required for a radioactive element to lose precisely half its mass due to fission, or as a result of the radioactivity it emits. Hence all elements have their 'half-life' which is a helpful indicator of how many years a certain radioactive pollution is likely to last.

Fallout

Fallout is the process whereby radioactive residues in the atmosphere (which may have been due to a nuclear explosion or breakdown in a nuclear power plant) descending on the earth with varying speeds by means of clouds, rain or dust. There are differences between radiation due to a nuclear reactor accident and radiation due to an explosion of a nuclear bomb. In the former cases radiation is emitted to the atmosphere and partly to the soil and waters in the vicinity. There is no explosive air pressure, no thermal radiation, no electromagnetic bolt, or nuclear radiation. The one thing that might really be worrisome in a nuclear reactor accident is the nuclear fallout. That can threaten life for years depending on the severity of the accident.

The Pollution at Chernobyl

In the Chernobyl accident the plutonium released from the core of the reactor has risen to the atmosphere along with the released hot air. Apart from plutonium a host of other radiation products have leaked to the air, soil and water. Those which are fairly well-known include strontium-90, cesium-137, carbon-14, cripton-85, iodine-131, cobalt-60, iron-59 and tritium. Apart from plutonium-239, the 'half-life' of which is estimated to be 24,000 years, the half-lives of other nuclei average about 50 years. This means that around Chernobyl a phenomenal radioactive pollution has occurred, and this situation is likely to continue for years to come. The pollution in question will inevitably spread by means of air, water and soil, and travel very, very far.

The atmospheric radioactivity loses its potency as it gets farther from ground zero, inversely proportionate to the square of the distance involved, subject to dominant wind patterns. In the Chernobyl case chance has played a role so far as nearby countries are concerned. Countries on the path of radioactive clouds during the accident, and places where rain has fallen in the days immediately after, were exposed to more dangerous levels. The more distant a country is from the scene of the accident the lower the danger level becomes due to the lessening of the radioactive effect while radioactive clouds are propelled by the wind. Yet radioactive pollutants would remain in the atmosphere for years to come.



1. Radiation during first week
2. Radiation appearing after the change in direction of the wind

Fallout: Case of the Bomb

Lets say a 15 megaton bomb has been dropped over Istanbul... The bomb would be a fireball with a 7 km radius, will wreak severe havoc in an area within a 36 km radius and cause medium damage in an area of 70 km radius. Considering a 35 km per hour wind the ashes of a bomb exploded over Istanbul would reach Ankara about 12-14 hours later, and the capital would be showered with ashes. Of those subjected for a period of 36 hours to that shower 15 percent would die immediately, and 30 percent of those living in an elliptic area between the two cities would also meet their ends as a result of the radiation. We wish that neither humanity nor the Turkish nation encounter such a bad fate.

[27 Aug 86]

[Interview with Professor Irfan Urgancioglu, director of Cerrahpasa Medical Faculty Nuclear Energy Center, by correspondent Zeynep Kakinc; date and place not specified]

[Text] We talked to professor Irfan Urgancioglu, director of the Cerrahpasa Medical Faculty Nuclear Energy Center, about the probably dangers of radioactivity in a nuclear war. Here are his answers to our questions:

[Question] In an outbreak of nuclear war how would a U.S. nuclear warhead fired at U.S.S.R. affect Turkey?

[Answer] The way Turkey would be affected by an explosion in a neighboring country would depend on a number of factors like the direction of the wind, the density of the cloud, the amount of radiation it carries and the kind of radioactive elements present.

[Question] Lets assume that a 1 megaton bomb had been exploded 2 km above Istanbul. Apart from the immediate deaths what would the likely side effects be for the people of Istanbul?

[Answer] The bomb produces what we call acute and chronic effects. The number of deaths resulting from acute effects varies. For instance, in Hiroshima 65,000 people died in a 1,400 meter radius, while in Nagasaki 30,000 people lost their lives. That is the total of immediate deaths and those that died within one or two weeks. In a 1,400 meter radius the bomb produces 400 rats of MLD (median lethal dose). Those closer to ground zero die sooner and those relatively distant die slightly later. And there are the delayed effects. For instance, in people who were farther than 1,400 meter the incidence of leukemia increased from 1.5 per ten thousand to 28 per ten thousand.

[Question] What are the symptoms of acute radiation disease?

[Answer] Nausea, vomiting, intestinal disorders, lack of appetite, excessive loss of weight. The severity of the symptoms varies according to the dose received. The effect of radiation depends upon the amount, the period of exposure, and parts of the anatomy that have been exposed.

[Question] Which part of the anatomy is most sensitive to radiation?

[Answer] The most sensitive part is the bone marrow and the least sensitive is the skin.

[Question] How long do the effects of radiation last?

[Answer] We cannot give a figure off hand. Danger exists whether it is the moment of exposure or 20 years later. One may expect to see an increase in the incidence of leukemia.

[Question] What are the ways in which radiation penetrates humans?

[Answer] Breathing, mouth and skin contact. The manner of transmission gains significance according to type of radiation. For instance, we distinguish rays of radiation as alpha-beta-gamma. Then there is neutron. The effective distance of the alpha rays are measured in microns, while beta is measured in millimeters, and gamma in meters. The most dangerous element that can be ingested through both the mouth and the breathing is iodine-131.

[Question] What measures can be taken against it?

[Answer] One should take iodized salt, iodized materials, and keep the thyroid fully saturated with iodine. This could prevent absorption of further iodine that may be radioactive. As to the dangers through skin contact, the best measure is cleanliness.

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